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Today many Christian people find the greatest threat to their existence within the 
growing secularity of western culture. They express less concern about the polemi-
cal differences that divided the church during the days of orthodoxy in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and spend more time wondering about the prospects for 
basic Christianity surviving as a viable force of culture in the future. Indeed, they 
find Jesus expressing this same concern and warning about god-lessness in the 
“latter days,” where the people are living a worldly existence of “eating, drinking, 
marrying, and giving in marriage” (Mt 24:38), without any thought about a higher 
or transcendent calling in life and no fear of any imminent visitation from the 
heavens above (Lk 18:8). Here these Christians find Jesus expressing their same 
concerns over what people these days describe as “secularity.” Today sociologists 
use the term to describe a disposition that finds religious categories irrelevant, that 
interprets the world as a self-sufficient system, containing an autonomous causal 
nexus or immanent force, negating any need for divine intervention, let alone a 
cataclysmic coming of the Messiah. The process of “secularization” is described as 
a tendency to liberate culture from religious authority, control, and significance.1 
Bryan Wilson delineates certain aspects of this process in these “latter days”:
Secularization relates to the diminuation in the social significance of religion. Its 
application covers such things as, the sequestration by political powers of the property 
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and facilities of religious agencies; the shift from religious to secular control of various 
of the erstwhile activities and functions of religion; the decline in the proportion of 
their time, energy and resources which men devote to supra-empirical concerns; the 
decay of religious institutions; the supplanting, in matters of behavior, of religious pre-
cepts by demands that accord with strictly technical criteria; and the gradual replace-
ment of a specifically religious consciousness (which might range from dependence 
on charms, rites, spells, or prayers, to a broadly spiritually-inspired ethical concern) by 
an empirical, rational, instrumental orientation; the abandonment of mythical, poetic, 
and artistic interpretations of nature and society in favor of matter-of-fact description 
and, with it, the rigorous separation of evaluative and emotive dispositions from cog-
nitive and positivistic orientations.2
Modern sociologists spend a great deal of time debating whether the world 
is becoming more and more secular in its outward form. Some reject the religious 
concern over secularity and point to the steadfast nature of religious affections in 
Europe or the high rate of church attendance in the U.S. as indicating a relative sta-
bility in metaphysical beliefs within western civilization.3 They readily admit some 
shift in the paradigm toward non-traditional expressions of inward spirituality, or 
“believing without belonging” to a specific fellowship but also try to broaden their 
tents in defining religiosity to include the non-traditional forms of faith as serious 
expressions and worthy of respect.4 Other scholars are less than impressed with this 
turn toward other forms of faith. They look at the same data and formulate a much 
different interpretation. They see an inevitable decline in religious faith and practice, 
even if new prophetic movements might interrupt the general flow on occasion.5 
There is no definitive proof on either side of the debate, but the so-called 
“secularization thesis” makes good sense for a number of reasons. It seems to many 
observers that the church is losing its former grip on society with declining rates 
of active participation in its denominations and the rise of agnostic, heterodox, and 
non-Christian expressions.6 David Voas provides a detailed analysis of British and 
European surveys from the last decade and finds steady growth within the secular 
subpopulation, the decline of religiosity across generations, and the move away from 
conventional Christian faith and practice. Non-conventional “Christians” possess 
a “fuzzy fidelity” and tend to move toward the growing secular hegemony, while 
those who identify with the new spirituality are not able to deflect the general trend 
and end up displaying the same basic movement toward unbelief.7 Some scholars 
counter the thesis by pointing to America as the great exception,8 but Gallup Polls 
do not support the counterpoint and seem to indicate a slight decline in spirituality 
over the last few decades when considering the downturn in weekly church atten-
dance and specific profession of orthodox faith.9 A recent Pew Research Survey 
finds the number of adults identifying their faith with Christianity has dropped by 
a significant amount from 78.4 percent (2007) to 70.6 percent (2014), with only 
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a slight uptick in non-religious faiths, a decided increase in agnosticism, and the 
millennial generation leading the way.10 Many scholars recognize this trend and 
point to the cultural revolution of the 1960s as providing a major impetus toward 
the general decline in religious expression. They point specifically to the main-
line or “liberal” denominations, who most identified with the cultural message of 
the era and experienced a precipitous drop in membership during the subsequent 
decades.11 They also point to a general trend that goes beyond recent developments 
and has a long legacy and decided momentum within the history of the modern 
western world. One can simply walk through an art gallery and notice the shift in 
focus over the centuries, beginning with iconic religious figures of the Middle Ages, 
proceeding to the realistic portraits of the Italian Renaissance and later period in 
the Netherlands, and ending with the subjective abstractions of inward dispositions, 
characterizing the modern period.12 Direct metaphysical reference is less visible in 
modern times and appears to be declining when examining these works of art, as 
well as other works of literature, music, architecture, and so forth. 
The lack of explicit reference to religion does not imply that its presupposi-
tions have less meaning in the modern world. It might mean that its categories lie 
deeper underneath the surface, outside of any explicit confession of faith in those 
who identify with secularity. For example, Max Weber finds religious presupposi-
tions within capitalism when analyzing the spiritual matrix out of which it arose 
in Europe and America.13 The same might be said of communism, in spite of its 
denigration of religion as the “opiate of the people” and attempt to reduce life unto 
a dialectical and material struggle of economic forces. The outward expression of 
atheism seems to be sincere enough, but it also seems constantly controverted by 
other aspects of communist ideology that most people associate with religious 
ideals or presuppositions: the Communists’ Hegelian/teleological/non-Darwinian 
view of history, marching toward an ultimate, ideological goal; their prophetic call 
to change the world into a new egalitarian image; and their righteous indigna-
tion about the brutal conditions of industry and the exploitation of workers—all 
emphasized within the works of Marx and Engels, even while they continued to 
deny any empathy for religious categories like morality or ultimate meaning.14 In 
fact, the fervor goes beyond simple religious ideals when the Communists embrace 
the work of Marx with cult-like devotion as if finding a unifying, totalitarian, and 
infallible vision within the final seal of prophecy.
[T]he Communist ideology constitutes a mythic framework of life, providing both a 
motivation for idealism and a validation of the existing social order; and the Communist 
party is, sociologically, a church with its own hierarchy, its sacred scriptures, its system of 
dogma, including doctrines of the fall (the development of capitalism) and eschatology 
(the eventual classless society), and having its exegetical disputes and heresies.15 
4 | forces of secularit y in the modern world
The difficulty of identifying communism as religious or secular represents a 
mere example of the problematic nature of formulating simple definitions and cat-
egories confronting all interpretations in the postmodern world. Terms tend to slip 
and slide between simple categories for those who follow the modern understand-
ing of hermeneutics, making it difficult to circumscribe meaning definitively and 
designate a final construct once and for all. Terms like “religion” and “secularity” no 
longer present a specific Platonic form or eternal essence to the modern intellect 
and live within a community of other ambiguous terms, providing space for any 
interpreter to work within the ambiguity and deconstruct the material in a fresh or 
unique way. The range of interpretive possibilities answers to the complexity and 
fluidity of the real world, which remains in a cacophony of many conflicting and 
competing forces, entangled with each other in producing its results and causing 
even a Christian like Martin Luther to speak of his own life as caught between 
God and the devil—simul iustus et peccator.16 Religious and secular matters are dif-
ficult to separate in this world, beyond the capricious labels of those who try and 
limit real life to ideal forms, often for ideological considerations. 
It is within this caveat that one can proceed forward with a discussion of 
secularity and venture to list some of its important forces. The forces ever remain 
ambiguous within their more complicated nature and are subject to much interpre-
tation. One can only look at them from a certain angle, which most people seem to 
interpret or identify with secularity and its power to eliminate the significance and 
authority of religion in their lives; and one can only list some of them in providing 
a certain definitive form, given the vast scope of life and its numerous forces. It is 
not possible for any work to provide a definitive list, but it is possible to provide 
a representative sample of some important intellectual and social influences that 
have caused many people to move away from a religious perspective of the world 
and illuminate the process of secularization in significant ways. Within this spirit, 
the present study has chosen to illustrate the process in the realm of economics, 
science, history, and politics. It discusses modern expressions of these subjects and 
divides the discussion into three representative types of secularity: the first repre-
senting a disturbing intellectual reality in the realm of economics and science that 
caused people to doubt their faith and accommodate secular forces in understand-
ing the world (chapters one and two); the second represents a growing cultural bias 
in history and science that made people look at the world through different lenses 
(chapters three, four, and five); and the third a more coercive political force that 
reduced the influence of religion and impelled society to embrace a more secular 
image of itself and corporate life (chapters six and seven). Of course, the types only 
serve as a tool in revealing the impetus toward secularity and guiding the reader 
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through the maze of human experience, which always remains ambiguous or slips 
and slides between simple categories.
The first chapter discusses the spiritual crisis that followed the new under-
standing of the world in terms of acquisitive or laissez-faire capitalistic forces in 
the seventeenth century. The chapter starts with the Jansenists and their recog-
nition that self-interest served the community just as well as the typical altruistic 
motives of Christian charity in causing people to act civil, kind, just, and honest. 
Self-interest served society in stimulating commerce and circulating goods in 
meeting the needs of others, without resorting to acts of charity or requiring the 
government to interfere with the process and impose typical religious values. 
This concept of self-interest brought a spiritual crisis over the next two centu-
ries in western civilization as many early capitalists saw life developing well-enough 
on its own terms through the happenstance of individual struggle or self-interest, 
without the need for the typical religious or moral categories to meddle into its 
affairs. Many tried to handle the spiritual crisis by creating a severe dichotomy 
between faith and reason. Pierre Bayle accepted the verdict of the new acquisitive 
capitalism in recognizing that self-interest was sometimes more useful in promot-
ing the welfare of the state than the typical virtues of austere and strict Christian 
piety. While he continued to preserve a place for religion, he did so at the expense 
of his philosophical musings by resorting to his Reformed understanding of faith 
and claiming that reason cannot penetrate its mysteries; but he was troubled by the 
disturbing way in which the real world seemed to work.
This same problem also haunted the work of Bernard Mandeville, the great 
apostle of early acquisitive capitalism, a Reformed Christian, and disciple of Bayle. 
In the Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits, he saw the world in dark 
terms, following the Augustinian tradition of the Jansenists, the growing cynicism 
of French culture, and his own religious background as a Huguenot/Calvinist. He 
lamented the absence of true Christian virtues in the real world and was willing 
to admit in the spirit of Realpolitik that “no society can be rais’d into a rich and 
mighty kingdom, …, without the Vices of Man.” This social analysis presented a 
disturbing reality for him, even if he ended up persevering in his Reformed faith 
much like Bayle; He refused to take his rational analysis with utmost seriousness 
and continued to take refuge in the superior wisdom of divine revelation and dis-
count his limited conception of the real world and its inner workings. Both Bayle 
and Mandeville continued to profess the Christian faith, while abandoning the 
medieval dictum of “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum), find-
ing a more autonomous role for reason in separating its concepts and analysis from 
the realm of faith and forwarding a different and secular view of reality. 
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The second chapter discusses one of the more disturbing applications of 
acquisitive capitalism in developing the pitiless world of Social Darwinism and 
challenging the old moral reaction to human misery as counterproductive. This 
new approach to social issues received an early impetus from the work of Thomas 
Malthus (1766–1834), a Cambridge mathematician and rector of a parish. Mal-
thus simply took a number of basic ideas from the acquisitive capitalism of Adam 
Smith and expanded them into a more sober and arresting view of life, as embod-
ied in his controversial work, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798)—a 
book that “haunted,” “overshadowed,” and “darkened all English life for seventy 
years,” according to its critics. His basic thesis stated that a population tends to 
increase in a “geometric ratio,” while “subsistence increases in only an arithmetrical 
ratio,” causing a “strong and constantly operating check on population from the 
difficulty of subsistence,” which can hardly keep up with the growth. Malthus 
found it wise for the government to practice a laissez-faire policy and let nature 
take its course without trying to alter what works best on its own principles. Poor-
laws involving public and private assistance only helped a few misfortunate souls 
and had no effect on the problem of starvation in the country among the general 
populace. Handing out money only helped those who received it, without increas-
ing production, and made those who received nothing from the program starve by 
forcing them to pay more and more for less and less food according to the law of 
supply and demand.
This theory provided a significant impetus for Charles Darwin in developing 
his theory of evolution. In his writings, he clearly borrowed Mandeville’s anal-
ogy of a ship to illustrate his basic mechanism of evolutionary development and 
show how life can evolve in a piecemeal manner through a step-by-step process of 
trial and error, without an end in view or antecedent design, just like Mandeville’s 
concept of capitalism. He also spoke of Malthus’ significant influence upon him 
in developing the theory of natural selection in some passages. He spoke in these 
places of his fundamental agreement with Malthus concerning the geometric 
expansion of the species and the natural check upon the expansion, leading to 
starvation and selection. Malthus helped Darwin understand the importance of 
struggle within nature in evolving the species by showing the difficulty of sup-
porting a large offspring in an environment and allowing the strong to triumph 
over the weak. Darwin even followed the Malthusian social program at times in 
rejecting human intervention on behalf of the weak, finding poor-laws and asy-
lums “highly injurious to the race of man” and counterproductive to achieving the 
ultimate triumph of the strong.
In Social Darwinism, the dogma of non-interference was made complete in 
its rejection of typical religious sensibilities. For Malthus, suffering was a simple 
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fact of life and worked well on its own terms in controlling the population, with-
out the government intervening and messing things up through acts of charity. 
For Darwin, life was like a ship, which evolved through the everyday struggles of 
self-preservation and found no need for creative planning or outside orchestration; 
thus, exorcizing the presence of God from any meaningful role in the development 
of humankind.
The third chapter considers the secular bias in the modern construction of 
history by examining some of its seminal works: Voltaire’s Essai sur le moeurs, 
Raynal’s L’Histoire philosophique et politique, Michelet’s Histoire de la Révolution 
francaise, Hume’s History of England, and Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire. Voltaire, Raynal, and Michelet clearly developed their “philosophical his-
tory” in accordance with their own enlightened bias against the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, or the religious sensibilities of most people. They conceived of history 
as leading western civilization in a teleological manner toward the present era of 
enlightened culture and leaving the intolerance and bigotry of the church behind. 
The Middle Ages was deprecated as a time of ignorance and darkness, filled with 
papal intrigues and superstitious dogma, with little appreciation for the overall 
mission of the church or its positive impact upon culture. The Italian Renais-
sance helped rescue Europe from the “Dark Ages” by diminishing the role of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition and rediscovering the tolerant and philosophical roots 
of western civilization in Graeco-Roman culture. England set the standard for 
enlightened government in the modern world and helped inspire its ascension in 
France during the Third Republic. Throughout this history, the philosophes treated 
the church as the great enemy of the French people and expressed no real appre-
ciation or understanding of the decisive and all-important role that Puritans, Jan-
senists, and other religious groups played in developing the modern concept of 
government and social norms. 
The great English historians displayed a more complex and objective approach 
to their analysis than the philosophes, although the bias against the church remained 
and tainted the general drift of their historiography. Hume made the most con-
certed effort in striving to preserve objectivity and was willing to give fundamental 
credit to the Puritans for establishing modern liberties in England, but his praise 
remained grudging in failing to link the social upheaval with distinct religious 
ideas. He was too much of an atheist to respect the importance of Puritan the-
ology in fueling the change and too much of a Royalist and a Tory to appreciate 
the Puritan Revolution as a necessary birth pang in producing the new order. He 
preferred to work within time-tested traditions of the country and participate in a 
slow, gradual evolution of existing social institutions than create a radical upheaval 
or a whole new world. Gibbon also was a Tory and tended to lose objectivity 
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when discussing religious zealotry and its penchant for creating theological dis-
putes and bringing unrest to social order over metaphysical ideas. He wrote his 
famous book on The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire with the 
distinct enlightened agenda of deprecating the Christian religion for destroying 
the greatness of a superior culture and replacing it with a millennium of fanatical 
piety and hierarchical corruption. At times, he protested the accusation of bias 
from the Christian community and said that he merely wanted to explain the 
collapse of Rome from a horizontal perspective, pointing to “secondary causes” as 
the reason for the ascension of the church in society, but it was hard to disguise the 
underlying bias. Even this “objective” and “secular” approach had a surreptitious 
way of making the supernatural accounts of the past and those who believed them 
look fanatical in explaining the “miraculous” growth and ultimate triumph of the 
church. 
The fourth chapter discusses the development of a secular or mechanistic view 
of the universe in science and the subjective nature of this interpretation. The 
Puritans supplied an early impetus toward the secular point of view by dividing the 
study of nature from ultimate questions and so provided a pretext for others to pro-
ceed further and reduce life to naturalistic explanations. René Descartes presented 
the classical statement of the viewpoint by filling space with a plenum or body-like 
extension and rejecting the free movement of objects within the machine—shut-
ting out any room for divine presence or activity in the world. Many sons of the 
Enlightenment promoted this mechanistic view of the universe in the name of 
science, but went beyond their limited, metaphysical purview in establishing the 
concept, and often misused the physics of Isaac Newton to do so. Newton clearly 
had nothing to do with it. He explicitly rejected Descartes’ mechanistic concept 
of the universe and its view of God as a “retired engineer.” He thought of God as 
present throughout the world and acting upon bodies as a spiritual force, even per-
forming miracles on extraordinary occasions, unconstrained by the “eternal laws” 
of a “cosmic machine.” Newton’s metaphysical explanation was ignored by the sons 
of the Enlightenment, who preferred to misuse his physics and promote a secular 
view of life in terms of a self-sufficient machine. Their concept only ascended to 
the forefront of intelligentsia as a cultural bias, rather than a strict scientific judg-
ment or direct empirical vision of the world. The sons of the Enlightenment were 
unable to demonstrate their point of view in any definite way since the relation or 
mechanism of causality ever remained beyond observation. David Hume provided 
the most scintillating criticism of the viewpoint by showing how the precise rela-
tion of the causal nexus escapes our rational capacity or empirical analysis, plac-
ing a question mark on all possible metaphysical explanations in general, whether 
the philosophes’ or Newton’s. His analysis led to a more subjective understanding 
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of human knowledge and recognition in the postmodern world that any secular 
interpretation of physics is little more than a metaphysical leap into the unknown, 
based on the subjective, non-scientific preferences of culture. This postmodern 
analysis runs counter to the secular bias of Quantum theory, which attempts to 
replace mystical forces in physics and interpret attraction and repulsion as an 
exchange of particles. Quantum theory seeks to replace Newton’s mystical force of 
“gravity” with a “graviton” in trying to explain the problem of action at a distance.
The fifth chapter addresses the age-old problem of innocent suffering and 
its role in exorcizing the presence of God from the modern understanding of the 
world. The Puritans embodied the religious perspective of the old school by inter-
preting horrific events as visible signs of divine displeasure in accordance with 
the book of Deuteronomy, bringing judgment upon the wicked and serving as 
a warning to God’s people about fulfilling their mission in the world. This per-
spective was developed out of the Puritan emphasis upon OT Scripture and its 
fundamental view of history, but it always lived in tension with other aspects of the 
Reformed tradition, consonant with the theology of John Calvin, which saw the 
ways of God as mysterious and beyond human scrutiny. Even the OT was unable 
to support a simple version of the old theory without some form of reservation or 
protest from those who saw certain injustices in life as Job, or the preacher of the 
assembly in Ecclesiastes. For many people in Europe, the Lisbon earthquake of 
1755 proved to be a pivotal point in questioning the basic view of life in the OT, 
with Voltaire wondering about the goodness of creation, John Mitchell limiting 
the discussion of tragic events to the phenomenological level, and much of the 
world wanting practical advice to avoid future catastrophes that dispensed with 
philosophical debates over theodicy or measures to propitiate divine wrath alto-
gether. Even the Jewish community dispensed with the OT explanation for the 
most part, particularly after the Holocaust. The majority considered the Holocaust 
a unique event in human history, which had no rational explanation or possible 
basis within the sins of the Jewish people, ending all future belief in the providen-
tial dealings of God. Their faith imploded over the Epicurean triangle, finding the 
existence of YHWH incompatible with the magnitude of the evil. They rejected 
any possible solution or justification, including the emphasis of so many modern 
theologians in the Jewish and Christian community upon the presence of God in 
the midst of suffering. 
Chapter six speaks of a more coercive form of secularism in the realm of pol-
itics and centers upon its development in America. This secular mentality first 
developed out of the early English Deists, French philosophes, and their disdain for 
revealed religion. They considered Christian theological tenets as offering little 
more than metaphysical mumbo-jumbo and containing no clear relevance to the 
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practical and moral needs of society. Thomas Jefferson followed their basic under-
standing in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, referring to religion as 
a “matter which lies solely between Man & his God,” calling for a “wall of sepa-
ration between church and state,” and thereby placing the church on the outskirts 
of political power and promoting a secular vision of life through the state that 
was consonant with the Deist concept of human autonomy. In his more militant 
moments, Jefferson thought of the church as creating turmoil in society and spilling 
“oceans of blood” over petty doctrinal issues and worked to eliminate its influence 
on society. He hoped the future would undergo a “quiet euthanasia” of Christianity 
and worked to this end as the father of public education in America, eliminating 
Christian instruction from the classroom and promoting Graeco-Roman anteced-
ents as the real foundation of modern culture, not the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
However, this “darker” side of Jefferson clearly lived in tension with other views 
of religion that he expressed periodically throughout his career. The other side of 
Jefferson thought of religion in different terms as providing a moral foundation 
for society. He expressed this conviction most famously in his Declaration of Inde-
pendence, where he found the fundamental purpose of government serving the 
God-given rights of natural revelation, just like John Locke. He also wanted to 
promote religion at times by enacting Puritan-type traditions like fasting, prayer, 
and Sabbatarian laws while serving as a legislator and governor in the state of 
Virginia. These and other illustrations demonstrate that Jefferson was not a simple 
monolith on the issue of church/state relations. 
Chapter seven discusses the subsequent relation between church and state in 
America, and the eventual emergence of the strict separation concept of secular-
ism as the fundamental paradigm. The Constitution rejected the establishment 
of a national church in America, but its most literal and historical reading made 
no explicit provision for creating a broader separation between the government 
and religion. It was not until 1947 that the United States Supreme Court decided 
to deconstruct the First Amendment in accordance with the new hermeneutical 
principles of the day and consecrate Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Asso-
ciation as the authoritative interpretation of the text in calling for a “wall” of sep-
aration between church and state, which is “high” and “impregnable.” Since then, 
the Court experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining its wall and ended 
up reducing the metaphor of a “wall” to a “line,” which is “blurred, indistinct, and 
variable.” Lately, the Court has displayed a willingness to accommodate religious 
expression in public places, but it remains steadfast in forwarding the basic secu-
lar agenda of rejecting any “endorsement of religion” in the state and thinking of 
the government as serving a “secular purpose.” It typically uses an argumentum ex 
ignorantia to dismiss the importance of religion and label its own values as secular, 
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without displaying any serious historical analysis or philosophical justification for 
doing so beyond the will to power. The argumentum ex ignorantia asks the people 
to forget any connection of the secular establishment with religious history or ide-
ology in order to privilege the values of the Court as an essential part of the nation 
and outside the fanatical realm of religion. The Court enters the cultural war on 
behalf of secularity in an attempt to denude life of religious meaning.
To develop the sample of secular forces in sufficient detail, the study has 
chosen to neglect other significant areas of research that are worth exploring. Some 
of these other forces will receive a fuller analysis in the next volume of the series. 
They are listed below to offer a more comprehensive view of what remains unde-
veloped in the present volume and provide a fuller appreciation and anticipation of 
what is forth coming in the series on modern secularity. The first three examples 
speak of a new intellectual reality; the next four a growing bias or subjective way 
of looking at the world; and the last one a more coercive social or political force. 
Here is what the reader might anticipate in the next volume: 
One, the modern world has witnessed the rise of skepticism in the philosophical 
community regarding religious matters, silencing God-talk as no longer a part of the 
discipline. Immanuel Kant showed the limits of reason by rejecting any definitive 
proof or knowledge of God and treating metaphysical or noumenal ideas as unsub-
stantiated presuppositions. Ludwig Wittgenstein went even further and placed any-
thing outside the concrete world of existence as defying the logic of language and 
off-limits for rigorous professional philosophy. He begins his Tractatus saying, “The 
World is all that is the case”; He ends by dismissing all metaphysical questions as 
nonsensical, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”17 
Two, the plausibility of former religious expressions has collapsed under 
the weight of scientific and historical scrutiny of the literal message.18 The story 
of Adam and Eve lost credibility to the Darwinian explanation of human ori-
gins; the story of Noah to the discovery of the Gilgamesh Epic as its basis in the 
myth-making world of the ancient Mesopotamian region. German higher criti-
cism spoke of the non-Mosaic origins of the Pentateuch, the mythological nature 
of biblical miracles, and the many contradictions within the Synoptic Gospels,19 
forcing the liberal side of the church to compromise its message and the conser-
vative side to live on the fringes of respectable society and modern scholarship. 
Unlike many other religions, the message of Christianity was based upon events 
that transpired in space and time (Lk 3:1–3, 1 Cor 15) and lost credibility when its 
history was challenged or reduced to a myth.20
Three, the need for religion tended to dissipate as dependence upon technol-
ogy increased. One notices this progression when studying religiosity in various 
types of societies. “For example, the proportion of the population that attends 
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Church (or the equivalent) at least weekly is 44 percent for agrarian, 25 for indus-
trial and 20 for post-industrial societies. Those who ‘pray each day’ declines from 
52 percent in agrarian to 34 in industrial to 26 in post-industrial societies.”21 
Voas notes that nineteen of the twenty most technological nations are “becom-
ing increasingly secular,” with the lone exception of America.22 The increase in 
technological know-how leads society to search for answers within their expertise, 
rather than hope for some mystical or miraculous intervention from beyond. It 
causes them to fight HIV/AIDS within the laboratory, rather than speak of divine 
wrath and promote acts of penance in the hope of appeasing the heavens, like the 
Flagellants of the Middle Ages.23 
Four, the rise of psychology or emphasis upon the inner self tended to negate the 
potency of outside powers—whether spiritual or nonspiritual. Sigmund Freud dis-
missed religious ideas as the mere product of illusions that develop from the “stron-
gest and most urgent wishes of mankind.” He thought these ideas correspond to the 
helpless longing of children, looking for a benevolent father to protect their lives 
from the brutal realities of the world, except extending this childish need to the rest 
of life.24 Today, postmodernists follow this psychoanalytic program to its final desti-
nation and erase the distinction between the subject and object. Charles Taylor says 
that this modern/postmodern self shapes its own reality and completely “buffers” 
itself against outside influences in the form of spirits or causal forces in general. No 
external agent or Platonic form constitutes its reality. The individual is left to explore 
the inner realm of thought and feeling, developing a “rich vocabulary of interioriza-
tion” in the process, unrelated to external objective knowledge.25
Five, nominalism of the late medieval period developed a dichotomy between 
God and the world. In so emphasizing the absolute power of God (potentia dei 
absoluta), the world lost much of its relation to God. It became the product of a 
capricious divine will and no longer revealed anything essential about a God who 
was able to produce something much different from what was created through 
ordained power (potentia ordinata). Objects lost their Platonic forms and received 
only capricious names (nomina) that possessed no ultimate or revelatory meaning. 
There was no evidence of God’s existence or essence in the world.26 
Six, NT Christianity tended to limit its message to matters of personal faith 
and conviction, and leave legal rigor or the specifics of social living outside the 
parameters of the faith (Gal 5:1, 2; Rom 14:23; Col 3:23). Early Christianity 
rejected legalism in personal living and spurned any specific application of its 
message to political or social concerns ( Jn 18:36; Rom 13:1–5; 1 Cor 7:20–24), 
leaving much space for its people to live their own individual lives before God, or 
separate their lives from specific religious demands in accordance with the pattern 
of western civilization.27 Secular tendencies prevailed in the west under the space 
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of its dominant religion—a belief system that extolled freedom in its foundational 
documents and continues to live in marked contrast with many other religious 
expressions, which emphasize the complete nature of their revelation, the social 
direction of their message, and the process of legalization in developing practical 
application, stressing orthopraxy over orthodoxy. 
Seven, the “liberal progressive” spirit has risen in popular culture. It thinks of 
traditional religion as based on the unconfirmed reports of people who were more 
ignorant than us.28 It tends to champion the “new” and “improved,” while deni-
grating the old as “backward,” including the “superstitions” of the past.29 It sees 
human culture evolving in a non-Darwinian manner toward higher forms of life, 
often pointing to the advances of technology as the paradigm for believing that all 
areas of life make similar progress toward the future. Its spirit follows the dictum 
of George Hegel: “World history [is] the world court of judgment.”30
Eight, “liberal toleration” has triumphed in modern culture with its tendency 
to dismiss theology or specific religious confession as a form of divisiveness and 
bigotry. The common schools and many American universities followed this trend 
at the end of the nineteenth century toward the nontheological, nonsectarian 
policy of inclusion to boost enrollment and eventually evolved into secular schools 
that tended to undermine and sometimes demean conservative believers.31 Liberal 
toleration has a commission to fight bigotry, or live in the problematic paradox 
of not tolerating intolerance.32 Societalization means acceptance and elimination 
of cultural diversity, often undermining serious religious confession.33 Hollywood 
might serve as a greater force of secularity in America than the government or the 
public school system in pushing liberal toleration, with its acceptance of diverse 
sexual expressions and other non-traditional values.
These are just some of the possibilities that come to mind when discussing 
the process of secularization. Instead of trying to discuss them all and the many 
other possible forces superficially, the study has chosen to examine in some depth 
a few examples that serve as representative types of secularity and provide a gen-
eral survey of the subject in this manner. The typology should serve as its own et 
cetera in allowing the reader to fill in the gaps with other examples, which are often 
implied or specifically mentioned within the text as a part of the discussion. 
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I. 
The Spiritual Crisis of  
Early Capitalism

c h a p t e r  o n e
The modern world brought a challenge to the religious and ethical categories of 
the metaphysical past in understanding how life worked in the real world and 
evolved on its terms, apart from outside rational intervention or moral restraints. 
Many advocates of an early form of capitalism came to argue that the economy 
worked well through its natural laws, apart from the government interfering with 
the basic flow of commerce; that questionable motives like self-interest often 
worked for the benefit of society and fueled the economy, alleviating any religious 
onus to cleanse the world from sin; that value was best determined by the law of 
supply and demand, freeing society from moral considerations in finding a just 
price or wage. This new type of economic thinking suggested the possibility of 
interpreting life in general as a secular process. It found little need to follow a 
metaphysical standard or posit that a miraculous force is intervening in the course 
of things to provide the world with design, purpose, or direction, and allowed life 
to use its efficacious means of producing results, regardless of intent or foresight. 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution looked to the economic insights of the early 
capitalists and thought of life developing in a similar manner through the happen-
stance of individual struggle or self-interest. Social Darwinism combined the new 
economic and biological theories, showing their mutual dependence and proclivity 
to excise the need for religious categories from the modern world. While some 
continued to use and merge the old religious terms with these theories, the new 
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type of capitalistic thinking in its most literal form showed little need for moral 
categories to correct the way life evolved on its terms, or interject the existence of 
God to meddle into the affairs of what worked best from its chaotic proclivities 
toward higher forms. The old religious categories proved ineffectual in describing 
or enhancing the actual processes of life in the real world. Hereafter the secular 
capitalists could justify pursuing their own self-interest, or struggling for their 
existence and amelioration without suffering any severe pangs from a moral or 
religious conscience, believing it all worked out in the grand scheme of things, 
apart from any antecedent design or individual intent and motive. 
Christian Altruism
Of course, there were other ways of understanding and deconstructing capitalism in 
the modern world. Max Weber, the great sociologist of the last century, devoted a 
couple of famous articles in 1904–5 to the subject, rejecting the Marxist propensity 
to reduce all ideology to materialistic interests and interpreting capitalism in terms 
of a religious calling—at least in the early stages of its maturation. His interpre-
tation emphasized the importance of the “Protestant work ethic” as providing the 
spiritual matrix for the development of capitalism, highlighting its exhortation to 
spurn an idle and cloistered life of monastic contemplation and serve God within 
the community through one’s profession (Beruf) or calling in the business world. In 
particular, the Puritans embodied this “worldly asceticism” of modern capitalism 
by emphasizing Luther’s priesthood of the believers and its special calling of each 
believer to fulfill their mission within the “hustle and bustle” of everyday life. Their 
divines rejected any sacramental means of cheap grace in receiving forgiveness and 
obtaining a propitious standing before God and encouraged the faithful to find 
assurance through working hard within the community—the true and only sign 
of divine grace and election. They found salvation outside of religious rituals in 
active community engagement and considered idleness the root of all evil, even 
the idleness of religious speculation, contemplation, and devotion. They especially 
despised the rich of their community for squandering their lives on frivolous enter-
tainment like “sporting or gaming,” exhorting them to repent of narcissistic pursuits 
and invest their time and capital in helping create a better world for others. The 
Puritans’ form of capitalism shunned a life of pursuing self-interests in exercises of 
individual religious piety or hedonistic amusements of self-indulgence, preferring 
their people to lead an austere life of self-discipline and pursue altruistic and utili-
tarian goals of useful service in improving the society, believing that God’s people 
were involved in a historical process of creating a better world for their children.1
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The Puritans reflected the spirit of capitalism not merely through hard work or worldly 
asceticism—the hallmark of Weber’s treatment—but also through their willingness to 
surrender present day security, take risks, and create something new and better in the 
future. They believed that change was good, the future was good, and they possessed 
a manifest destiny before God to bring all good things to pass. They were part of a 
historical process that would culminate in the dawning of the Kingdom of God.2
This vision of capitalism is rooted in the Christian concept of altruism or self- 
sacrifice and presents a clear alternative to the typical acquisitive image of capital-
ism associated with modern secular times and its emphasis upon self-interest.3 The 
difference is similar to the way in which Anders Nygren opposes two basic con-
cepts of love in Paul and Plato within his classic, two-volume work on the subject, 
Agape and Eros (1930–36).4 Following the analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche, he says 
that Christianity brought a “transvaluation” of ancient values through its central 
doctrine of agapē or self-sacrificing love, overturning the Graeco-Roman emphasis 
upon eros or self-love.5 The original Pauline doctrine of agapē contradicted the 
eros-motif of Plato and the later schools of Platonism in the most uncompro-
mising terms, even if the church ended up producing a synthesis between them 
in the course of time through the process of Hellenization.6 Eros was “essentially 
and in principle self-love.”7 Eros was an egocentric, acquisitive longing to pos-
sess an object of desire, motivated by the will to obtain individual eudaemonia 
or happiness through something valuable or worthy of esteem. The eros-motif of 
Neo-Platonism emphasized climbing a “ladder” upward to the heavenly realm in 
longing for complete union with the divine as the true object of human happiness.8 
The divine reality remained aloof from the process of history and encased within 
a self-satisfied state of blessed eros, while the soul remained entrapped within an 
imperfect state, longing to satisfy its needs and ascend toward the ultimate reality 
for its natural and complete fulfillment.9 
Nygren argues that Paul rejected this concept of eros when he put forth agapē as 
the central teaching of Christianity and the cross of Christ as the clearest example 
of its sacrificial nature (Rom 5:6–8).10 He says that agapē emphasizes the love of 
God and understands it as a creative act, which creates fellowship with others ex 
nihilo, “indifferent to value” in the objects of its affection and unmotivated by the 
attractiveness of others.11 Human beings only reflect the divine image by creating 
new relationships in the same spontaneous manner and proceeding to love others 
outside their worth as neighbors or enemies.12 Agapē does not look for some divine 
spark of value within others as if finding something worthy of esteem.13 It does not 
even long for God as the most satisfying object (Summum Bonum) of all as if seeking 
to obtain something from God.14 “Agape recognizes no kind of self-love as legiti-
mate” and “spells judgment on the life that centres round the ego and its interests.”15 
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Self-love is the natural perversity of human beings, and agapē requires the death of 
self-centeredness to find the true self within the death and resurrection of Christ.16 
According to Nygen, this NT concept of agapē was corrupted through the 
pervasive influence of Hellenism in the church, and the chief culprit for infect-
ing the Christian faith with eros was Augustine due to the enormity of his stat-
ure and influence.17 Much like the Neo-Platonists, Augustine thought of love 
as acquisitive or directed toward the object of its longing, with humans finding 
their ultimate fulfillment in possessing God as the Summum Bonum.18 Augustine 
took this concept and forged an unholy alliance with the biblical concept of love. 
Neo-Platonism was only “able to show him the object of his love and longing, but 
not the way to gain it,”19 forcing Augustine to combine divine grace or agapē with 
eros to obtain the ability to ascend unto the heavens and lay hold of God.20 His 
entire Confessions testify to this synergistic concept of salvation, where divine grace 
liberates him from the “wrong love” or cupiditas of worldly existence and allows 
him to ascend unto the heavens with a “right love” or caritas, oriented towards 
the things of God.21 In Augustine, love never sacrifices itself and always seeks its 
own, even if its own good is found within God, the ultimate ground of human 
happiness or eudaemonia.22 Augustine only equivocates at this point when he treats 
self-love (amor sui) as the sin of pride (superbia),23 but in these places he speaks of 
an ego-centric love of self, which tries to live in autonomy from divine grace, much 
like the teaching of Pelagius, which Augustine so unequivocally opposed and con-
demned in a series of works and councils.24 Most often the love of God and love 
of self are related;25 “For the self, Augustine would have us love is never the self in 
itself, but always the self in God;”26 Without the love of God, self-love would be 
nothing but self-hatred.
The human mind is so constituted that it is never forgetful of itself, never fails to 
understand itself, never fails to love itself. But because one who hates another is anx-
ious to hurt him, it is not unreasonable to describe the human mind as “hating” itself 
when it hurts itself. Certainly it does not know that it wills itself evil, for it does not 
think that what it wills is harmful. But it does will evil all the same, since it does will 
what is harmful. Hence the Scripture: “Who loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.” 
So that if a man knows how to love himself, he loves God; but if he does not love 
God, even granting that self-love which is naturally instinct within him, yet he may 
be described not inappropriately as hating himself, since he does what is inimical to 
himself and persecutes himself like an enemy.27
Let us, then love not ourselves, but Him; and in feeding His sheep, let us be seeking 
the things that are his, not the things which are our own. For in some inexplicable way, 
I know not what, every one who loves himself, and not God, loves not himself; and 
whoever loves God, and not himself, he it is that loves himself.28
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Of course, Augustine was circumspect enough to understand the difficulty of dis-
cerning one’s motives, never knowing for certain throughout his career whether he 
was succumbing to the temptation of pride or truly loving his neighbor and self 
with true caritas unto God.29
Jansenism
The Augustinian tradition provided some openings for those who wished to 
speak of self-love positively, but self-denial and self-sacrifice remained the central 
teaching of the church in light of the NT’s emphasis on the suffering of Christ 
and his call to discipleship (Lk 9:23–25). The Puritan form of altruistic capital-
ism certainly worked within the basic NT theme of leading a life dedicated to 
self-sacrifice in serving the community, and even the early form of acquisitive cap-
italism found its emphasis upon self-love an unsettling aspect of the real world and 
recognized a higher calling of virtue in serving others as the fundamental message 
of the gospel. This moral concern was particularly acute among the Jansenists, who 
provided much of the early inspiration for acquisitive capitalism. The Jansenists 
were a sectarian group of Catholics, who emphasized the Augustinian doctrine of 
sin and grace in northern France and southern Netherlands. They were faithful to 
this aspect of his theology, but most of them were less empathetic with his ideas 
on eros and thought that true Christian piety involved the annihilation of the ego 
and deflected any reference to their person, preferring to substitute the indefinite 
French pronoun on and refer to their group as a whole when espousing a certain 
set of beliefs.30 Blaise Pascal found the word “I” or “mine” hateful to Christian 
sensibilities and preferred to annihilate himself in looking to find true happiness 
within the God of all glory and grace.31 Pasquier Quesnel contrasted “charity” 
with “self-love” throughout his comments on Paul’s great chapter on love in 1 
Corinthians 13. Charity “labours to forget her-self,” while “self-love, always intent 
on her own interests, forgets those of God and her neighbor,… always under 
the agitation of her own passions,… always ready to take fire against her brother 
upon the least occasion.” He thought self-love would not survive the eschaton 
for “no-thing will remain of that, but what may serve to torment the damned.”32 
However, this emphasis upon self-sacrifice presented the Jansenists with a spiritual 
crisis when turning to analyze the ways of the present world and recognizing the 
effectual nature of self-interest in stimulating its everyday state of affairs. This 
meant that the real world of economic and social relations seemed to work on dif-
ferent principles than the simple demands of Christian piety, creating a dichotomy 
between faith and reason for those Jansenists who accepted the acquisitive nature 
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of everyday existence and its role in stimulating intercourse and exchange. Even-
tually, many of those who suffered under the strain became more secular in the 
course of time and found it necessary to abandon the ideal world altogether, often 
embracing the way things happen to be in the real world of avarice and selfishness 
and leaving God-talk to the irrelevant metaphysical language of the past. 
The earliest forms of this capitalistic system provided a path toward secu-
larism by wrestling with religious scruples, displaying the equivocal judgment of 
the church towards self-interest, and leaving reason with more space to exercise 
an autonomous skepticism toward the faith. These tendencies are already seen 
within the works of Pierre Nicole (1625–1695), an early advocate of acquisitive 
capitalism and zealous apologist for the Jansenists. Nicole promoted the cause of 
the Jansenists by helping to edit their polemical works and produce with Antoine 
Arnauld some pro-Jansenist tracts defending Augustinian theology and its appli-
cation to contemporary issues inside and outside the church. His most lasting 
contribution was a series of essays, entitled Essais de morale, which covered a whole 
range of moral, social, and political topics and helped promote future interest in a 
burgeoning genre of literature upon Christian living.
His Essais de morale is particularly important since it contains many elements 
of early acquisitive capitalism and must be considered a significant impetus in 
stimulating the movement, if not its founding document.33 In Essais de morale, 
Nicole follows the Augustinian emphasis upon the total depravity of human 
beings, stressing the impurity of their motives in light of Adam’s fall into sin.34 
He thinks of humankind as so depraved that desire (cupidité) and self-interest 
(amour-propre) have replaced the noble motive of charity (charité) in determining 
how human beings function in society and calculate their actions.35 Humans pres-
ent only an outward appearance of lofty motives and great humility when offering 
their services for the community to mask their true underlying desires, which usu-
ally long for the esteem of others, even when performing the most philanthropic 
endeavors.36 Even so, inward motivations make little outward or practical differ-
ence in society. Both charity and self-interest engage in the same types of activities 
and carry the same effect in causing people to act civil, kind, just, and honest. 
Self-interest recognizes the need to treat others in a merciful and just manner as 
much as charity if it wants to remain in good standing within the community.37
If charity extends its benefits to those of whom it expects nothing, even to enemies 
alike, but it only regards their good, and not its own interest, self-interest does the 
same, because it knows that the more the benefits appear disinterested and exempt 
from all need for investigation, the more they attract a general affection, by the hope 
they give everyone in order to receive in like manner.38
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“Enlightened” self-interest or cupidity lives in a reciprocal relationship and only 
gives to receive goods and services from others, but this is all that is necessary for 
society to function. It can serve as the basis of all human commerce, circulating 
and exchanging goods and services in meeting the needs of each other, without 
resorting to acts of charity.39 
Because of this observation, Nicole finds it unnecessary to impose a religious 
or moral order upon others in society and develops a laissez-faire attitude toward 
the economy. He might condemn self-interest as an inward vice and corruption 
in the eyes of God, but he also remains convinced of its utility in the everyday 
workings of the social network, as long as its excesses are regulated or managed by 
the government when it becomes “unenlightened” or turns into a “wild animal,” 
“full of cupidity.”40 In treating social morality in this cavalier manner, his approach 
presented a tension between the admonitions of the Christian faith and the practi-
cal realities of worldly existence, bringing the charge of Pyrrhonism or skepticism 
against him. The obvious dichotomy between the two realms was disconcerting 
to many of his critics, but he remained firm in his convictions and faithful to the 
authority of Scripture and the church—more willing than most to distinguish 
faith and reason, engage in open and honest discussions about issues, and recog-
nize the limits of human sagacity in probing these and other questions.41
The basic themes of Nicole’s concept of capitalism must have resonated within 
much of the Jansenist movement for the same themes are found in several lead-
ing Jansenist authors at the time. Jean Domat (1625–1696), the renowned French 
jurist, was a friend of Pascal and sympathetic to the spiritual and theological mission 
of Port-Royal. In his works, he makes some capitalist-type comments like Nicole, 
maintaining that self-interest (amour-propre) brings about positive results in society; 
fear promotes obedient subjects; avarice stimulates the economy, and pride and the 
love of luxury engender “most of the progress in the arts and sciences.” One might 
think that self-interest and its many vices would tend to destroy the social fabric of 
human relations, but divine providence can bring good out of evil and use the devices 
of humankind to serve its purposes; in this case, creating a bond in society of mutual 
dependency out of selfishness in meeting the needs of each other.42 Domat follows 
Nicole in this regard and creates the same division between the temporal and the 
spiritual realms to justify a policy of restraint in trying to cleanse the world from sin. 
The heavy-handed measures of government only become necessary when passions 
no longer prove useful in serving the community and proceed toward excessive or 
criminal behaviors in defrauding and pillaging one’s neighbor.43 
Another good example of early acquisitive capitalism was Pierre de Boisguilbert 
(1646–1714). He was educated at the Petites Écoles of Port-Royal and continued 
expressing the religious and cultural sentiments of the Jansenists throughout his life, 
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finding particular inspiration in the writings of Pierre Nicole.44 His writings display 
the dominant themes of Nicole and early acquisitive capitalism in emphasizing the 
pervasive nature of individual self-interest in commerce and its “reciprocal utility” in 
bringing about harmony within society.45 However, unlike Nicole and Domat, he 
brings a fuller and more rigorous discussion of specific economic issues to the move-
ment and receives considerable praise from later economists like the physiocrats for 
discussing and forwarding the “advantage of the freedom of trade,” the “advances 
required for useful work,” the “role or expenditure” or circulation of wealth, and so 
many other proto-capitalistic themes.46 Much like the physiocrats he thinks of the 
universe as a perfect machine, with a “natural state” of optimal equilibrium, where 
money and wealth circulate in a liberal and perpetual movement, investing in the 
economy and exchanging hands, creating equilibrium by giving to some who lack 
and taking from others who possess a surplus.47 In this natural state, the government 
has no special role to play in developing the fundamental rules of the game and finds 
its place relegated to a subordinate role of managing what is given in nature. Bois-
guilbert thinks that any heavy-handed regulation of the market place and burden-
some system of taxation only serves to disrupt the flow of nature and cause problems 
for everyone, especially those at the bottom and edges of society. It is not government 
policies but free trade and free competition that neutralize extreme fluctuations and 
prevent disequilibrium within the market.48 No miraculous intervention is needed 
from the heavens above or the earth below. As long as nature is “left alone” to the 
laws of secondary causality, divine providence will keep the equilibrium in place, and 
everyone will receive the necessities of life.49
The fissure between faith and reason grew in the course of time as the world 
seemed to function on its principles of causality, without any need for miraculous 
intervention, and function in a way that defied and disturbed the simple religious 
categories of the church. No longer was reason employed as a mere servant of faith, 
following the medieval dictum of Augustine and Anselm (fides quaerens intellec-
tum) and using its resources to substantiate what was already believed; but reason 
became an autonomous avenue of truth or skepticism that might question the 
faith and eventually abandon the faith, proceeding from the self-reliance of Deism 
to the unbelief of atheism and secularism.
Pierre Bayle
Leading the way toward a more independent and skeptical use of reason was a 
Huguenot refugee by the name of Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), author of the single 
most popular work of the eighteenth century, Dictionnaire historique et critique 
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(1696). Bayle exercised much influence over the philosophes of the Enlightenment 
in leading them to question the authority of priests and dogmatic rational for-
mulas of theology in the name of religious toleration. He also exercised consider-
able influence over important proto-capitalists like Bernard Mandeville, who used 
Bayle’s concept of faith and reason to question the wisdom of imposing ascetic or 
altruistic Christian standards on others when the economy often employed “pri-
vate vices” to produce “public benefits” for society.50 Both Bayle and Mandeville 
remained pious Christians in the midst of their doubts and continued to submit 
their ultimate understanding unto the revelation of God, but they also were rig-
orous enough in their application of reason to represent its results with integrity, 
admitting a number of problems in regard to their faith, causing distress within 
their souls and leading some to abandon the faith altogether. 
Bayle’s skepticism traverses a whole range of topics and issues within his 
famous Dictionnaire, making it difficult for the reader to miss this fundamen-
tal disposition of the author. In his more impious moments, he dismisses the 
typical religious appeal to divine providence as eschewing a serious response to 
the problem of evil in the world and questions the possibility of constructing a 
credible theodicy that truly addresses the problems of critics. He also questions 
the standard cosmological proofs of rational piety in the same context, finding 
them ultimately unconvincing in their attempt to establish the existence of God 
through the rigors of philosophical analysis.51 Usually, he finds solace within the 
authority of special revelation and the grace of God and deprecates the power of 
human sagacity to probe the secrets of the Almighty. Only on certain occasions 
does he risk his source of solace and speak of the Scripture with the same candor 
and critical analysis as other matters of natural philosophy and worldly concern. 
The most infamous occasion was an article on “David,” which he had to amend 
in later editions due to the public outcry. In the original article, he speaks of 
David in Machiavellian terms, showing the unscrupulous and “exceedly wicked” 
means he used in establishing his kingdom—all to reassure present-day monarchs 
about the impossibility of following “strict moralists” in exercising their office.52 
Here he thinks much like a proto-capitalist in recognizing the societal benefit of 
unseemly motives and actions and goes on to speak of self-interest in much the 
same way as a Jansenist. For example, he insists on some occasions that atheists 
can act as good and moral citizens since people tend to seek honor in their daily 
lives and have no need of God to motivate them in finding recognition among 
their fellow citizens. To substantiate the point, Bayle cites Augustine’s reference 
to “pagans” who act from self-interest (l ’amour-propre) in their worldly lives as 
committing “glorious sins” when accomplishing mighty and magnificent feats.53 
In fact, Bayle finds humans, in general, to be motivated by the “love of praise, the 
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fear of disgrace, the natural temper, punishments and rewards in the magistrates 
hands,” and other like-passions.54 While true virtue emanates from the love of 
God, self-interest and other vices of depraved humanity are sometimes more 
useful in promoting the welfare of the state than the strict and austere virtues of 
Christian piety.55 Of course, Bayle and the early capitalists give ultimate credit to 
divine providence, which can make the wicked deeds of human depravity serve 
the good purposes of society,56 but they all seem to feel a certain vexation within 
their souls in recognizing the disturbing reality of the world and its vice-laden 
modus operandi. 
Outwardly, Bayle lets none of this disturb his faith. For the most part, Bayle 
tries to remain triumphant in his profession and insulate it from criticism by 
making religion a matter of the heart and claiming that reason cannot measure or 
penetrate its mysteries.57 In this context, he finds it necessary to give up the pre-
tenses of philosophical hubris and endless rational disputes to find solace within 
the miraculous power of divine grace and enter the kingdom of God, just like a 
child.58 Here he resorts to his Reformed understanding of faith with its emphasis 
on the irresistible grace of God and the total inability of human beings to find God 
or penetrate divine mysteries through their own capacities, making a great divide 
between faith and reason.59 Only God can reveal God; only revelation can provide 
final answers. Otherwise, grace would not be grace. This position might limit his 
ability to offer a critical analysis of faith and reform its beliefs and practices, but it 
also liberates his philosophical musings from serving the dogma of the church and 
allows for some open-ended analysis of questions, knowing that the limitations 
of reason can never damage or destroy what is most sacred to him, even when it 
entertains some disturbing thoughts. 
French Authors
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many French authors became 
obsessed with the dark side of human nature and the disturbing reality that much 
of human activity was motivated by baser passions and dominated by self-interest.60 
Among the earliest representatives of this genre, none captured a larger audience 
than François de La Rochefoucauld’s literary masterpiece Maximes (1665), which 
endured and developed a number of editions, alterations, and additions during his 
lifetime. In the work, he finds human beings completely self-absorbed or centered 
around the “assertiveness, acquisitiveness, and aggrandizement of the ego.”61 He 
says self-love is a “part of every aspect and circumstance of life.”62 “We would rather 
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run ourselves down than not speak of ourselves at all.”63 “Whatever fine words we 
may apply to our affections, they all too often derive from selfishness and vanity.”64
La Rochefoucauld’s dark view of humankind works within the same Augus-
tinian understanding of total depravity as the Jansenists.65 He sees humans as fallen 
from the original design of creation and filled with inward corruption or concupis-
centia, tainting all their activities and permeating their body, soul, and spirit, just 
like this Catholic tradition.66 He says, “We should often be ashamed of our noblest 
actions if the world but knew all the motives that helped shape them.”67 “We can 
say of all our virtues what an Italian poet has said of virtues in women, that it is 
seldom more than the art of appearing virtuous.”68 “[Our] virtues are swallowed up 
by self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea.”69 
In this work, La Rochefoucauld thinks of self-love (amour-propre) as refracted 
into a whole array of diverse passions that serve its one singular interest.70 These 
passions are produced incessantly within the human heart and interpreted as 
“varying temperatures of the blood,” stimulating and controlling every aspect of 
life in a material and self-serving manner.71 In fact, he often relates love to the 
self-interest of eros by speaking of it as a passionate, romantic, and capricious 
feeling that simply strikes the human heart with its arrow. He excuses the indis-
cretions of its victims from personal responsibility, claiming that humans have 
no will-power to withstand its corporeal lusts and self-serving desires.72 Humans 
have no spiritual ability to transcend this material world and experience a pure 
love that exists outside their passions.73 They can never separate “personal” or 
“mutual gain” from developing a friendship with another person, and even find 
the “misfortunes of our dearest friends…something not entirely displeasing.”74
Of course, many considered La Rochefoucauld’s portrait of the human condi-
tion horrid and pointed to the many good deeds individuals perform every day in 
society, but he rejected this rejoinder as shallow and remained skeptical and dis-
illusioned about the true motivations of most people throughout the various edi-
tions of his work. He thought it was necessary to probe deeply within the human 
psychē in a Freudian-like manner to find the darker and more disturbing truth 
about human nature.75 Through this psychoanalytic process, La Rochefoucauld 
sought to unveil the ugly, insidious truth about most people, finding them all filled 
with hypocritical and ulterior motives, even while standing for justice, seeming 
humble, exhibiting courage, and promoting philanthropic causes. He says, “We 
give praise only that we may get it”; “We refuse praise from a desire to be praised 
twice”; “We behave politely to be treated politely, and to be considered polite”; 
“We help others to make sure they will help us under similar circumstances.”76 
He defines humility as a “stratagem of pride” employed to bring domination over 
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others; gratitude as a way of obtaining greater benefits; and magnanimity as the 
“noblest means of gaining praise.”77
The emphasis upon self-interest took a more decided turn toward secularism in 
the eighteenth century among the philosophes and reached its most strident expres-
sion in the atheistic and materialistic philosophy of Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–
1771), a Parisian-born stalwart of the Encyclopedists, who represented the extreme 
edges of their philosophy. Helvétius embodied much of philosophes’ vitriol toward the 
church, accusing its priests of subjecting the people to their power, blaming them for 
all the intolerance and ignorance in society as peddlers of metaphysical dogma, and 
charging them with the destruction of the state by enslaving the king to their good 
pleasure.78 His most caustic work was De l’esprit or Essays on the Mind, published in 
July of 1758. The philosophes failed to rally behind the work, believing Helvétius was 
premature in publishing its controversial opinions, even if they sympathized with 
much of its spirit and most of its ideas.79 The Parlement and the Sorbonne imme-
diately condemned the work upon its publication for promoting irreligion, forcing 
Helvétius several times to retract his temerity for publishing the book in the first 
place despite receiving prior approval.80 The church spelled out the charges as “deci-
mating the foundations of the Christian religion,” “adopting the detestable doctrine 
of materialism,” “destroying the dignity of man,” “annihilating the first notions of 
justice and virtue,” “substituting for sound moral doctrine [an emphasis upon] inter-
est, passions, pleasures,” “favoring atheists, deists, and all types of unbelievers,” “con-
taining a great number of hateful statements against the church and its ministers,” 
and so forth.81 The church associated De l’esprit with the Encyclopédie as expressing 
the same essential message in a more brazen form and moved to ban both of them 
through the power of the state, but only succeeded for a short time and ended up 
spreading the notoriety of the philosophes’ perspective in the attempt to suppress it. 
In the aftermath, Helvétius avoided personal reprisals, Diderot completed the Ency-
clopédie, and De l’esprit became one of the most celebrated works of the era, honored 
with numerous editions and translations throughout Europe.82
Helvétius’ main concern is self-interest. He follows La Rochefoucauld and 
Mandeville in making self-interest (amour-propre) the principal motive of human 
action—both in De l’esprit and his other great work, De l’homme or A Treatise on 
Man (1772).83 “If the physical universe be subject to the laws of motion, the moral 
universe is equally so to those of interest. Interest is, on earth, the mighty magi-
cian, which to the eyes of every creature changes the appearance of all objects.”84 
It is the “only sentiment that is engraved in our hearts in infancy.” It is the prin-
cipal motivation behind the formation of moral, legal, civic, and social institu-
tions.85 All human passions and desires only represent the “application of self-love 
to particular objects”86: “We esteem only such ideas as are analogous to our own”; 
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“We help others” only to ensure “they will help us under similar circumstances.”87 
Compassion is merely an act of self-love in recognizing the suffering of oneself 
within others, not an altruistic act or expression of concern for the welfare of fellow 
human beings.88 What distinguishes individuals in society and “most commonly 
sets them apart” is the pursuit of “honour” or the “passion for glory,” which Helvé-
tius places above other self-interests as the “most desirous” motivation of them 
all—much more than the accumulation of wealth. Here he reiterates the sentiment 
of Mandeville on the subject and provides inspiration for the like-minded opinion 
in Adam Smith.89 In these and other similar comments, Helvétius works within 
the acceptable limits of a controversial tradition and its teachings without pushing 
the edges too far. 
Helvétius only incurs the wrath of authorities when he dares to push the enve-
lope further and proceed in a more secular direction than many of his predecessors 
and immediate successors in interpreting the position. He does so by proceed-
ing to reject the orthodox doctrine of human depravity and think of people as 
redeemable through better social legislation and public education, not the work of 
Christ.90 “No individual is born good or bad.”91 Self-interest is described as the one 
inherent “sentiment that is engraved in our hearts,” and it has no specific inclina-
tion toward evil. It has the potential to proceed in any direction, good or bad, given 
a certain set of circumstances and particular focus upon certain objects.92 In fact, 
self-interest is the same inherent force in all people and only develops in different 
directions through the varying objects or opportunities presented to it in the envi-
ronment and surrounding culture.93 Helvétius attributes the inequalities between 
people and their intellectual development to the “effect of the difference of situa-
tion in which chance has placed them” and their passionate attention to the oppor-
tunities at hand. It is human passion excited by chance that sets people in motion 
and explains their differences in social, moral, and intellectual achievement.94 All 
humans have the same aptitude to discover and comprehend the “highest truths” 
of the world around them, just like Isaac Newton, given the proper set of fortu-
itous circumstances, including an apple falling out of a tree.95
Helvétius ends up deifying human potential in the process, rejecting the typical 
strictures upon finite capacities, undermining the orthodox belief in human deprav-
ity, and proceeding to make the moral calling an expression of human nature, not 
the will of a transcendent deity. He rejects the Christian call for self-sacrifice and 
other ascetic practices that emasculate egoistic and primitive pleasures in the name 
of some higher ideal.96 Self-love is liberated from its slavery to the Christian con-
cept of corruption and now becomes much the opposite—the “only basis on which 
we can place the foundations of an useful morality.”97 In this way, Helvétius lays 
the foundation for a new theory of ethics, representing an early form of the social 
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utilitarianism that became so popular during the French Enlightenment, making the 
greatest happiness principle the calculating sum of all moral behavior, and so trans-
forming “egoistic self-love into socially useful self-love.”98 He argues that the “love 
of self produces the desire for happiness,” developing from our corporeal sensibilities 
and controlling “our actions, our thoughts, our passions, and our sociability” in con-
cert with one another, and so making the “happiness of the majority” the object of 
ethics.99 This means that laws must be constructed or abolished in a society based 
upon the “supreme law” of public utility.100 Helvétius rejoices over this new “science 
of morals” as it eliminates the need for philosophical or metaphysical speculation, 
rests upon a firm empirical basis within corporeal sensibility, and makes what is just 
or unjust a simple calculating sum of mathematics.101 Ethics no longer needs reli-
gion as a motivating factor in prescribing or proscribing human conduct through its 
tactics of fear; it no longer needs to look outside of human interest and happiness for 
answers in a special revelation of God and a divine law inscribed within nature and 
the hearts of human beings.102 Humans are more or less a social construction, forged 
through the power of government, and do not need special divine grace to redeem 
them or make them virtuous citizens.103 Human self-interest has its own ethical and 
salvific quality in serving the public good.104 
Helvétius went on to interpret all of life in these secular and materialistic 
terms.105 Like most philosophes, he was enamored with the abstract physical laws 
of Isaac Newton and the epistemology of John Locke and the British empiricists, 
but he clearly went beyond his constituency and other Anglophiles by attempt-
ing to apply and expand British concepts to the human race in a thoroughgoing 
manner.106 As a result, he reduced human ideas to an external material impulse, 
pleasure to corporeal sensations, and proceeded to deny altogether the presence 
of innate ideas within the mind, the freedom of the will to generate responsible 
behavior, and the existence of an immortal soul or any other transcendent real-
ity.107 Many philosophes like Rousseau and Diderot shuddered to proceed so far 
in destroying human dignity and considered his positions an extreme caricature 
of the “enlightened” philosophical tendencies in the era,108 but his radical stance 
certainly represented the main current of the time in bold relief as it was sweeping 
Europe and proceeding toward a more secular future. 
Physiocrats
In the middle of the eighteenth century, the new field of economics began to 
emerge, developing more scientific and mathematical rigor under the work of the 
physiocrats, a closely aligned association of early capitalists in France. François 
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Quesnay, a royal physician, often receives credit for founding the group through his 
role in writing some leading economic articles in the Encyclopédie (1757) and his 
authorship of its most celebrated scientific work, Tableau économique (1758/59),109 
but he clearly collaborated in forging the movement with many other noteworthy 
figures like Vincent de Gournay, Marquis de Mirabeau, and Mercier de la Riv-
ière.110 Of these three, Mirabeau served as the most direct collaborator in forging 
the movement with him, writing its early best-seller, L’ami des homes, ou traité de la 
population (1757), and working with Quesnay on La philosophie rurale (1763), one 
of the movement’s great works.111 Over a decade later the group reached its zenith 
of power when Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot brought physiocrat policy to the 
government as the finance minister of France, even though the outward political 
success was short-lived. Turgot and the physiocrats were still ahead of their times 
in bringing “enlightened” policy to pre-revolutionary France and lost power when 
the rich and powerful complained about the erosion of their privileges and inter-
ference in their monopolies under his tenure, leading to his dismissal a couple of 
years later in 1776.112 The prominence of the physiocrats waned after this time,113 
but their legacy continued to inspire future economists like Du Pont de Nemours 
and Adam Smith long after their heyday. Du Pont carried the physiocrat legacy 
for the next several decades on the world stage, spreading the message in France, 
Europe, and America as the “first important case of a professional economist 
turned policy maker.” Du Pont claimed that he developed much of his economic 
insights on his own, but he admitted his excitement when first reading Quesnay’s 
articles and great work in finding some support out there, and crystallized and 
refined his thinking through reading these and other works of the physiocrats.114 
Du Pont and the physiocrats were never alone in developing their economic con-
cepts but belonged to the process of history and served a common tradition of 
ideas that were circulating throughout France, drawing particular inspiration from 
the native-born emphasis upon self-interest and the monumental success of Brit-
ain in creating an economy based on early capitalist principles.115
Of course, the physiocrats thought of their work as creating a “new science” 
of economics.116 The Tableau was celebrated as a milestone in economic theory 
because of its attempt to bring a new academic rigor and forge a new discipline of 
study, even if its zigzag arithmetical chart was obscure and difficult to follow, even 
among the faithful.117 Before the Tableau, the area of economics was deprecated 
as un-“disciplined,” filled with unproven and flaccid hypotheses, coming mainly 
from loose and unreliable mercantilist intuitions, with its presentiments toward 
strong central government, large companies and guilds, the acquisition of bullion, 
the accumulation of wealth at the expense of others, and the policy of increasing 
exports, not imports through exacting duties upon them.118 
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The physiocrats wanted to challenge this old way of thinking with a new sci-
entific system based on the facts of experience, although they brought their own set 
of metaphysical commitments and intuitions to their analysis, just like most schol-
ars in working to forge a system.119 Quesnay tried to base his theory upon “physical 
experiment” and avoid the Cartesian penchant for deductive system building, but 
the majority of the physiocrats were less inductive in methodology and wanted 
a complete systematic framework in presenting physiocracy as a total science of 
society.120 After all, their creed was based upon the “natural and immutable order” 
that encompassed all of life and served as the “archetype of all governments” and 
social arrangements, that illumined the hearts and minds of humankind, allowing 
them to deduce all possible truth from it and let “nature rule” (physiocratie).121 The 
physiocrats looked at the natural order as containing both physical and moral laws, 
intertwined and working together to the advantage of society. The “regular course 
of every physical event of the natural order” and the “rule of every human action of 
moral order conformable to physical order” are “most advantageous to mankind”; 
“They are immutable, irrefragable, and the best laws possible,” “the best founda-
tion of the most perfect government,” working together for the material benefit 
of humankind and allowing the physiocrats to develop a total systematic view of 
life, covering all of its aspects and disciplines—the laws of nature and the laws of 
human society.122 
The physiocrats saw the natural order as living in harmony between the inter-
ests of the one and the interests of many. Like Helvétius, they represented a most 
positive view of self-interest within the Jansenist tradition in merging the two 
interests, believing a well-ordered society arises behind the conscious plan of indi-
viduals and the pursuit of their own special interests—at least in most cases.123 
Individuals might think they are working solely in terms of their own particular 
goals and designs in pursuing what is best for themselves in each particular case, 
but they are unconscious of the ultimate effect of their actions and end up working 
for others in the grand scheme of divine providence. Individuals might think they 
are fixing their own value on commodities and setting their own prices through 
an act of free will, but God is working all along, above and beyond their designs, 
in balancing all values against each other and setting the natural level within an 
overall plan of equilibrium.124 Prices of goods and the rate of interest are balanced 
by the law of supply and demand, rising or falling naturally, in accordance with the 
market value.125
This concept of natural equilibrium led the physiocrats to denounce govern-
ment interference in the market place with pet slogans like “laissez faire” or “laisser 
aller,” which became part of the popular parlance of capitalism.126 They felt it 
is best for the government to follow a policy of free trade as much as possible, 
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since “prices will always be regulated by competition of trade in the commodities,” 
allowing all to prosper in the end—both buyer and seller.127
All duties on exports and imports, all prohibitions and regulations which constrain 
external and internal commerce diminish the wealth of the State and the revenues of 
the sovereign; all imposition of duties prejudicial to commerce and the production of 
goods is destructive imposition.128
The general freedom of buying and selling is therefore the only means of assuring, 
on the one hand, the seller of a price sufficient to encourage production, on the other 
hand, the consumer, of the best merchandise at the lowest price.129
What is called the arrangements—i.e., fixing the number of pieces of woollen cloth 
a manufacturer can make and ship to the Levant, fixing the price and the number 
of people who may sell it—necessarily tends to diminish the number of merchants, 
manufacturers and workers, and ruins our wholesalers by depriving them of their cal-
culating spirit and of the necessity to calculate. Therefore those arrangements tend to 
increase the number of beggars in our country.130
These and other ideas proved valuable over the course of time in helping future 
economists understand some basic principles, but they were never able to embody 
the total picture. Their ideas were never able to produce what they desired—a 
final and complete system of fundamental axioms, or even a single proposition 
that withstood all further scrutiny as an indubitable fact, suffering the same fate 
as the Cartesian system, or any other system offering its basic concepts as the 
building block of everything else. Their “new science” certainly helped promote 
the importance of economic theory by challenging Mercantilist assumptions and 
forwarding concepts that recognized the self-regulating nature of the economy, 
providing some valuable insight over time in understanding its inner workings and 
positive results for society—at least within certain limitations; but some of their 
ideas seemed incredulous to later generations. Perhaps, the most nonsensical was 
one of their leading ideas, that the source of wealth in a country is its agriculture, 
especially its wealthy farmers, which Quesnay and the physiocrats justified with 
copious “scientific” analysis. 
These poor cultivators, of such little use to the state, do not represent the true laborer, 
the rich farmer, who cultivates land on a large scale, who governs, who commands, 
who multiplies the expenses to increase his profits, who does not neglect any means or 
personal advantage yet produces the general welfare, who employs in a useful manner 
the inhabitants of the countryside, who can choose and wait for a propitious time to 
deliver his grains, to buy and sell his livestock.…
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Manufacturing and commerce maintained by the deranged need for luxury accumu-
late men and wealth in the large cities, prevent the appreciation of property, devastate 
the countryside, inspire scorn for agriculture, augment excessively the expenses of pri-
vate individuals, harm the support of families, prevent the propagation of mankind, 
and weaken the state.
The decline of empires has often closely followed a flourishing state of com-
merce. When a nation spends on luxuries what it gains from commerce, the only result 
is the circulation of money without any increase in wealth. It is the sale of superfluities 
that enriches the subjects and the sovereign. The products of our land must be the 
primary material for manufacturing and the object of commerce: any other kind of 
commerce which is not based on these foundations has little security; the more luster 
commerce acquires in a kingdom, the more it stimulates the emulation of neighboring 
nations, and the more it is shared.… Commerce at home is necessary to obtain the 
necessities of life, to maintain the production of luxuries, and to facilitate consump-
tion; but it contributes little to the power and prosperity of the state. If a part of the 
immense wealth that it retains and whose use produces so little for the kingdom were 
to be distributed to agriculture, it would produce revenues that are much more real 
and considerable.131
Many later economists found this dogged belief responsible in part for impeding 
the modern industrialization of the country, undermining the importance of man-
ufacturing and monetary transactions in the economy, and dishonoring the labor 
of artisans, craftsmen, and merchants.132
Furthermore, the physiocrats were not always so wise or prescient in their 
counsel and sometimes spoke from the provincial perspective of their world, dis-
playing little comprehension of capitalism’s radical implications for shaping soci-
ety in the future. They tended to accept the present political and social order, 
never providing a serious or direct challenge to the basic structure of their world: 
the divine right of monarchical authority, the landowner as the king of the econ-
omy, the seigneurial system of privileges and its feudal property arrangements, 
and the monopolistic practices of guilds, except in certain instances.133 They never 
expanded their vision or spoke of any revolutionary impulses within their lais-
sez-faire economic system, leaving most of these implications to their British and 
American counterparts, who combined them into one movement.134 Like most of 
the philosophes, they followed the typical political beliefs of the Ancien Régime and 
submitted intellect and will to justify the sovereign authority of kings, seeking only 
to transform it into a “legal despotism” by limiting interference in the lives of the 
people and checking it by the rule of natural and positive law.135
Nevertheless, they were purveyors of a tradition that exerted an enormous 
influence beyond their limited purview. They continued to espouse a belief in 
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divine providence to balance out the prices and interests to meet the needs of 
the entire society, but their laissez-faire economic policy contained a more secular 
message for future generations in eliminating the need for divine or moral inter-
vention, seeing that life worked well-enough on its principles and required no fur-
ther assumptions to explain its mechanism and results. The merging of individual 
and societal interests found a more consistent application in the atheistic and util-
itarian schema of Helvétius, who was able to eliminate the paradox between the 
two by denying the depravity of self-interest and espousing the greatest happiness 
principle. This more secular and utilitarian approach will encompass the French 
Revolution and much of the world to come, allowing humankind to calculate its 
activities apart from divine revelation, or a transcendent Word from on high to 
discriminate between its interests, seeing that the “voice [or interest] of the people 
is the voice of God.”136 The schema will no longer need to follow Kant and presup-
pose the existence of God or some outside force to reconcile virtue and happiness 
together since these two aspects of the summum bonum are the same.137 In Brit-
ain, self-preservation will become the mechanism for the evolution of the species, 
merging biology and economics and exorcizing the need for divine intervention in 
the process of life, in general, to explain the development of order and complexity 
in the world—all evolving from the self-interest or chaos of individual struggle. 
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c h a p t e r  t w o
Bernard Mandeville
One of the most pivotal figures in spreading the quintessential teachings of acquisi-
tive capitalism abroad and turning its salient features into a matter of public debate 
was Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733). His ancestors were probably Huguenots, 
who emigrated from France to Holland looking for a more tolerant atmosphere to 
practice their Reformed faith and succeed in their professional life. His father rose 
to prominence in the culture as a leading physician, and Bernard followed his steps 
by studying medicine at Leyden, practicing the profession for a short time in the 
country, and then moving his practice to London during the early 1690s, where 
he stayed the rest of his life.1 In this new environment, Mandeville began another 
career as an author and spread his controversial message about the public benefit 
of self-interest and private vice, restating the Jansenist thesis in a more brazen and 
caustic manner than its previous proponents. The thesis was first mentioned in a 
poetic piece entitled “The Grumbling Hive” (1705), then developed a few years 
later in The Female Tatler (1709–1710) as a response to Richard Steele’s The Tatler, 
and finally expanded, refined, and broadcasted with uncompromising clarity and 
candor in his great work The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714).2 
The Fable gained the succès de scandale a decade later when its new enlarged edition 
was published and immediately denounced by the London Journal on July 17, 1723, 
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catapulting it into the center of public disdain and providing it enough publicity to 
justify five more editions in the next ten years, with a volume of dialogues added 
to the first in 1729 supplementing the basic message. During this time, the work 
endured and prospered under the constant assault from a wide-range of sources: 
periodicals like the Bibliothéque Britannique and Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, 
bibliographies like Masch and Trinius, encyclopedias like the General Dictionary, 
and a diverse array of significant scholars and political figures.3 A number of the 
reviews referred to the work as making a “great noise in England,” and some saw 
the controversy spreading to other countries in Europe.4 The Fable found its special 
significance in bringing to the forefront the Jansenist tradition of self-interest in 
bold relief,5 causing people to reel from the dark rhetoric of the book while thinking 
about the issues and recognizing some validity in its overall thesis. Adam Smith 
devoted a whole chapter to attacking the “licentious system” of Mandeville,6 but 
he was clearly influenced by its teachings and later acknowledged the important 
impact of its paradoxical defense of capitalism upon the leading figures of the day.7 
In the Theory of Moral Sentiment and Wealth of Nations, he followed a moderate 
form of the basic thesis in affirming the depraved motives of people and the salvific 
effect of self-interest in society, and directly paraphrased other discussions from the 
Fable, as in the case of his famous passages upon the division of labor.8 Smith and 
others chose to mitigate the basic thesis of the Fable in reeling from a darker reality 
that might upset the need for an “invisible hand” and moral purpose in life. The new 
theory of economics lent its more disturbing view of reality to nineteenth-century 
biology and social sciences in showing how order might develop without design in 
the work of Thomas Malthus, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Spencer.9 
Mandeville’s overall thesis developed out of a dark view of the human con-
dition. Darkness characterized the anthropology of the church in general with its 
emphasis upon the fallen nature of humanity, the confession of sin, and the need for 
grace to rescue the massa perditionis, but some of its strongest expressions were found 
within the Augustinian tradition of the Jansenists, the growing cynicism in French 
culture,10 and the Calvinist background of the Huguenots—all of which played a 
major role in shaping the worldview of Mandeville. Many of the early Deists and 
liberals began to question this view of Christianity and preferred a more positive 
interpretation of human nature—like Lord Shaftesbury, who saw a natural tendency 
or sentiment toward benevolence in society and accused Mandeville of turning the 
human race into a pack of “wolves”11; but Mandeville categorically rejected the 
optimistic portrait of the liberal community and remained faithful to the orthodox 
tradition of total depravity and its pessimistic view of human nature. In his works, 
he says human beings generally find “real Pleasures” within the “Mundane and Cor-
ruptible things” of this worldly existence, excepting a “few Devout Christians,” who 
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are “preternaturally assisted by divine grace.”12 He particularly chastens the “well-
Bred” gentlemen of the social elite for feigning virtue by making a grand production 
out of their generosity, while trying to hide their true, self-serving motives from 
public view.13 Sometimes he finds an exception within a pious few, but other times 
he denounces all the activities of all human beings as filled with sordid motives, 
even the most pious and benevolent acts of human love.14 Here his work is more 
consonant with the Calvinist doctrine of civil righteousness and its emphasis upon 
the total depravity of all Christians and non-Christians alike.15 This view finds no 
possibility of human beings offering anything of true righteousness before the ulti-
mate judgment of God while living in this fallen world—above and beyond the 
Augustinian tradition, which contains the genuine possibility of serving God and 
performing good deeds through divine grace or the power of the Holy Spirit. In 
fact, Mandeville applies the Calvinist doctrine to his own fallen nature and cannot 
find “one Christian virtue” when he examines its motives under the microscope of 
divine righteousness,16 much like Paul in Romans 7. He and other human beings 
might cloak their “darling lusts” and “filthy Appetites” under a veil of “concern for 
the public Good” and act as if they are working for some noble or moral end, but 
they never obtain true self-denial in any of their endeavors and only end up deceiv-
ing others and themselves about the true reasons lurking behind their overt deeds.17 
Here Mandeville follows the Gospel tradition of denouncing humans as “hypo-
crites” and “white-washed tombs” (Mt 23) in trying to unmask the true motives of 
all people, hiding behind Pharisaical appearances, but his critics found him much 
too harsh in destroying human potential. His anthropology provided Mandeville 
with a pretext for developing a cynical view of life and satirical way of writing about 
it—at least according to his critics,18 while others found him brutally honest. 
As one might suspect, Mandeville’s concept of depravity follows the typical 
concern of acquisitive capitalism and focuses upon self-interest as the archetypal 
sin. His works expand the discussion to include the animal kingdom as he observes 
various species killing each other in struggling for their own life or kind and adapt-
ing to the natural environment.19 Humans share this same common instinct for 
self-preservation in acting according to their own self-interest and selfish motives. 
All their apparent virtues only cover the underlying desire to satisfy the baser 
passions of a natural and self-serving impulse.20 Compassion only comes from the 
natural instinct for self-preservation in its attempt to eliminate pain.21
Later in his works, Mandeville decides to distinguish this instinct for self-pres-
ervation or “self-love” from the pride of “self-liking,” which arises only in society 
when seeking the approval of others.22
Self-liking I have call’d that great Value, which all Individuals set upon their own Per-
sons; that high Esteem, which I take all Men to be born with for themselves…. When 
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this self-liking is excessive, and so openly shewn as to give Offence to others, I know 
very well it is counted a Vice and called Pride.23
Self-love would first make it scrape together every thing it wanted for Sustenance, 
provide against the Injuries of the Air, and do every thing to make itself and young 
Ones secure. Self-liking would make it seek for Opportunities, by Gestures, Looks, 
and Sounds, to display the Value it has for itself, superiour to what it has for others; an 
untaught Man would desire evry body that came near him, to agree with him in the 
Opinion of his superior Worth, and be angry, as far as his Fear would let him, with all 
that should refuse it: He would be highly delighted with, and love evry body, whom 
he thought to have a good Opinion of him, ….24
Mandeville thinks of honor and shame as fundamental factors in moving human 
beings away from the primitive state of self-preservation and self-gratification 
toward a more advanced stage of interaction in society. The invention of honor 
proves more beneficial to society than simple religious admonitions to lead a vir-
tuous life since few people care about practicing genuine humility or reverence 
toward God as a daily motivating factor in their lives.25 In history, great civiliza-
tions were built through offering their citizens the reward of praise with its many 
triumphs, monuments, arches, trophies, statues, and inscriptions, not preaching to 
them pious platitudes or exhortations toward virtue.26 Even in modern Christian 
Europe, few men can resist the temptation of restoring their honor through the 
dreadful practice of dueling, rather than following the biblical mandate to turn 
the other cheek.27 Europeans clearly center much of their lives around this special 
form of self-interest, and Mandeville, along with other capitalists like Bayle and 
Smith, are just confronting the brutal reality of human conduct in society with 
as much candor as possible when making honor (or shame) the chief motivating 
factor in what they witness every day around them.28 
Mandeville’s work provides a direct challenge to Richard Steele’s Tatler and 
its all-too-typical denunciation of vice in the public and private sphere, which 
characterized the Augustan era in England.29 In his work, he shocks the moral 
scruples of the era by making a distinction between the private and public sector 
and showing how unsavory elements are necessary for the “Welfare of trade and 
Commerce” and the “Sociableness of man,” that “Avarice and Prosperity are nec-
essary to the Society,” that private vices actually have public benefits.30 He says 
those who make sanctimonious preachments against certain passions and want to 
inculcate the perfect virtue of a “Golden Age” only end up discouraging the very 
elements that create a “wealthy and powerful Nation,” an “opulent and flourish-
ing people.”31 Without English women coveting Asian silk, their trading partner 
would possess no capital to “purchase the vast Quantities of fine English Cloth,” 
and both economies would suffer.32 In the “Grumbling Hive,” the many vices of 
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“Fraud, Luxury, and Pride” actually made the culture thrive with the “buzz” of 
economic prosperity and social interaction.33 
Luxury Employ’d a Million of the Poor,
And odious Pride a Million more:
Envy itself, and Vanity,
Were Ministers of Industry;
Their darling Folly, Fickleness,
In Diet, Furniture and Dress, 
That strange ridic’lous Vice, was made
The very Wheel that turn’d the Trade.34
When the vices of the hive were decreased for a time through the miraculous 
intervention of the gods, all the occupants grew content with their possessions and 
settled into a lower standard of living.35
According to Mandeville, vices are necessary to produce a luxurious and felic-
itous lifestyle.36 Money might be the root of all evil (1 Tim 6:10), but no economy 
can truly prosper without it, making the exigencies of the world much different 
from the spiritual admonitions of the gospel.37 The state might express concern 
about certain defects within its social arrangements and forward interests that 
exceed the base material prosperity of its subjects, but no one wants complete 
moral virtue to fetter society; it would be foolish to try and fix every moral prob-
lem in trying to create a perfect world.38 Mandeville thinks it is wiser to develop 
a balanced approach by accepting un-Christian motives and practices as a neces-
sary part of a fallen world, without overtly trying to advocate criminal behavior 
or maintain that all vices are useful.39 Sometimes he can say that “Virtue is more 
beneficial than Vice … for the Peace and real Happiness of Society in general” and 
“Temporal felicity of every individual,”40 but he never thinks it is wise for society 
to try and cleanse the world from sin and often finds some evil necessary in order 
to prevent a much greater evil from presenting itself and so destroying the people. 
He finds dueling a necessary part of his particular world in keeping people more 
civil and courteous to each other, even if a few might die in the process.41 “There 
would be twenty times the mischief done there is now, or else you have twenty 
times the constables and other officers to keep the peace [sic].”42 He also finds 
“publick stews” a necessary evil in protecting and preserving virtuous women from 
the seduction of rapacious male appetites, allowing “Chastity” to be “supported 
by Incontinence” and a few prostitutes sacrificed for the general honor of most 
women. He maintains that wise politicians support or tolerate this practice, recog-
nizing the need to protect society from the greater harm of rape, debauchery, and 
sexual immorality among the general populace.43 He particularly dislikes artificial, 
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egalitarian measures to meddle in the natural differences between human beings 
and prefers a laissez-faire policy of letting nature take its course.44 He finds the 
attempt to educate the poor and improve their lot in life the epitome of “pious 
smugness, self-righteousness, and stupidity.”45 It is better for a “well-ordered soci-
ety” that a “certain Portion of Ignorance” subsists within it to perform the menial 
tasks of labor, rather than develop a victimization complex by making the poor 
discontent with their important role in the economy. It is better for their children 
“to wear out their Clothes by useful Labour, and blacken them with Country Dirt 
for something, instead of tearing them off their Backs at play, and dawbing them 
with Ink for nothing.”46
…every Hour those of poor People spend at their Book is so much time lost to the 
Society. Going to school in comparison to Working is Idleness, and the longer Boys 
continue in this easy sort of Life, the more unfit they’ll be when grownup for down-
right Labour, both as to Strength and Inclination.47
Many critics associated Mandeville with Tacitus, Machiavelli, and a disturb-
ing trend toward Realpolitik that was destroying public morality in their mind.48 
George Blewitt accused him of making evil an “essential [component] of society,”49 
and it is difficult to defend him against this charge. Certainly, Mandeville’s work 
speaks over and over about the impossibility of forging a Christian nation, since 
few follow the precepts of the religion in their daily lives, and the basic tenets of 
the faith are incompatible with the pride and war-like instincts it takes to create a 
mighty nation—much the same way as Machiavelli characterized the situation.50 
In creating the dichotomy between public and private life, Mandeville eliminates 
the possibility, or even the need for virtuous behavior in the political realm,51 
maintaining the “no Society can be rais’d into such a rich and mighty kingdom, 
or so rais’d, subsist in their Wealth and Power for any considerable times, without 
the Vices of Man.”52 He never proceeds in the direction of Helvétius or tries to 
eliminate the dichotomy in a utilitarian manner by justifying the political means 
in terms of a good social outcome, but remains content in representing the facts 
of life without attempting a simple reconciliation.53 In many ways, Mandeville is 
paving the way toward the work of sociologists, who make a concerted effort in 
trying to detach their analysis from a moralistic viewpoint and concentrate on the 
effect of individual actions upon the collective whole, regardless of the personal 
intention of the actor or its ethical value. Mandeville’s religious and moral com-
mitment remains steadfast throughout his work, but like many early capitalists, he 
paves the way for sociologists by dispensing with personal convictions and pro-
viding a new framework for thinking about social consequences, where rational or 
ethical intention seldom match the results.54 
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When Mandeville thinks of true religion, he disregards its effects on society 
and considers it an other-worldly existence regarding self-denial or resistance to 
the passions of this world.55 Many critics questioned his ascetic concept of virtue,56 
but Mandeville insists that self-denial is the essence of spiritual virtue or true 
Christian piety.57 His social analysis represents a disconcerting reality for him that 
most people spend their time pursuing the pleasures of this world; and those who 
practice the ascetic-type of lifestyle, the “sincere and real Christians,” are few and 
far between, possessing little impact on society.58 Mandeville’s understanding of 
people clearly comes from his Reformed background, which finds it impossible to 
serve God apart from grace and sees few people elected unto this higher calling.59
Many modern scholars dismiss Mandeville’s clear and unequivocal testimony 
to his religious convictions. They often treat him as a religious subversive with 
a surreptitious plan to ridicule and undermine faith, but in doing so, they seem 
to reveal little more than their own secular agenda in subverting what is plainly 
in the text and wanting to claim such an important figure as one of their own. 
F. B. Kaye appears most responsible for advancing this bizarre interpretation of 
Mandeville and the Fable in his important introduction to the work, unveiling 
the author as an atheist or Deist, continually hiding under the mask of Chris-
tian faith to ward off persecution and secretly defend a secular, empiricist, and 
utilitarian point of view60; but such an interpretation would contravene Man-
deville’s continuous profession of the faith and rejection of deism in just about 
all his works. Unless he is a pathological liar or engaging in the type of hypocrisy 
that is so reviled in the Fable, he can hardly be interpreted as a secularist. He 
clearly follows the Reformation and the basic cultural milieu of his day in using 
literal hermeneutical principles to interpret the Bible and support the historical 
account of Adam and Eve, Noah’s ark, and the Tower of Babel.61 He accepts 
the typical Protestant shibboleths of sola fides, sola gratia, and sola scriptura in 
finding the human race unworthy and incapable of receiving the knowledge and 
salvation of God apart from grace.62 He remains true to his Reformed back-
ground by endorsing the Pauline doctrine of predestination as the clear teaching 
of Scripture, even if he wants toleration to reign among the polemical sides of 
the debate.63 He conducts a serious polemical campaign of his own against the 
Catholic Church, particularly denouncing its priests and rituals for enslaving the 
laity to Rome during the Middle Ages.64 He promotes religious toleration and 
extends the same policy to atheists as moral citizens—much like Bayle, yet he 
hesitates in granting the courtesy to Catholics as an ardent polemicist against its 
priestcraft and propensity toward hierarchical authority in church and state—
much like Locke.65 All in all, he presents the picture of an ecumenical, non- 
denominational Protestant, who wants toleration to reign between conformists 
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and non-conformists in the land of England, while displaying a decided ten-
dency toward the Reformed or anti-Catholic side of the debate in the struggle 
over the soul of the Anglican Church.66 If all this is an elaborate ruse, he pro-
vides no real indication of it, or wavering over his convictions to allow scholars 
to understand him in a different manner.
Much of the misunderstanding comes from a failure to appreciate his clear 
distinction between faith and reason. Unlike the later philosophes, he never takes 
his musings with utmost seriousness so as to proceed into complete skepticism and 
undermine his faith.67 He displays a dim view of natural human sagacity and its 
ability to possess the true knowledge of God, beyond some vague awareness of an 
“Invisible Cause” behind all things.68 The truth of God only comes from a direct rev-
elation, inducing the believer to forsake the power of reason and trust in what God 
has revealed in Scripture.69 Its mysteries live above the arrogant pretenses of philos-
ophy to judge the divine revelation and determine what is beyond human reach (1 
Cor 1–2).70 Even his philosophical musings remain a debatable and fallible witness 
to the limits of human reason and carry no absolute authority for the believer next 
to the Scripture.71 In this way, Mandeville follows the same basic outline as Bayle in 
allowing reason to exercise its autonomous powers and present honest problems for 
a religious view of the world without going too far and undermining the faith itself. 
Both Bayle and Mandeville come from a Reformed theological community that 
provides a spiritual matrix for this understanding of faith and reason to develop in 
emphasizing the qualitative distinction between God and human beings (solus deus), 
negating the ability of a lost and fallen race to establish the true knowledge of God 
(massa perditionis), and making salvation/revelation dependent upon divine grace or 
the miraculous and personal activity of God (sola gratia). Mandeville follows the 
Reformed tradition and probably receives inspiration from Bayle to interpret the 
faith in this particular way as a basic source of his ideas.72
By far the chief of these [influences] was Pierre Bayle. In the Fable Mandeville cited 
Bayle and borrowed from him again and again—especially from his Miscellaneous 
Reflections; in his Free Thoughts Mandeville specifically confessed the debt which that 
book owed to Bayle’s Dictionary; and the germ of the Origin of Honour is to be found 
in Miscellaneous Reflections…. It is worth noting, too, that Bayle was teaching in Rot-
terdam while Mandeville was attending the Erasmian School there…, and that, con-
sequently, Mandeville may have had personal contact with Bayle.73
Mandeville maintains his faith in the midst of rational arguments that might 
cast doubt upon his religion and erode its very foundation. He perseveres in the 
typical pious manner whenever intellectual problems arise and cause disturbances 
with simple piety by deferring to divine providence and its use of tainted means to 
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serve a greater purpose and bring about a good result for society74; but one can still 
wonder whether his system needs to explain the outcome of life miraculously when 
its normal chaotic forces can fit together and do the job on their own. His system 
finds government intervention unnecessary for the most part in following the 
basic laissez-faire economic policies of the early capitalists and believing that pri-
vate interests reap public benefits.75 Mandeville thinks it best not to meddle in the 
“Felicity, that would flow spontaneously from the Nature of every large Society” by 
interjecting the “short-sighted Wisdom” of “well-meaning people.”76 The order of 
life evolves over a long period through slow changes or the “joynt Labour of many 
Ages,” making “morals, mores, reason and speech the product of an evolution that 
has taken” a long time.77 In this way of thinking, life is more comparable to the pro-
duction of a ship and less analogous to a rational machine with a complex mechan-
ical design—the age-old basis of theistic argumentation. A ship evolves through 
numerous trials and errors of many civilizations, making small changes over a long 
period, without a specific end in view or antecedent mathematical design.78
Cleomenes: The Chevalier Reneau has wrote a Book, in which he shews the 
Mechanism of sailing, and accounts mathematically for every thing 
that belongs to the working and steering of a Ship. I am persuaded, 
that neither the first inventors of Ships and sailing, of those, who have 
Improvements since any Part of them, ever dream’d of those Reasons 
[ or technological improvements], any more than now the rudest and 
most illiterate of the vulgar do when they are made Sailors, which 
Time and Practice will do in Spight of their Teeth…. I verily believe, 
not only that the raw beginners, who made the first Essays in either 
Art, good manners as well as Sailing, were ignorant of the true Cause, 
the real Foundation those Arts are built upon in Nature; but likewise 
that, even now both Arts are brought to great Perfection, the greatest 
Part of those that are most expert, and daily making Improvements in 
them, know as little of the Rationale of them, as their Predecessors did 
at first.79
Horatio: If, as you said, and which I now believe to be true, the people, who 
first invented, and afterwards improved upon ships and sailing, never 
dreamed of those reasons of Monsieur Reneau, it is impossible that they 
should have acted upon them, as motives that induced them a priori 
to put their inventions and improvements in practice, with knowledge 
and design; which, I suppose, is what you intended to prove.80
This illustration of Mandeville will be used later in the work of Hume and 
Darwin in seeing life as evolving through a process of small adaptations and 
botched attempts, rather than one massive design like the famous watch of Wil-
liam Paley.81
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Adam Smith
Adam Smith (1723–1790) followed Mandeville and the basic tradition of acquis-
itive capitalism in composing its most celebrated work, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith was born in Kirkcaldy, a small 
fishing village near Edinburgh, and went off to study at the University of Glasgow 
when he was 14 years of age, sitting under Francis Hutcheson, and later attended 
Balliol College at Oxford. He served as a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow for over a decade beginning in 1752 and then took a posi-
tion as a tutor of the young duke of Buccleuch, where he traveled to France for a 
couple of years and met with important “enlightened” figures like Voltaire, Rous-
seau, Franklin, Hume, Helvétius, Turgot, Quesnay, and other physiocrats, already 
sharing many of their ideas.82 Upon his return to Britain, he began work on the 
Wealth of Nations, which took around a decade to finish writing, editing, and finally 
publishing it in 1776. 
The work clearly emerged and operated within the tradition of acquisitive 
capitalism, but a more precise origin of its ideas is difficult to pinpoint, given the 
sparse references to specific sources in his writings.83 With this reservation, one 
can still sense the relative significance of the physiocrats for Smith as prominent 
purveyors of the tradition. Smith considered the physiocrats’ system “with all its 
imperfections” a significant challenge to Mercantilist policy on free trade and the 
nearest approximation to the truth on the political economy.84 They might have 
overreacted to Mercantilism by centering the economy upon agrarian concerns, 
but their belief in the liberty to pursue one’s economic interests and freedom from 
excessive taxation and regulation made a significant impression upon Smith in 
formulating his ideas.85 In fact, he thought of dedicating the Wealth of Nations to 
Quesnay at one point as a testimony to his rigorous economic thinking and influ-
ential ideas, but the latter died before Smith’s work was finally completed.86
Of course, one must not exaggerate the influence of a single source like 
Quesnay or the physiocrats and show some deference to the many other sources 
of the tradition, pervasive in Smith’s era and elite circles. Early on, in his Theory or 
Moral Sentiment (1759), he specifically mentions the work of Rousseau, La Roche-
foucauld, and Mandeville as a part of the tradition. He chooses at this time to 
deprecate the “licentious system” of Mandeville and La Rochefoucauld, focusing 
his ire particularly upon Mandeville’s ascetic view of morality, treatment of all 
human passions as evil, and over-emphasis upon self-interest as the center of soci-
ety, preferring instead to promote the more sensible treatment of Rousseau upon 
the subject with his emphasis upon sympathy.87 He tries to uphold a conservative 
moral stance within the work and distance his ideas from the darker moments of 
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the Fable in warding off criticism from his own opinions and presenting a more 
eclectic and balanced approach to the issues at hand. However, he already follows 
Mandeville and the tradition’s more disturbing ideas by recognizing vanity as an 
essential impetus in society and finding some element of truth in the paradoxi-
cal relationship between private vice (or self-interest) and public benefit.88 Later, 
Smith commends Rousseau because he “softened, improved, and embellished, and 
stript [Mandeville’s principles] of all that tendency to corruption and licentious-
ness which has disgraced them in [the] original author [of the Fable of the Bees],”89 
not that he overturned its fundamental truth. By the time he completes the Wealth 
of Nations, his writing reflects a more willing and open disciple of the tradition in 
expressing its more disturbing elements, without ever leaving a critical sense of 
proportion and balance in recognizing some of its defects.
Smith follows the tradition’s accent upon self-interest or self-love as a fun-
damental principle in understanding human activity.90 He finds this motivation 
understandable in human beings, given the need to sustain their lives as an indel-
ible aspect of finite existence. Only a deity can afford to act out of benevolence in 
all external activities since the divine life exists in complete, self-sustained glory 
without any need of anything else to enhance its eternal perfection.91 Much of 
human activity must be taken up with meeting its needs, and Smith finds this 
motivating factor particularly pervasive when explaining the economy.92
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but 
of their advantages.93
To Smith, these interests and passions are not evil but understood in the manner 
of Rousseau as natural aspects of the human condition, which manifest themselves 
“upon many occasions [as] very laudable principles of action” when used through 
the prudence of rational discrimination and moral judgment.94 In this sense, he 
rejects the paradox between private vice and public virtue because it is based upon 
Mandeville’s ascetic system of value, which turns self-interest into a vice and dis-
counts the possibility of a positive application of its desires.95 
Smith certainly tries to paint a brighter picture than the Fable in his discus-
sion of self-interest, but he still recognizes the considerable truth in Mandeville’s 
darker image and also goes on to speak of a morally corrupt side of it permeating 
society. Like Rousseau and others, he distinguishes the genuine natural needs of 
self-interest from those driven by the artificial pressures of society, where citizens 
long for the favorable “opinions of others,” seeking “honour without virtue.”96 “It is 
vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us.… The desire of becoming 
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the proper object of this respect…is perhaps the strongest of all our desires, [much 
more than] supplying all the necessities and conveniences of the body.… The rich 
man glories in his riches, because he feels they naturally draw upon him the atten-
tion of the world.”97 He admits that riches may serve as a partial motive inducing 
people to cultivate the soil, build houses and cities, and improve the arts and sci-
ences, but this desire is secondary to the lust for honor, which serves Mandeville 
and many others within the tradition as a constant theme in describing what is 
most essential in depicting contemporary society and its corruption of simple 
human needs. Smith finds the lust for honor so pervasive in his world that he 
thinks of society as deriving its impetus and general rules of engagement from this 
basic concern over the approval and disapproval of others—“the love, the respect, 
or the horror of the spectator.”98 The rich might possess an “eye larger than the 
belly,” but they “consume little more than the poor” and end up distributing much 
of their produce to those in need, wittingly or unwittingly, so riches cannot serve 
as the fundamental motive, even within these depraved souls.99 
Smith views self-interest as the principal governing motive in explaining 
human economic affairs, even in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.100 The economy 
generally runs upon self-interest in appealing to the advantage of each partici-
pant, who says, “Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you 
want.”101 Thus, Smith follows the paradox of Mandeville in this particular sense 
by finding within the pursuit of individual advantage unplanned and unintended 
consequences resulting in the benefit of others and the welfare of the public on a 
larger scale.102 
He finds this paradox somewhat miraculous and appeals like other members 
of the tradition to divine providence as guiding the process above and beyond the 
chaotic intensions of individual self-interest to ensure a rational and harmonious 
result for all. In both his Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, he 
finds the conflict disturbing enough to find its resolution only within the mysteri-
ous activity of an “invisible hand.” He says each individual “intends only his own 
security” and “gain” but is “led” by an “invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention … [often] more effectively than when he intends to 
promote it.”103 He says the rich end up forwarding a benevolent intention to divide 
the earth’s provisions in “equal proportions among all its inhabitants…without 
intending it, without knowing it” through the same secret guidance of an “invisi-
ble hand.”104 In all this, the economy finds its analogy within the larger workings 
of Nature, which also directs irrational instincts to “fulfill beneficent ends which 
the Director of nature intended to produce”—the passions of hunger, thirst, and 
pleasure driving their participants to fulfill the divine will without real knowledge 
of the ultimate purpose.105 Nature provides sexual urges and paternal instincts as 
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a means of forwarding its true end in the propagation of the species, providing 
a quintessential example of the irrational way in which nature and the economy 
work in general, deriving its order from the chaotic nature of forces working below 
the surface.106
This concept of life might lead other commentators like Schopenhauer and 
Darwin to develop a more atheistic interpretation of the way nature works, but 
Smith remains committed to the basic tradition of his society and early capitalism 
in affirming a belief in divine providence. He speaks of the universe as a “great 
machine” with “secret wheels and springs,” God as the “great Architect of the 
Universe,” the “great Director of Nature,” or “Invisible Hand,” and uses the met-
aphor of a “watch-maker” to demonstrate a theistic, or teleological belief in the 
nature of life serving a final cause.107 At times, he proceeds in this line of thinking 
as far as it goes and thinks of the universe as the best of all possible worlds, as if 
the cosmic force contrives and conducts the immense machine in such a way that 
self-interest perfectly matches the general welfare as “happiness and perfection of 
the species”; even the “weakness and folly of men” serve the greater design of the 
divine “wisdom and goodness.”108 But one wonders whether Smith is holding on 
to a mythological explanation against the basic propensities of his understanding 
of the way life works in reality and on its terms, just like so many others in the 
early stages of the tradition. First of all, he admits that life does not always yield 
such sublime results in his way of thinking, so he finds it necessary to interject the 
government here and there to correct the abuses of self-interest through prudent 
and moralistic policies. Second, he often shows how self-interest results in societal 
benefits through offering simple examples but seems to defy the explanatory value 
of his own illustrations by interjecting a mystical force that no longer serves any 
real purpose. Why interject a deus ex machina when no real mystery remains about 
the fundamental mechanisms of the economy when the chaos of self-interest can 
explain the apparent order or design in a simple manner? Does the presupposition 
of a divine force serve any real purpose? 
Like the physiocrats, Smith continues to persevere in understanding nature 
through theistic categories, emphasizing the natural law and exhibiting the same 
tensions as his predecessors in describing the divine role in it.109 Sometimes the 
laws of nature refer to the machine of divine creation that can be described in a 
rational, mathematical, and scientific manner when studying the empirical form 
of its design and inner workings. Other times the natural law refers to divine 
imperatives, which God impresses upon all human beings, serving as a guide for 
success in receiving its rewards as if obeying the laws of karma. Smith says that 
“every virtue naturally meets with its proper reward, with the recompense which 
is most fit to encourage and promote it; and this too is so surely, that it requires a 
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very extraordinary concurrence of circumstances entirely to disappoint it,” making 
it “almost always true” that “honesty is the best policy,” that nature rewards the 
“industrious knave” over the “indolent man.”110 
The tension within the natural law leads him to adopt a distinct dualism in 
his view of government policy. On the one hand, he advocates a laissez-faire policy 
as the fundamental disposition of the government toward the economy answering 
to his emphasis upon the way nature happens to work out best through its own 
design and maintaining that politicians should stay out of it and let the forces of 
nature set prices and wages according to the law of supply and demand.111 In this 
way, he champions the cause of freedom: the freedom of choice in occupations 
through the absence of regulations and settlement laws, the freedom of trade in 
commerce by repealing restrictions on land transfers and abolishing import duties 
and local custom taxes, and the freedom from undue regulation in general, so 
much associated with the Mercantilist regime and its protection of special interest 
groups, inhibiting genuine competition and the freedom of all citizens.112 On the 
other hand, he ends up rejecting a doctrinaire laissez-faire policy and finds a more 
positive role for government to play in the economy answering to his belief in the 
moral imperative within the natural law and recognizing that what transpires in 
the world of nature and self-interest does not always serve a wise, good, or prudent 
end.113 Here he decides to list three basic duties as the specific responsibility of the 
sovereign: to protect society against foreign and domestic violence; to establish an 
exact administration of justice, and to erect “certain public institutions and certain 
public works.”114 He also speaks of an “impartial spectator,” who judges the pro-
priety of individual activity and makes it fit within the general rules of society.115 
The passions of self-interest must be tempered by a sense of “fair play” and the 
“laws of justice,” which discourage violence toward others and ensure a benevolent 
purpose for all.116 These laws find a basis within an “immediate sense and feeling” 
of the divine will, and have no pretext within the empirical or rational calculations 
of utilitarianism. Smith rejects the attempt of David Hume and the early English 
Deists to restore a genuine sense of ethics through secular means and prefers the 
inconsistency of a moderate stance, which clings to the old religious and moral 
categories while subscribing to the basic principles of acquisitive capitalism.117 
Social Darwinism
Despite Smith’s concerns, the theory was extended into the social sphere to 
question the traditional moral approaches, and found one of its most disturbing 
applications within the pitiless world of Social Darwinism, which viewed the old 
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moral reaction to human misery as counterproductive. This new approach to social 
issues received an early impetus from the work of Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), a 
Cambridge mathematician and rector of a parish. Malthus simply took a number 
of basic ideas from Smith and expanded them into a more sober and arresting view 
of life, as embodied in his controversial work, An Essay of the Principle of Popula-
tion (1798)—a book that “haunted,” “overshadowed,” and “darkened all English 
life for seventy years,” according to its critics.118 The work was excoriated for its 
dark message in seeing misery as a fact of life and directly opposed by authors like 
William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet, who heralded an optimistic view 
of human “perfectability” and unlimited possibilities following the French Revolu-
tion.119 In the work, Malthus acknowledges the disconcerting nature of his thesis 
and the heartfelt desires of his critics to paint a rosier picture of life and its future 
possibilities, but he also finds them disingenuous and wants to develop a more 
realistic conception about the prospects for success, given the indelible nature of 
human vice and weakness and the “unconquerable difficulties” of making genuine 
progress on certain issues.120 He wants to face life with all the integrity and skep-
ticism of Mandeville’s analysis, rather than escape its problems and try to create 
an illusory world of idealistic expectations, which only end up making the brute 
realities of everyday existence even worse. 
Within this spirit, Malthus sees suffering as an integral aspect of life and 
essential part of the divine plan. He finds it impossible to remove its cruelties 
through idealistic government policies and better to embrace suffering as a nec-
essary component of the grand scheme of things for stimulating “mental and cor-
poreal” development of the species.121 Malthus finds suffering most beneficial in 
checking the problem of population growth since humans tend to multiply beyond 
their food supply and need a means of reducing the number of mouths to feed.122 
According to the theory, population tends to increase in a “geometric ratio,” while 
“subsistence increases only in an arithmetrical ratio,” causing a “strong and con-
stantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence,” which 
can hardly keep up with the growth.123 Malthus finds it wise for the government 
to practice a laissez-faire policy and let nature take its course without trying to 
alter what works best on its own principles. Poor-laws involving public and private 
assistance only help a few misfortunate souls and have no effect on the problem of 
starvation in the country among the general populace. Handing out money only 
helps those who receive it, without increasing production, and makes those who 
receive nothing from the program starve by forcing them to pay more and more for 
less and less food according to the law of supply and demand.124 
If one hears in these words some of the basic themes of acquisitive capitalism, 
it is because Malthus relates them to Smith’s economic theories125 and stresses 
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many of the same themes of Smith and other capitalists within the text as bearing 
upon his social interpretation. He speaks of the basic capitalistic emphasis upon 
self-interest as the fundamental motivating factor of human beings. He rejects 
William Godwin’s emphasis upon benevolence as the most important factor in 
society, along with the typical left-wing call for rich people to give the necessi-
ties of life unto the poor without exacting labor.126 He also speaks with the same 
skepticism of capitalism toward the Mercantilist System, rejecting the need for 
the government to meddle in the economy and preferring to let the basic laws of 
nature “operate as a constant check to incipient population” in creating equilib-
rium.127 Even his basic thesis finds some mention within the Wealth of Nations, 
where Smith speaks with some concern over population levels in wanting people 
and animals to multiply “in proportion to the means of subsistence” and the 
demand for labor to determine the rate of birth128—affording much the same sen-
timent as Malthus and indicating the clear affinity and relation between the works 
of these two scholars and their schools of thought. 
Smith’s form of capitalism was never an isolated theory of economics, but a 
part of a social tradition that contained ramifications for other disciplines as a total 
perspective upon life. Perhaps, most interesting was its relation to the emerging 
science of biology in the nineteenth century and the social theories that developed 
in light of this relationship, where science and economics merged with each other 
in significant ways. Charles Darwin saw the relationship in developing his theory 
of evolution and recognizing its larger social implications. In his writings, he bor-
rows Mandeville’s analogy of a ship to illustrate his basic mechanism of evolution-
ary development and show how life can evolve in a piecemeal manner through 
a step-by-step process of trial and error, without an end in view or antecedent 
design, just like Mandeville’s concept of capitalism.129
When we no longer look at organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something 
wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production of nature as one 
which has had a history; when we contemplate every complex structure and instinct as 
the summing up of many contrivances, each useful to the processor, nearly in the same 
way as when we look at any great mechanical invention as the summing up of the 
labour, the experience, the reason, and even the blunders of numerous workmen; when 
we thus view each organic being, how far more interesting, I speak from experience, 
will the study of natural history become.130
He and Wallace also speak of Malthus’ significant influence upon them in devel-
oping their respective theories of natural selection. Wallace says,
But perhaps the most important book I read was Malthus’s “Principles of Population”, 
which I greatly admired for its mastery summary of the facts and logical induction to 
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conclusions. It was the first work that I had yet read treating of any of the problems 
of philosophical biology, and its main principles remained with me as a permanent 
possession, and twenty years gave me the long-sought clue to the effective agent in 
the evolution of organic species…without which work I should probably not have hit 
upon the theory of natural selection and obtained full credit for its independent dis-
covery.… [W]hile again considering the problem of the origin of the species, some-
thing led me to think of Malthus’ Essay on Population (which I had read about ten 
years before), and the “positive checks”—war, disease, famine, accidents, etc.—which 
he adduced as keeping all savage populations nearly stationary. It then occurred to 
me that these checks must also act upon animals, and keep down their numbers; and 
as they increase so much faster than man does, …. While vaguely thinking how this 
would affect any species, there suddenly flashed upon me the idea of the survival of 
the fittest.131
Darwin mentions reading Malthus’s Essay on September 28, 1838, and proceeds 
to talk about its importance in developing his theory.132
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry, I 
happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to 
appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued 
observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me under these cir-
cumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones 
to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species. Here, then, 
I had last got a theory by which to work; but I was so anxious to avoid prejudice, that 
I determined not for some time to write even the briefest sketch of it.133
As soon as I had fully realized this idea [of the power of selection], I saw, on reading 
Malthus on Population, that Natural Selection was the inevitable result of the rapid 
increase of all organic beings; for I was prepared to appreciate the struggle for exis-
tence by having long studied the habits of animals.134
You are right, that I came to the conclusion that selection was the principle of change 
from the study of domestic productions; and then, reading Malthus, I saw at once how 
to apply this principle.135
A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic 
beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces sev-
eral eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during 
some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its 
numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country should support 
the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there 
must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of 
the same species, or the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions 
of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal 
and vegetable kingdom.136
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[My theory of evolution] … is the doctrine of Malthus applied in most cases with 
ten-fold force.137
In these testimonies, Darwin speaks of his fundamental agreement with Malthus 
concerning the geometric expansion of the species and the natural check upon the 
expansion, leading to starvation and selection.138 Malthus helps Darwin under-
stand the importance of struggle within nature in evolving the species by showing 
the difficulty of supporting a large offspring in an environment and allowing the 
strong to triumph over the weak.139 
Darwin makes more of a concerted effort to confine his work to the realm of 
natural history, but his ideas were formulated within a larger cultural context and 
were destined to precipitate into a larger social agenda.140 John Maynard Keynes 
sees the Darwinians as simply outpacing the capitalists in advocating “the supreme 
achievement of chance, operating under conditions of free competition and lais-
sez-faire” government policy, with Herbert Spencer and the “Social Darwinians” 
serving as the supreme example of this intimate relationship.141 Even Darwin rec-
ognizes the relation and remains personally linked to the economic and social 
ramifications of his theory in accepting Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest” as 
a “more accurate” way of conceiving “natural selection,” while expressing admira-
tion for Spencer’s general application of the theory to society.142 Darwin can speak 
just like Malthus in rejecting human intervention on behalf of the weak, finding 
poor-laws and asylums “highly injurious to the race of man” and counterproduc-
tive to achieving the ultimate triumph of the strong.
We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimina-
tion; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-
laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the 
last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who 
from weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak 
members of civilized societies propagate their own kind. No one who has attended to 
the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the 
race of man.143
In the case of corporeal structures, it is the selection of the slightly better-endowed 
and the elimination of the slightly less well-endowed individuals, and not the preser-
vation of strongly-marked and rare anomalies, that leads to the advancement of a spe-
cies. So it will be with the intellectual faculties, since the somewhat abler men in each 
grade of society succeed rather better than the less able, and consequently increase 
in number, if not otherwise prevented. When in any nation the standard of intellect 
and the number of intellectual men have increased, we might expect from the law of 
the deviation from an average, that prodigies of genius will, as shewn by Mr. Galton, 
appear somewhat more frequently than before.144
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Lastly, I could show fight on natural selection having done and doing more for the 
progress of civilization than you seem inclined to admit. Remember what risk the 
nations of Europe ran not so many years ago of being overwhelmed by the Turks, and 
how ridiculous such an idea now is! The more civilized so-called Caucasian races have 
beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence. Looking at the world at no 
very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated 
by the higher civilized races throughout the world.145 
This world of Social Darwinism represented a much different perspective on 
life than the Pauline concept of self-sacrificing love for the weak and down-and-
out (1 Cor 1). It represented a different social message than the Puritan concept 
of altruistic capitalism, which exhorted its followers to sacrifice the pleasure of 
narcissistic goals and work for others in building a “City on a Hill” and a better life 
for future generations. Social Darwinism developed out of a different tradition of 
capitalism, which was more pessimistic about redeeming society, given the innate 
darkness of human nature and the need to be realistic about future prospects. The 
acquisitive capitalists saw no possibility of cleansing the world from the tainted 
motives of self-interest or escaping its tribulations and imposing a religious order 
on society that might change human nature into a more sublime image. It was best 
to leave people alone and let them follow their own devices as they often work for 
a good social outcome above and beyond their desires, no matter how unseemly or 
selfish the motives in performing the task at hand. It was best to reject the heavy-
hand of government intervention in their lives and its counterproductive measures 
of bolstering the economy or feeding the poor, and recognize the wisdom of a 
Realpolitik that lets life take its course and work things out on its terms. It was 
unwise to forget the brute realities of life and live in a Platonic, dream-like state 
of ideal perfection, trying to build a utopian or Christian nation and only making 
matters worse in an attempt to make all things right and prop up the weak and 
their wretchedness. 
Because of this, many acquisitive capitalists ended up embracing a dichotomy 
between faith and reason, answering to their division between the spiritual admo-
nitions of the Christian gospel and the practical realities of temporal existence. The 
old religious and moral categories had difficulty explaining the chaotic way of the 
world’s inner mechanism, bringing along with it a certain amount of skepticism to 
traditional theistic rationalizations of life’s difficulties. Reformed scholars like Bayle 
and Mandeville tried to rescue the faith from the criticisms of reason by applying 
their theological beliefs in the total depravity of humankind and the all-sufficient 
grace of God to develop a dichotomy between faith and reason. They permitted 
their philosophical musings to venture into questionable areas and posit dangerous 
ideas, like the social efficacy of self-interest, while confessing the frailty of human 
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reason, its inadequacy to penetrate divine mysteries, and the need for a special act 
of grace to receive the true and solid revelation of God. Almost all of the early 
capitalists deferred to divine providence when explaining the relationship between 
the beneficent end of life and questionable means that were employed to reach 
it as if witnessing a miraculous act of reconciliation beyond the reach of human 
imagination, but secularism was growing, and its apologists gaining ground: some 
beginning to mitigate the paradox in favor of reason, and others seeking to elimi-
nate faith altogether. Smith mitigated the paradox by rejecting the depravity of self- 
interest and merging its desires with those of the public, even though he continued 
to embrace the moral law of the “impartial spectator” to rectify abuses in the system 
and refused to proceed any further and accept the atheistic and utilitarian schema 
of Hume. Helvétius was much more consistent in this line of thinking and rejected 
the basic dichotomy by forwarding the perspective of a thoroughgoing atheist, 
who no longer needed any innate ideas or moral categories and interpreted life in 
materialistic terms—far beyond the British empiricists and most French philosophes. 
Helvétius eliminated the paradox by centering society around the self-interest of the 
greatest happiness principle, denying the depravity of humankind and its desires, 
and making self-interest the efficacious means of virtue in the spirit of a thor-
oughgoing utilitarian point of view. In this more consistent perspective, laissez-faire 
capitalism meant that life worked fine on its own principles, without any need for 
an outside standard of righteousness or special help from the “invisible hand” to 
interfere or perform some extraordinary act. In Social Darwinism, the dogma of 
non-interference was made complete in its defiance of typical religious sensibilities. 
For Malthus, suffering was a simple fact of life and worked well on its own terms in 
controlling the population without the government intervening and messing things 
up through acts of charity. For Darwin, life was like a ship, which evolved through 
the everyday struggles of self-preservation and found no need for creative planning 
or outside orchestration, exorcizing the presence of God from any meaningful role 
in modern biological sciences. 
The ruthless world of Social Darwinism lost favor and gave way to a more 
egalitarian spirit in western civilization after the defeat of Hitler’s racial policies 
in World War II. In America, William F. Buckley fought to preserve a religious 
element within the Republican Party and its basic allegiance to capitalist princi-
ples,146 but he was swimming against the powerful stream of left-wing intelligen-
tsia in the country, which was proceeding toward secularism and erected a wall 
of separation between church and state in 1947 through the mere fiat of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Even the Republican Party was proceeding along with the current 
in a secular direction, only leaving God to a few footnotes and formulas of political 
rhetoric to satisfy the remnant of religious affection among the people. Ayn Rand 
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represented the secular side of the party in emphasizing acquisitive capitalism in 
its most atheistic form. She made her appeal to the modern consumer and the 
growing materialistic interests in the country while mitigating the racial aspect of 
Social Darwinism or the callous disregard for the poor as no longer offering a 
viable political alternative. She saw life within a Darwinian framework in finding 
self-preservation as its “single goal” and turned the pursuit of self-interest into a 
moral imperative.147 She rejected any puritanical admonitions toward altruism as 
unnecessary in fulfilling the mission of capitalism, believing that commerce bene-
fits all parties involved in the mutual exchange of goods and circulation of money 
and requires no one to sacrifice any of their needs for the sake of others.148 She felt 
that true love always includes self-interest. It never involves an unconditional act 
of self-sacrifice or the granting of unconditional favors in spite of one’s feelings 
or respect. True love involves a personal affection and esteem, which experiences 
self-gratification in the presence of the beloved.149 This favorable review of self- 
interest resonated with many Republicans,150 but her form of acquisitive capitalism 
ran into some difficulty when attempting to explain sacred notions like individ-
ual property rights, which remained so much a part of the country and especially 
the Republican Party. Rand’s atheistic philosophy had to reject the historical jus-
tification for developing these rights within the will of God, and forced her to 
attribute the notion to an idea “derived from reality” and “validated by a process 
of reason,” making inalienable rights and social ethics an “objective, metaphysical” 
area of study.151 However, much of her discussion seemed vacant on this point, 
unable to answer simple questions. How can a metaphysical notion like natural 
law or rights be derived from a simple description of nature? How can one find an 
imperative within this world as if it contained a transcendent commentary upon 
its own processes? Or, can reason transform its limited vantage point in describing 
what happens to transpire in nature and find a more exalted role in prescribing 
what “ought” to occur in reality, when no ideal world exists to anchor this type of 
judgment?152 Such a problem has confronted atheism down through the ages and 
leaves some room for the place of religion in the modern world, which has yet to 
discover a coherent alternative. 
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II. 
The Removal of Religion from 
Human Development and  
Natural Events

History is a discipline that cannot escape its humanity. It is continually involved 
in the all-too-human process of selecting and representing people and events to 
highlight what is significant for the “lesson” at hand. If science cannot know the 
“thing-in-itself ” in the post-Kantian world, with all its direct and existential rela-
tion to the empirical object, then history cannot know the “past-in-itself ” through 
the indirect testimony of its human records and documents.1 No better illustration 
of this problem is the many and continuous quests of scholars to obtain objective 
or semi-objective information on Jesus of Nazareth—perhaps, the most pivotal 
or crucial figure in western civilization. Scholars find the humanity of the early 
reports disconcerting when trying to ascertain the exact historical truth about him. 
These reports were written in such a way that the subjectivity of the authors is 
woven together with the object of the inquiry, the style of the authors with the 
words of Jesus, the soteriological significance with the person, and the kerygma 
or message with the historical events, making it difficult to separate the Jesus of 
history from the Christ of faith.2 Was it Jesus or John who proclaimed God’s love 
for the world in sending the only-begotten Son ( Jn 3:16)? Was Jesus still speaking 
to Nicodemus about the Spirit and salvation, or John expanding the account and 
providing his metaphysical commentary when these famous words are related in 
the text? There appears to be no objective way of answering the question about this 
and anything else Jesus said or did. Jesus and John are tangled together within the 
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text, creating a problem that follows the quest for the historical Jesus wherever it 
turns and illustrating the same problem that follows all other historical research in 
varying degrees, since no one can speak in an objective way about events, or escape 
the human element of history. The subject and object are ever joined within the 
human condition.
In the United States, many people complain about the secular bias of modern 
textbooks, marginalizing religion and its people in a systematic manner.3 Few 
people find their complaint without merit, given the religious sensibilities of many 
Americans and desire to represent all perspectives in an egalitarian and demo-
cratic society. Paul Vitz and the Department of Education led the crusade against 
secular bias in the 1980s by conducting an exhaustive study of the nation’s social 
and history texts and complaining that these texts generally ignored religion as 
a motivating factor in the nation’s fundamental beliefs and tended to associate 
it with antiquated colonial beliefs of a bygone era.4 In a rare instance of political 
cooperation, both left-wing and right-wing forces joined the chorus in the next 
few decades in complaining about the secular bias or marginalization of religion 
in the texts.5 
Probably the most egregious problem that many of these critics mention in 
their reviews is the overemphasis upon the concept of religious freedom in found-
ing the country. Robert Bryan says,
These textbooks are written to propound the thesis that America was settled for the sake of 
religious freedom, and that religious freedom means the absence of religion [emphasis in 
original].… Once the [early Eastern seaboard] settlement has been effected, and the 
population has escaped from the trammels of religion, religion need not be mentioned 
again. There are exceptions to this general rule, but they are so sporadic as to be 
incapable of conveying anything like the true importance of religion in America.…6
Bryan sees the strong emphasis upon religious freedom as a surreptitious attack 
upon religion, or a clandestine way of stressing that religion brings strife and divi-
sion in society above all other social forces, and people need emancipation from 
its dogma in the public arena.7 This doctrine of “toleration” feigns the high road 
of advancing the cause of liberty and diversity, but causes the reader to dislike 
religious people as an intended or unintended consequence by making them the 
sponsors of intolerance and bigotry in society.8 The texts develop this notion of 
“tolerance” by viewing the world in a binary manner, adopting Jefferson’s “wall of 
separation between church & state,” and causing the reader to miss the intimate 
relationship between religion, politics, and culture, except in a negative way.9 
The influence of the binary is best illustrated by the enormous credit given to 
certain eighteenth-century patriarchs or “Founding Fathers” for establishing the 
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American view of government while slighting any serious mention of the Puri-
tan matrix of these ideas within the culture. It is abundantly clear that Puritans 
served as the fundamental social force in spreading concepts like liberty, equal-
ity, democracy, and the federal government in England during the seventeenth 
century and used these ideas to establish vital experiments in New England at 
that time, beginning with the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629. It is also clear 
that their culture stimulated the revolt against Mother England during the next 
century, with Congregationalists representing up to nine-tenths of the churches 
and the Reformed around three-quarters of all churches in America. A previous 
study established these matters in some detail,10 but other studies, typically older 
studies like David Hume’s History of England and Alex de Tocqueville’s Democracy 
in America, knew of this cultural influence and related it with much the same 
emphasis,11 before the binary mindset began to skew the judgment of historians 
and eliminate the positive significance of religion in shaping the nation.12 Today, 
the Puritan heritage is practically forgotten. The grave of John Winthrop, the first 
democratically-elected governor of the Puritans, lies hardly noticeable next to a 
Unitarian church and Boston’s Freedom Trail, which celebrates the typical figures 
and events of the American Revolution, without much reference to Puritans. The 
“Founding Fathers” of the country are not Puritans but eighteenth-century “sec-
ular” politicians who helped lead the revolt and receive much credit for doing so 
through the erection of idols and colonnaded temples on the Washington Mall, 
the consecration of holidays in their honor, and the naming of buildings and land-
marks—all to the glory of their role in history and the national consciousness. 
Sometimes their religion is mentioned to pacify certain quarters but only as a 
footnote and often separated from their “enlightened” political point of view. 
This bias of modern American history began to develop at the end of the 
eighteenth century when the ideology and attitudes of French philosophes gained 
considerable stature among the intelligentsia and the learned public. The new 
enlightened disposition carried with it a decided bias against Christianity in gen-
eral as the great obstacle to human progress and sponsor of bigotry and turmoil 
in society—part of which was grounded in the substantive shortcomings of the 
church but much of it in an exaggerated and unbalanced caricature of its history. 
Ironically, much of the criticism began within the church in Protestant circles, 
who wanted to reform their religion and not destroy it. The Puritans led the way 
in trying to reform the church of “Romish” practices in England but ended up 
creating a dark caricature of ecclesiastical history in their zealotry—a zealotry 
that was used by the enemies of the Christian faith to proceed even further and 
propose écrazer l’infâme with Voltaire and his disciples in the French Revolution. 
John Foxe’s Actes and Monuments (1563) served as the most popular and celebrated 
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account of this conception of history, undergoing no less than nine editions and 
several abridgments before the Puritan Revolution in the 1640s.13 His work dis-
pensed with the typical hagiography of previous accounts and preferred to empha-
size the dark side, revealing for the first time in a “full and complete history” the 
atrocities that developed in the church a thousand years after its inception—the 
corruption, bribery, graft, simony, and violence of this “dark age.” The papal church 
made a pact with the devil during this time and persecuted the small “rennaunt” 
of true believers, barely visible to the naked eye—“heretics” like Berengar of Tours, 
Joachim, William Ockham, John Wyclif, Lorenzo Valla, and John Hus.14 The 
church developed into a thoroughly corrupt institution and needed serious reform 
in the mind of the Puritans—or maybe, a much more permanent solution as the 
early English Deists and French philosophes had in mind.
Voltaire (1694–1778)
Voltaire and the French philosophes used this Protestant concept of history as con-
ducive to their polemical struggle with the church and paved the way toward the 
modern version of history, which no longer looks to the Judeo-Christian tradition 
as the fundamental source of cultural inspiration. In his works, Voltaire is the first 
to recognize his bias or the subjective nature of human history and his account 
of it.15 He admits quite openly that writing history involves a process of limiting 
the immense amount of material that encompasses all of life and selecting what 
is of “use” to the author’s purpose.16 In fact, he finds it necessary to dispense with 
documentation to make the material accessible to the reader in creating a graceful 
narrative and highlighting what is truly significant or necessary to know.17 Writing 
history involves the author in a “philosophical” process as one attempts to synthe-
size the material into a comprehensible unity for the reader and brings the imprint 
of moral judgment upon it, as one tries to characterize the past and provide “les-
sons” for future generations to follow.18 
Voltaire’s “philosophical history” shows a distinct bias toward the present, as if 
all of history was leading up to his era and culture in a teleological manner.19 The 
progress involves a desire to demythologize or exorcise any supernatural under-
standing of history and emphasize the autonomous “march of the human mind” in 
creating the world through the rational use of nature.20 Of course, secular scholars 
tend to hail this move as a significant moment in the production of modern history 
as they follow Voltaire in using present standards to judge the past and promote the 
current secular view of life as the objective way to understand things.21 They might 
be less pronounced in their bias, but the basic outline of the Voltairean program 
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remains much the same in exalting secularity. Voltaire thinks Western Europe 
is “now more populated, more wealthy, more enlightened than before, and even 
more superior to the Roman empire.”22 In particular, the “age of Louis XIV” is the 
“dawn of good taste,” the “most enlightened century that ever was,” and embodies 
the standard by which one can judge all the other periods.23 This era stands in 
stark contrast to the Middle Ages, where “human nature fell to a sub-bestial level 
in many respects” after the fall of Rome.24 “Physics, astronomy, and the principles 
of medicine” were unknown in the “age of darkness”; its universities filled with 
“gibberish,” mixing theology and philosophy together to resolve the most inane 
scholastic disputes.25 Toward the end of the thirteenth century, the Italians began 
to “shake off this barbarous rust,” and continued the “rebirth” up until the seven-
teenth century when Galileo brought “real philosophy” to Europe by using the 
“language of truth and reason” in his physics.26 Italy preserved this flicker of light, 
while the Reformation devastated much of Western Europe, “retarding instead of 
forwarding the progress of reason.”27 The Reformers brought a “tyrannical spirit,” 
“inflexible and violent” temper and “strong desire to distinguish themselves” in the 
hope of “attaining power over consciences.”28 The modern world needed to throw 
off its “self-incurred tutelage” within the Judeo-Christian tradition to become 
truly “enlightened” through the power of autonomous or secular reason.29 
Throughout the presentation, Voltaire displays his intense animosity toward 
the Judeo-Christian tradition as a primary motive underlying his historical anal-
ysis.30 He wants to show how little value the West derived from its relation to 
Hebrew culture and how much havoc it endured from the Christian Church, 
the intolerant offspring of Jewish religious convictions.31 His Essai les Moeurs et 
l ’Esprit des Nations finds one of its main purposes in undermining the bigotry 
or provincial nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition by broadening the limited 
contours of western history into a universal perspective, which tries to encompass 
and appreciate all major cultural forms upon the globe.32 The vast majority of the 
presentation still remains centered on European history, but he does his best to 
include a number of sections upon other cultures to reduce the problem of western 
ethnocentricity—a remarkable achievement given the knowledge and resources 
of the day. In trying to promote the study of other cultures, he lures in the audi-
ence by suggesting the West owes a considerable cultural debt to the East as the 
“nursery of all arts.”33 In trying to promote religious toleration, he extolls Islam for 
creating a superior culture in Spain, exhibiting more openness to people than the 
Jews, and displaying more toleration than Christians toward each other through-
out its empire.34 As a good Deist, he wants the audience to believe that all human 
beings possess the same essential beliefs and values, and does so by portraying 
the Chinese, Mongols, Japanese, Indians, and other peoples as believing in one 
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supreme deity and sharing a similar ethical code, except exhibiting more toleration 
than Jews and Christians during much of their history.35 
He thinks of Christianity as causing most of the violence within western soci-
ety. Unlike the “pagan” religious community, the church was split with seditious 
disputes over dogmatic tenets throughout its history: bishops condemning each 
other to exile, prison, death, and eternal torment36; popes using trivial matters 
of contention to excommunicate their rivals—all for the sake of gaining power.37 
Christian emperors joined the zealotry by extending the religion through the force 
of arms. They ensured uniformity among the subjects by participating in the big-
otry of Orthodox disputes, like the infamous iconoclastic controversy during and 
after the time of Charlemagne, the burning of heretics beginning at Orléans in 
1022, and the Thirty Years’ War, which divided Germany with intolerance and 
chaos during the times of the Reformation. Voltaire likes to emphasize these dark 
chapters in Christendom and provides a darker interpretation of the events than 
what is typically presented in most accounts to diminish the church.38 For exam-
ple, his description of the crusades provides little sympathy for the Crusaders and 
tends to favor the Muslim side of the situation to promote this agenda. Voltaire 
speaks of the crusades as beginning with the “pathetic” and “imaginative” ravings 
of Peter the Hermit, who complained about the “exactions which he suffered in 
Jerusalem” and gave Urban II an excuse to incite enthusiasm and call Christians to 
arms against Muslims.39 In taking Jerusalem on July 5, 1099, the Crusaders mas-
sacred all non-Christians without mercy and then “burst into tears” upon reaching 
the sepulcher of Christ, the ill-founded destination of their fanaticism.40 Some of 
them were motivated by “their zeal and love of glory, others by their crimes and 
distresses; the fury of propagating religion by the sword.”41 Voltaire contrasts this 
orthodox zeal with the generosity of Muslims like Saladin, who spared the lives of 
Crusaders, restored the Church of the Holy Sepulcher to the Orthodox, and loved 
all human beings as brothers, regardless of their specific religious profession.42 
When Voltaire thinks of the church, he invariably has its hierarchy in mind 
and his intense dislike for its exercise of authority in the temporal sphere. He says 
that all humankind has some sense of the priesthoods’ oppressive nature and want 
to gain independence from the temporal lusts of popes, bishops, and priests.43 In 
the desire to gain worldly power and possession, the hierarchy has corrupted the 
sanctity of the church and brought anarchy and bloodshed to society.44 
In describing the church and its hierarchy, Voltaire’s particular focus falls upon 
the papacy as representing the entire mission of the church. His account tries to 
proceed in a fair and objective manner by praising the conduct and rule of certain 
popes and dismissing scurrilous reports of wickedness when sufficient historical 
documentation is lacking, but the general drift of the discussion contains a decided 
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agenda in directing the reader toward a dark view of the papal office and its history. 
A few good things are mentioned, but papal crimes and wickedness stand out in 
the account and include such infamous acts as immorality, incest, and debauch-
ery; murdering the innocent, poisoning rivals, and torturing enemies; and selling 
relics, benefices, and absolution in order to gain a more opulent lifestyle45—the 
typical Protestant charges that contain some element of truth when kept within 
proportion. 
Above all the charges, Voltaire centers his account upon the lust for tem-
poral power. This passion has prompted the papacy to issue “false decretals” like 
the Donation of Constantine and moved some of its occupants to engage in the 
tragicomic image of leading armies into battle, with bishops serving as officers.46 
Voltaire finds the zenith of this impudence within the constant attempt of popes 
to make emperors, kings, and princes their vassals, subjecting them to chastise-
ment or humiliating acts of penance—a matter that preoccupies his discussion.47 
The “superstition” of the day granted to the pontifex maximus absolute authority 
over the remission of sins, and the popes used the power to control princes and 
undermine their secular authority.48 Gregory VII (1073–1085) was the first pope 
to raise his dignity above the state as the judge of all temporal rulers, claiming 
the sacred duty to reproach moral lapses in worldly powers and pull down their 
pride.49 Voltaire rejects the papacy’s right to meddle in the affairs of the state 
and commends the response of “every secular prince endeavoring to render his 
government independent of the see of Rome.”50 He chastens Gregory VII as 
an evil man with an “inflexible ambition,” believing that “every good citizen” 
should hold him in horror,51 but shows considerable secular bias in failing to 
appreciate the depravity of civic rulers and their need for moral reproof.52 He 
displays almost no understanding of the important relationship between the rise 
of canon law and papal power in the eleventh century and so expresses no appre-
ciation for the papal office and its attempt to bring some semblance of moral 
order in Europe by chastening the wantonness of its rulers.53 Gregory VII and 
his successors are attempting to make lex rex,54 while Voltaire prefers to exalt the 
autonomous wisdom and powers of his “enlightened” despots in throwing off the 
yoke of the Vatican and its law.
Voltaire’s analysis of the church suffers from its continual preoccupation 
with the papacy and its failure to grasp the many dimensions and cultural ram-
ifications of the religion as a whole. In his Essai and elsewhere, he proposes to 
write a history that steers away from the old emphasis upon the battles of worldly 
leaders and center upon the development of the human mind, as well as the cus-
toms and manners affecting the everyday life of the common person,55 but much 
of his emphasis belies this type of expansive vision. Most of his history spends 
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its energy upon the power brokers of society, and only a small minority of sec-
tions are devoted to larger intellectual and sociological concerns in any explicit 
way. This deficit is particularly evident in his analysis of the church, which he 
tends to portray through papal intrigues or the power plays of its hierarchy—
hardly representing its overall cultural impact or what the religion represents 
to the average person. For the most part, his discussion appears to ignore the 
political and cultural ramifications of the Christian faith, especially any positive 
impact on the maturation of society and prefers to think of the religion as a mere 
“pretense” for “perpetual slaughter and confusion” in Europe.56 For example, he 
tends to characterize the Protestant faith as bringing more sectarian dissent into 
Europe and fails to recognize its decisive role in the emerging political order of 
the modern world, except in a few parenthetical comments. He describes the 
“first religious war between Catholics and the Reformed” without understanding 
Zwingli’s struggle for liberty against the Hapsburgs and the pope.57 He dis-
cusses the massacre of Huguenots on Saint Bartholomew’s Day and empathizes 
with their suffering, but considers their religious ideas fanatical and shows little 
appreciation for the clear relationship between those ideals and their republican 
views of polity as a part of the conflict.58 He recognizes the Protestant faith of 
Elizabeth I but shows no connection between her religious profession and poli-
cies of toleration—perhaps wanting to attribute this positive change of heart to 
some other factor than her understanding of Christian faith and practice.59 He 
condemns the Puritans for executing William Laud, the Archbishop of Can-
terbury, over his preference for traditional Catholic ceremonies but ignores the 
deeper nature of the conflict, which concerns his support for the hierarchical 
government and his nefarious role in persecuting nonconformists as the chief 
inquisitor of the Privy Council.60 
When he acknowledges the deeper connections, it typically leads to a wholesale 
condemnation of the political stance as a product of fanatical religious devotion. 
He condemns Thomas Muntzer for taking Luther’s priesthood of the believers or 
obsession with equality and preaching to the peasants that “all humans are created 
equal.”61 He condemns the Puritans and Whigs for taking the same egalitarian 
emphasis, developing a republican polity, undermining the royalty, and leading the 
British nation into “barbarism.”62 But he expresses his most vehement condemna-
tion for those religious fanatics who deign to attack the king: Catholic fanatics for 
conspiring against Henry IV and James I, Jesuits for justifying regicide, and Puritans 
for deigning to execute Charles I.63 Voltaire considers the rule of secular despots not 
so bad as to warrant their violent removal.64 The real source of evil occurs when the 
church tries to meddle in the affairs of state and inflict its fanatical beliefs upon it. 
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Guillaume Thomas François Raynal (1713–1796)
The philosophes continued the legacy of Voltaire’s philosophical history in writ-
ing a new account of its persons and events that diminished and demeaned the 
contribution of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Their most famous and influential 
work was L’Histoire philosophique et politique des établissemens et du commerce des 
Européens dans les deux Indes, which was first published in 1770 and substantially 
expanded a couple of times in 1774 and 1780. It was attributed to Abbé Raynal, 
although Diderot composed around a third of it and others collaborated with him 
in producing the massive six-volume work. Its immediate impact was enormous in 
spreading the philosophes’ point of view throughout France, Britain, and America, 
undergoing thirty official French editions and producing almost half that number 
in English during the first few decades.65 
In the work, Raynal (and his colleagues) conveys the typical suspicion of 
priests that circulated among the philosophes.66 He denigrates the Jewish priests 
of the OT as the forerunners of the Christian hierarchy,67 but specifically focuses 
on the policies of Constantine in the fourth century and blames him for pro-
ducing an “ecclesiastical despotism,” which afforded the clergy an unprecedented 
“share of wealth and authority” and “so many means of future aggrandizement.”68 
Thereafter these ministers became obsessed with power in regulating the conduct 
of others, disposing of their fortunes, and “securing to themselves in the name of 
heaven the arbitrary government of the world.” The power was used to enhance 
the ministers and provided no benefit to the rest of humankind in helping them 
lead a more felicitous life here on earth. It only served the priests in obtaining 
the things of this world and corrupting their spiritual ministry. It caused them to 
represent a corrupt moral example of “abuses, sophisms, injustices, and usurpa-
tions,” and serve as the “most dreadful enemies of the state and nation,” corrupting 
princes and all citizens alike.69 
Raynal extends his animosity beyond the priests to encompass the entire 
Christian faith and its stifling effect on the culture. Christianity brought a meta-
physics of doom and gloom into the world, which demolished the “gay divinities 
of Greece and Rome,” making western civilization a dark place.70 It subjected all 
aspects of life to absolute religious surveillance with “prelacies of the Christian 
state…constantly informed of every commotion [and] every event” exercising 
“authority over every individual mind…in almost every transaction.”71 Christi-
anity (along with Islam) covered the nations with blood and ignorance, bringing 
“disputes, schisms, sects, hatred, persecution, and national as well as religious wars” 
over idle scholastic questions “devoid of all sense.”72 The Italian Renaissance began 
to reverse the negative influence of Christianity by reviving the “arts of genius in 
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the republics of Greece and Rome” and extending the “rebirth” to the shores of 
the Thames River. Italy, France, and England are now leading Europe into a new 
enlightened age of continuous linear growth toward the truth through the auspices 
of great lights, such as Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, Bacon, and Newton.73 The 
destruction of Christianity and its priests have brought a new age of freedom and 
toleration, allowing the human race to follow the impulse of their conscience and 
extol the dictates of reason in making social progress.74 
Raynal thinks that modern culture is making special progress in its under-
standing of the operations of good government. He expresses great admiration 
for the English system as the best regulated constitution “upon the face of the 
globe,” with its separation and balance of powers in the tradition of Locke and 
Montesquieu and its allocation of “real legislative power” in the Parliament.75 The 
English were the first to discern the “injustice and insufficiency of ecclesiastical 
power, the limits of regal authority, and the abuses of federal government,” basing 
their system upon the “rights of the people” and a “social compact.”76 This view 
of government was extended into the private sector, where a policy of free trade 
and rewarding hard work provides an enlightened concept of the inner workings 
of a vibrant economy. Raynal says it is these capitalist principles that increase the 
wealth of a nation, rather than the age-old pursuit of gold or the pillaging of other 
peoples through wars of conquest.77 
In comparison to this account of England, his review of America and its poli-
cies is somewhat mixed. He follows the “noble savage” tradition of Rousseau and a 
natural humanitarian conscious that decries the ruthless treatment of native pop-
ulations by the European colonists and inspires many of his readers to do likewise. 
The protest includes a strong denunciation of Spanish exploits in the southern 
hemisphere and the entire institution of slavery in North America.78 He provides 
the most excoriating analysis of these and other practices, and yet he also finds 
much the opposite in the New World that is worthy of praise. In particular, he 
holds out the Quakers of Pennsylvania as the one shining light for all of human-
kind, producing genuine policies of full toleration, liberty, and democracy.79 They 
disestablished religion and made their plantation a joint partnership of “Quak-
ers, Anabaptists, members of the church of England, Methodists, Presbyterians, 
Moravians, Lutherans and Catholics”—all loving and cherishing each other in the 
city of “brotherly love.”80 William Penn and the Quakers chose to purchase much 
of their land from the natives, rather than take what belonged to others through 
violence and bloodshed. Their tolerance set an “example of moderation and justice 
in America, which was never thought of before in Europe.”81 However, his exal-
tation of the Quakers is made at the expense of the Puritans. He recognizes the 
democratic nature of the northeast colonies in making their own laws and electing 
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their own officials,82 but denigrates the republics for the most part as run by reli-
gious fanatics and filled with intolerant practices, which are accented and exagger-
ated in the narrative.83 In doing so, he misses their cultural significance and only 
reveals his own deist prejudice in preferring to exalt non-dogmatic expressions 
of faith like the Quakers and their social impact. His narrative fails to mention 
that the Quakers grew up during the Puritan Revolution and simply extended the 
egalitarian, democratic, and antinomian tendencies that were already an integral 
part of the former religious movement.84 It also fails to remain consistent with its 
own sympathy toward the upcoming revolution in America85—a revolution that 
was spearheaded by the Puritans or Congregationalist of the northeast. Raynal 
recognizes that the “cry of liberty” and the “violent exhortations against England” 
are leading the way toward revolution,86 but he fails to acknowledge the role of 
Northeast Congregationalists in promoting the cause, or the legacy of Puritanism 
in developing the justification for revolution in the first place.87 It is clear that 
Puritans took the lead in fighting for liberty, while Quakers remained in the minds 
of most Americans after the war all-too-passive. Raynal’s account is shortsighted 
in failing to appreciate these and other points because of its secular and religious 
commitments.
Jules Michelet (1798–1874)
France was deeply divided over the philosophes and their legacy in the nineteenth 
century. The philosophes’ vitriolic style incited angry critics from the other side 
of the cultural debate, with some libraries “forced to bowderlize their shelves by 
throwing out volumes of Voltaire and Rousseau,” while others simply warned the 
readers of their connection with the horrors of the Revolution and its Reign of 
Terror.88 Napoleon and his successors tried to lessen the significance of the phi-
losophes, expressing concern about certain aspects of their thought and the radical 
nature of the subsequent Revolution, but this spirit was kept alive by a remnant 
of intellectuals in opposing the general tendency of those regimes. They were led 
by Jules Michelet, who used historical research as an apologetic weapon to defend 
the legacy of the eighteenth century and help reverse the cultural trend toward the 
ascendancy of the philosophes’ ideals.89 In developing his history, he conducted mas-
sive research, perusing official documents in the National Archives and municipal 
records at the Hôtel de Ville as a conscientious historian, but showed few footnotes 
in his work and used the sources more like a lawyer who is pleading a case and 
mentioning only what suits his client than a faithful narrator of the simple facts.90 
He and those who read him were the product of an ideology that they wanted to 
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support by all means and were willing to find material and develop an interpreta-
tion conducive to their cause. His seven-volume Histoire de la Révolution française 
(1847–53) was used as the central text in the cultural war and kept the vision of 
the French Revolution alive among liberal leaders of the Second Empire. When 
the Third Republic came to power, its ideology became the law of the land and 
gained a wide readership that included many political leaders at the time like Jules 
Ferry, Jean Jaurès, and Jules Simon, who cut their teeth on its patriotism, republi-
canism, etatism, and anti-clericalism.91 Today the ideals are firmly implanted into 
the hearts and minds of the French people, and many of them consider Michelet 
the greatest of their historians.92 
His work starts out making a shameless appeal to the ethnic prejudices of the 
French people in exalting the country and its roots in the Revolution. He claims 
to have demonstrated through the strict application of “logic and history” that “my 
glorious country is henceforth the pilot of the vessel of humanity.” This sublime 
destiny was set during the times of the Revolution, which lives as a vital force in 
the souls of the French people revealing its inner mystery and fundamental source 
of being.93 Those who prefer a more critical approach to the Revolution and like 
to emphasize the horrible bloodshed of the period are deprecated as “vampires of 
the ancient régime,” trying to turn its victims into martyrs for the monarchy.94 The 
Revolution should be remembered for its deeper essence as “the advent of the Law, 
the resurrection of Right, and the reaction of Justice.”95
The specific impetus behind the Revolution comes from two different direc-
tions, which are never completely reconciled in the account. The first is the 
influence of the philosophes providing the rational justification for the movement 
through the exercise of a superior intellect. “Whatever ideas the Revolution pos-
sessed it owed to the eighteenth century, to Voltaire and Rousseau.”96 These and 
other philosophes used their reason to penetrate the social order and prescribe the 
law, “bearing the tables of law in [their] hands” as the new version of Moses.97 
“Philosophy found man without right, or rather a nonentity, entangled in a reli-
gious and political system, of which despotism was the base. And she said, ‘Let us 
create man, let him exist through liberty.’”98 
The second impetus is the people, who became the real impulse behind the 
Revolution, moving with their leaders as one voice in “marvelous unanimity” 
toward creating one nation. Here Michelet follows Rousseau in viewing the “gen-
eral will” of the people as the “voice of God.” The people moved upon the Bastille 
through a divine impulse according to his highly romanticized version of events, 
acting outside of reason (philosophes?) and beyond the National Assembly in ful-
filling their spiritual destiny. The people showed great restraint in dealing with 
their enemies and must be viewed as an untainted spiritual force in spite of the bad 
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press, acting outside the evil schemes of Robespierre and Saint-Just, who brought 
such disrepute upon the Revolution and the nation as a whole.99
For Michelet there is only la patrie and la fraternité. The French nation is the 
“real,” the “natural,” and the “eternal image of the good which we possess within 
us.”100 It was born when the first cannon was fired at the Bastille, when the people 
emerged from the isolated posture of egotism and awakened their souls to live in 
a fraternity, when they discovered the fundamental basis of human nature within 
society, before any laws or power could unite them together as one nation.101 The 
“great family of the nation” undermines all other traditional loyalties to immedi-
ate kin, local community, and disparate religious or ethnic customs.102 Michelet 
employs religious language to describe the “new religion” of the state, urging the 
creation of more symbols and festivals to replace the “old” and “pale” ones of the 
moribund Christian religion.103 
The “enemy” of the Revolution was the Christian faith and remains so to this 
day, “far more than the royalty.”104 Michelet rejects the so-called “Catholic Robes-
pierrists” like Philippe-Joseph-Benjamin Buchez and Prosper-Charles Roux, who 
try to merge the principles of the Revolution with the church or believe it is pos-
sible to reform this implacable enemy.105 “The dead church has no heirs”; it has 
brought nothing but darkness into the world.106 Christianity opposed reason and 
justice from its very beginning in the NT. It viewed God as allotting grace and 
forgiveness to a chosen people, outside of true virtue and merit, and justified the 
capricious reign of tyrants through this concept of God, with their similar policies 
of arbitrary favoritism.107 With the destruction of the Roman empire, Christianity 
ushered in a time of chaos, where civil order and justice perished from the earth 
and the righteous were crushed for a thousand years under “hate and maledic-
tion.”108 The medieval church taught that “souls redeemed at the same price are all 
worth the blood of a god; then debased these souls, once recovered, to the level of 
brutes, fastened them to the earth, adjudged them to eternal bondage, and anni-
hilated liberty.”109 The church went on to torture many of those who would not 
conform to its oppression. The Reign of Terror and its guillotine were merciful 
in comparison to the “millions of men butchered, hanged, [and] broken on the 
wheel.” The Bastille represented the typical torture chamber of the church, serv-
ing much the same purpose as convents in the Middle Ages. It was run by Jesuits 
to torture their enemies in its “subterranean dungeons,” where monks meted out 
their arbitrary sense of justice with lettres-de-cachet to get rid of people and bury 
their victims alive.110 The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew’s Day represented the 
modern day policy of Rome in persecuting Huguenots and all other Protestants 
who would not conform to its will.111 The clergy are described as little more than 
conniving hypocrites who possess no real faith and keep the people in darkness.112 
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The French people had an “incontestable right” to take away their estates during 
the Revolution, given the monstrous injustice the church exhibited in the last 
thousand years of seizing this property from the nation. If anything, the French 
people showed great acts of kindness to the priests by giving them a livelihood 
through the state in exchange for the loss of property, leveling the pay of the hier-
archy, and shutting down monasteries that imprisoned many of them for centu-
ries.113 Bishops rewarded the kindness of the French people with inciting the civil 
war that tore apart the country, and remain to this day enemies of the people in 
trying to divide and conquer them.114
David Hume (1711–1776)
The English also produced their share of eminent historians during the period 
of Enlightenment. The standard text of English history was written by David 
Hume, the well-known Scottish philosopher, who gained notoriety for a penetrat-
ing intellect and probing skepticism. His History of England was first published 
in six volumes from 1754 to 1761 and underwent more than fifty editions of the 
complete work through the course of the next century as the basic source on the 
subject.115 In the work, Hume displays his typical intellectual honesty by making 
every effort to provide an objective and critical analysis of the material in pre-
senting his results. He finds French philosophes like Voltaire “sometimes sound, & 
always entertaining” when relating the people and events of the past, but also finds 
them all-too-willing to run roughshod over the facts of history in order to support 
a specific agenda.116 If he contains any political bias, he readily admits the problem 
in describing himself as “a Whig, but a very skeptical one,” hoping to place his 
work “above any regard to Whigs or Tories” and criticize all excesses within the 
political spectrum.117 In keeping with this spirit, he hopes to write an objective, 
empirical, and secular account of history, which skews a priori prejudices of value 
and meaning and spurns the presumption of abstract philosophical theories in 
forcing an artificial unity upon the complexity of human history.118
The quest for honesty leads him to present a more complex portrait of histor-
ical figures than Voltaire provides in his “philosophical history.”119 A good example 
of this tendency might be found in the sections on Elizabeth I, where he provides 
the typical praise of her character and leadership during the period,120 but also 
recognizes that it is only possible to extol her by restricting the commentary to the 
standards of her day, since she clearly exercised her dominion contrary to what the 
English understand as constitutional at present.121 She was no lover of liberty in 
the present sense of the term. She persecuted Puritans and Papists; she ran the Star 
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Chamber and High Commission, extorted money, bought monopolies and exclu-
sive patents; she voided the acts of Parliament and produced obsequious subjects 
under her imperious temper, capricious rulings, and unlimited authority. Hume 
refuses to condemn her for ruling within the limitations of a bygone era, but also 
refuses to sanitize the story or create an image to fit a later political agenda—the 
typical vice of his day.122 
Many historians commend Hume’s example in trying to reduce the subjective 
element of his work as paving the way toward the modern discipline of historical 
writing. Hume certainly provides considerable inspiration for those who seek to 
render the complexity of facts more faithfully and objectively than previous efforts 
in the field, but in commending the effort, no scholar can pretend that Hume 
or anyone else eliminates subjective abstractions and metaphysical judgments in 
assembling and relating the material at hand. In many ways, his work reflects the 
same cultural prejudices that infect every other person’s point of view. In fact, it 
boldly and continually puts forth the British social system as the paradigm of the 
past and future—“if not the best system of government, at least the most entire 
system of liberty, that ever was known amongst mankind,” betraying an intense 
ethnocentric commitment and uniform philosophical prejudice of his enlightened 
intellectual circles.123
His distinctive prejudices also come out in the narrative and often relate to 
the particular means of evolving the present system. Here he speaks much like an 
English gentleman in preferring a moderate approach of “gradual and slow steps” 
that stay within a “happy medium,” rather than making a qualitative leap into the 
unknown.124 This attitude disposes him to extenuate the cruelties of despots and 
justify the security of the established order over the calls and cries for liberty.125 
Like a good English gentleman, he expresses great admiration for the tradition 
of common law in establishing order and stability in the country. Law and order 
evolve gradually through the collective wisdom of the nation and its time-tested 
traditions, developed through centuries of statutes, writs, and customs.126 History 
evinces “the long way that the British people had traveled before achieving the 
political liberty, stability, prosperity, and secularity at home and abroad that they 
enjoyed in the eighteenth century.”127 Those who honor the process of traditional 
evolution and the gravitas of “persons of higher quality” achieve more lasting 
results in the final analysis than the impetuous demand for immediate and radical 
change through “insurrections of the populace.”128 
This prejudice causes him to complain about nonconformist and radical Prot-
estant groups, who want “total abolition of Monarchy” and “total abolition of epis-
copacy and even of the aristocracy” for the sake of leveling society in the name 
of their absolute doctrine of equality.129 He particularly abhors their continuous 
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polemical battles against matters of indifference or “inoffensive observances” 
within the church—“Romish” ritual practices, clerical garb, “images, altars, cru-
cifixes,” and other aspects of high church Anglicanism, unable to appreciate the 
symbolic power of these matters or the need of radicals to fuel change through 
challenging the small things that matter so much to the multitudes and represent 
the old hierarchical order.130 
The fanaticism of the independents, exalted to a higher pitch, abolished ecclesiasti-
cal government, disdained creeds and systems, neglected every ceremony, and con-
founded all ranks and orders [going beyond] any bounds of temper and moderation. 
The soldier, the merchant, the mechanic, indulging the fervors of zeal, and guided 
by the illapses of the spirit, resigned himself to an inward and superior direction, and 
was consecrated, in a manner, by an immediate intercourse and communication with 
heaven.131
This type of attitude leads Hume to deprecate all radical Protestant groups and 
their leaders. John Knox is described as a man “full of sedition, rage, and bigotry,” 
representing the “highest fanaticism of his sect,” preaching against Catholic idola-
try, causing iconoclastic riots, and denigrating Mary Queen of Scots as a “Jezebel” 
in spite of her “gracious condescension to win his favor.”132 Oliver Cromwell is also 
deprecated in the typical style of the day, following the Restoration of the mon-
archy in England and the need to yield obeisance to royalty. Cromwell attained 
his power through “fraud and violence” and used religion as an “instrument of 
his ambition,” possessing the “most profound dissimulation” to cover “his natural 
temper, magnanimity, grandeur, and imperious and dominating policy.”133 He and 
the Puritans accused Charles I of erecting a “tyrannical government” and waging 
war against the Parliament and the people, but this accusation was merely a pretext 
to justify the religious prejudices that drove them to execute the innocent king. 
Hume again shows his “royalist” leanings in allowing the people to resist tyranny 
as long as it does not proceed too far and result in the execution of the king. The 
beheading of Charles I was the “height of depravity.”134
His religious prejudice also helps skew the account in certain other areas. 
The prejudice never matches the anti-Semitic and anti-Christian hatred of the 
French philosophes, but it is sufficient to taint the account and cause him to miss 
many instances of Christianity’s positive influence on society. The “Scottish skep-
tic” finds religious questions subject to serious doubt, believing it is impossible to 
establish the existence of God in any rigorous philosophical manner—let alone 
speculate about the nature of God’s being and engage in passionate arguments 
about one’s point of view.135 The Christian religion has caused much turmoil in 
society by engaging in these theological flights of fancy and making its speculations 
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and superstitions a matter of official dogma for the rest to follow.136 He continu-
ally refers to Catholicism as “abject superstition”137 and develops a rather negative 
review of the church’s place in society because of this harsh and simplistic assess-
ment. 
But we may observe, the few ecclesiastical establishments have been fixed upon a 
worse foundation than that of the Church of Rome, or have been attended with cir-
cumstances more hurtful to the peace and happiness of mankind.
The large revenues, privileges, immunities, and powers of the clergy rendered 
them formidable to the civil magistrate, and armed with too extensive authority an 
order of men, who always adhere closely together, and who never want a plausible 
pretence for their encroachments and usurpations. The high dignities of the church 
served, indeed, to the support of gentry and nobility; but by the establishment of 
monasteries, many of the lowest vulgar were taken from the useful arts, and main-
tained in those receptacles of sloth and ignorance. The supreme head of the church 
was a foreign potentate, guided by interests, always different from those of the com-
munity, sometimes contrary to them. And as the hierarchy was necessarily solicitous 
to preserve an unity of faith, rites, and ceremonies, all liberty of thought ran a manifest 
risqué of being extinguished; and violent persecutions, or what was worse, a stupid and 
abject credulity took place every where.138
He goes on to speak of Christianity in general as the basic sponsor of intolerance 
in society, but in highlighting this negative portrait, he seldom provides sufficient 
space for counterexamples, where the church served an important role in devel-
oping a more loving and tolerant world. For example, in the sixteenth century, he 
illustrates the evils of Christian dogma through the cruel and horrid persecutions 
of Mary Tudor but fails to connect the more benevolent policies of Elizabeth I 
with her understanding of the faith.139 He knows that Elizabeth is a devout Prot-
estant but fails to connect the dots, preferring instead to dismiss Protestants with 
a continuous epithet as “fanatics,” only considering them a little less superstitious 
than Catholics.140 
With that said, Hume is much too honest a scholar to dismiss the clear con-
nection between Puritan struggles and the modern British system of governance. 
He recognizes that the seventeenth-century Puritans brought about a radical 
change in society and rejects the type of revisionist history that imposes a modern 
political agenda on the past or tends to idealize and exaggerate the importance of 
antecedents like Germanic roots, Saxon law, or Magna Carta in developing the 
present version of liberal government.141
Those who, from a pretend respect to antiquity, appeal at every turn to an original 
plan to the constitution, only cover their turbulent spirit and their private ambition 
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under the appearance of venerable forms; and whatever period they pitch on for their 
model, they may still be carried back to a more ancient period, where they will find 
the measures of power entirely different, and where every circumstance, by reason of 
the greater barbarity of the times, will appear still less worthy of imitation. Above all, 
a civilized nation, like the English, who have happily established the most perfect and 
most accurate system of liberty that was ever found compatible with the government, 
ought to be cautious in appealing to the practice of their ancestors, or regarding the 
maxims of uncultivated ages as certain rules for their present conduct.142
The credit is somewhat surprising for a man who emphasizes the gradual develop-
ment of institutions and despises the religious zealotry of Puritans, but his study 
leads him to this conclusion, which he expresses over and over again in no uncer-
tain terms.143
So absolute, indeed, was the authority of the crown, that the precious spark of liberty 
had been kindled, and was preserved, by the puritans alone; and it was to this sect, 
whose principles appear so frivolous and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the 
whole freedom of their constitution.144
The evidence forces him to admit that the “noble principles of liberty took root” 
only under the “shelter of puritanical absurdities” and their “fanaticism”145—a 
fanaticism that he clearly does not understand. He displays almost no understand-
ing of the theological matrix for developing the new constitutional principles—no 
real understanding of covenant theology, the priesthood of the believers, the Prot-
estant work ethic, or any other doctrine that led the Puritans in this direction.146 
The deficit clearly reflects the enlightened attitude toward theological discussions 
as worthless speculations and prevents his discussion from developing a fuller 
understanding of Puritanism and its political ideals, but it should not undermine 
the true greatness of Hume’s work or his sincere attempt at objectivity. In fact, he 
must receive much credit for his integrity and willingness to recognize what few 
sons of the Enlightenment in the past or present want to admit—that the church 
had a positive influence in creating the modern world and their binary way of sep-
arating church and state is not so faithful to the historical evidence. 
Edward Gibbon (1737–1794)
Another English historian of similar disposition was Edward Gibbon. Like Hume 
and Burke, he rejected extreme political expressions and preferred to balance the 
interests of left-wing and democratic impulses with the gravitas of a publically- 
spirited nobility in creating a healthy society of moderation and stability. This basic 
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disposition made him side with the Tories and represent their interests for a while 
as a member of Parliament, but he soon grew disillusioned with all the rancor of 
active political involvement and left it for a more “tranquil” life of “repose” and 
“ease” within the “enlightened and amiable culture” of intelligentsia.147 The result 
was one of the great books of the western world, The History of the Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire. The first volume appeared in 1776 and gained him instant 
notoriety, along with some infamy for its critical analysis of the church in chapters 
15 and 16. A couple of volumes were added in 1781, and a few more in 1788 to 
complete the massive six-volume edition.148 
His thoughts reflected the moderate tone of his political life while displaying 
a distinct leaning toward the enlightened ideas of the day. He met with Raynal 
several times at Lausanne and read his work; he frequented the salons of France 
and conversed with the philosophes; but he never engaged in their ultraisms, con-
sidering the world much too complex for the bigotries of Voltaire or the extreme 
atheistic dogmatism of d’Holbach and Helvétius.149 He joined them in preferring 
the power of reason to the dubious assertions of blind faith, but also recognized 
the limits of all human attempts to address metaphysical concerns, making him 
much more like Hume than the typical philosophe in admitting his problems and 
remaining skeptical.150
His religious convictions followed this basic pattern. He grew up in the Angli-
can Church, but he began to read Catholic literature while studying at Oxford 
and was so impressed with its traditions that he converted to the religion and 
received baptism on June 8, 1753—much to the chagrin of his father.151 Later his 
father sent him to study under a Calvinist minister in Lausanne, who dissuaded 
him from his Catholic faith and brought him back into the Protestant fold. He 
attended a local parish church after that according to the “pious and decent cus-
toms of the family,” but eventually developed into a skeptic by the time he reached 
twenty-three years of age.152 In his work, he expressed considerable suspicion 
toward miraculous accounts in Scripture and disdain for theological controversies 
as the cause of much bigotry, but spurned those who dismissed him as an “infidel” 
and claimed to relate only “a simple narrative of authentic facts,” which the readers 
must consider in formulating their own perspective.153 
Despite this denial, his narrative selects and interprets its “facts” within an 
agenda that stands opposed to theology as a non-edifying discipline for humanity. 
A good example is his discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, where he relates 
its evolution in the most unflattering light to denigrate its place in the church. 
According to Gibbon, the doctrine was a simple product of Plato’s absurd meta-
physical musings over the “first cause, the reason, or the Logos, and the soul or spirit 
of the universe,” and possesses little connection with the account of Jesus in the 
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Synoptic Gospels.154 Athanasius and the Alexandrian school of theology stirred 
up the controversy as the leading see of Platonism in the Graeco-Roman world, 
ending a period of tranquility and ushering in a new age of orthodox bigotry.155 
After the Nicene Creed established the doctrine in the fourth century, the church 
inculcated it with the force of the empire, making the numerous sects conform to 
Catholic orthodoxy, prohibiting the assemblies of those who dissented from the 
confines, and eventually spilling much Arian blood with its superior numbers and 
power, which Gibbon exaggerates with his many unprovable “facts.”156 Through-
out the account, he displays no real appreciation for any practical ramification of 
the doctrine, or the need for a fellowship to define its nature and set parameters.157 
He displays no real understanding of the important differences between the Atha-
nasian and Arian viewpoints, of viewing Jesus as the incarnation of God or a mere 
creature, of viewing Jesus as the revelation of God or looking elsewhere and out-
side of Jesus to find the divine nature.158 
Many historians hail Gibbon for developing a more critical use of sources and 
so paving the way toward the modern scientific practice of historiography.159 No 
doubt he is a decided improvement over the many propagandists of the past in 
recognizing the necessity of sifting through all sides of a story and mixing negative 
and positive commentary when speaking of real people and real events, but his dis-
cussions hardly escape the subjective, moralistic, and transcendent aspect of other 
works.160 In fact, his narratives have a particular tendency to lose its objectivity 
when it comes to religion, leading critical readers to recognize the need of decon-
structing the text and finding the “whirlpools underneath” the “placid waters on 
the surface.” Often the bias remains implicit within the overall drift of the mate-
rial, but sometimes it erupts to the surface in certain moments of candor, where 
“discreet sneers and mockeries are followed by sallies of caustic irony.”161 These 
eruptions reveal that the general tenor of his secular style is only feigning objec-
tivity in presenting a “neutral” front and calculating all along to make religious 
passion look fanatical and irrational in comparison to its “dispassionate” discourse 
and “detached” criticism.162
Gibbon likes to contrast the enlightened worldview of his day with the mirac-
ulous universe of the primitive church. “They…fancied, that on every side they 
were incessantly assaulted by daemons, comforted by visions, instructed by proph-
ecy, and surprisingly delivered from danger, sickness, and from death itself.”163 
In rejecting the three-story universe, he presents ecclesiastical history from an 
enlightened point of view, which prefers to credit the triumph of Christianity in 
western culture to “secondary causes,” rather than attribute its remarkable growth 
to the efficacious nature of its supernal teachings or the miraculous power of divine 
intervention, as it was portrayed in the book of Acts and much of church history.164 
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The result is a secular history where God is not a factor, where the power of the 
Holy Spirit no longer serves as the fundamental explanation in spreading the reli-
gion and turning the world upside down (Acts 17:6).165 Gibbon’s work prefers to 
view the world as a self-contained shell and wants to accent a chain of cause and 
effect within a natural understanding of events, contriving all along to discredit 
the miraculous version of the church by providing a successful alternative.166 His 
mistake comes from taking his causal reasoning much too seriously and failing 
to appreciate Hume’s excoriating analysis of human rationality and its ability to 
penetrate the world of cause and effect in the first place. Hume sees every causal 
explanation as a metaphysical leap into the unknown, making any explanation of 
historical events a matter of faith—religious or non-religious alike. 
One of the principal motives for writing the book is to demonstrate a cause 
and effect relationship between the rise of Christianity and the fall of Rome. 
Gibbon follows the basic enlightened perspective on Rome that views it in an 
idealized form as arising from Greek city-states and developing a prototypical 
form of republican government and superior philosophical culture, although he 
never spends much time discussing the actual history of the early phase.167 Instead, 
he begins in the second century C.E., which he describes as the “most happy and 
prosperous” in the “history of the world.”168 At this time, Rome ruled the “fairest 
part of the earth” with a “disciplined valour,” the “advantages of wealth and luxury,” 
and the “gentle, but powerful influence of law and manner.”169 Whatever darkness 
crept in after reaching the zenith of its power, the light of the “invigorating air of 
the republic” remained extant in the Roman law to provide some semblance of 
order and civility, even in the Middle Ages.170
Gibbon’s main purpose is to show how the greatness of Rome came to ruin. 
His Autobiography underscores this very purpose.
It was at Rome, on the 15th of October, 1764, as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the 
Capitol, while the barefooted friars were singing vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, that 
the idea of writing the decline and fall of the city first started to my mind.171
The reasons for its demise are multiplied and detailed throughout the book, 
making them difficult to summarize in a simple list, but some of the more import-
ant reasons include the destruction of time and natural forces, the decay of military 
virtue, the decadence of luxury and lasciviousness, the loss of political liberties, 
the chaos of civil wars, the invasion of barbarians, and the spread of Christian-
ity.172 The triumph of Christianity is one of the main reasons and is often coupled 
with the conquest of “barbarism” to underscore the menacing nature of this uncivil 
threat to Roman culture.173 Christianity is singled out for its leading role in the 
destruction as it “erected the triumphant banner of the cross on the ruins of the 
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Capitol,” symbolizing the complete victory and utter destruction of the glorious 
city.174 Five specific reasons are listed for its ultimate success and triumph.
I. The inflexible, and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Chris-
tians, derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and 
unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing 
the law of Moses. II. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional cir-
cumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. III. The 
miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. IV. The pure and austere morals 
of the Christians. V. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradu-
ally formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman empire.175
He goes on to say that early Christianity corrupted the public spirit by preaching 
an other-worldly asceticism. It opposed everyday business and preferred trusting 
God for sustenance in seeking the kingdom of God (Mt 6:24–33). It also disre-
garded the military and courts of law by practicing an extreme form of pacifism 
that threatened the public safety. This “criminal disregard for the public welfare” 
brought concern among the neighbors, who saw within its “pusillanimous spirit” 
a secret longing for the destruction of the empire.176 As Christianity ascended 
to power in the fourth century, it changed its early emphasis on pacifism and 
brought condemnation on others through numerous theological controversies, 
which destroyed the philosophical spirit and unity of the empire with supersti-
tious and fanatical intolerance.177 “At the head of the class” stands the iconoclastic 
controversy that ended up dividing the empire and led to the complete demise of 
the eastern part.178 
Gibbon contrasts the Holy Roman Empire with the ancient world and its 
tolerant treatment of various religious expressions and their superstitions.179 
Christianity developed its bigotry out of Judaism—the mother of the religion and 
enemy of Voltaire and the philosophes for this very reason.180 The Jews possessed an 
“implacable hatred for the rest of human-kind” as the chosen people of a jealous 
God and developed a legal economy to inculcate this animosity, which included 
the command to extirpate idolatrous people, the prohibition of alliances and mar-
riages with other people, and special ritual and dietary observance, designed to 
promote segregation. The Romans tried to indulge the Jewish superstition, but 
could not dissuade them from their “unsocial manner,” “detestation of foreign reli-
gions,” and obstinate unwillingness to relate their speculations to other Graeco- 
Roman mythology and join the cosmopolitan ethos of the empire.181 
The Romans experienced the same problem with Christians, who inherited 
from the Jews an obstinate refusal to participate in pagan religious institutions and 
the total life of the community.182 Christians tried to blame the problem on the 
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Romans as if they were the victims of bigotry, but their accounts have a “total dis-
regard of truth and probability” in exaggerating whatever harm was done to them 
and end up imputing to the Roman magistrates their own “implacable and unre-
lenting zeal” in persecuting heretics.183 The actual number of martyrs was “very 
inconsiderable”—usually just a few bishops, presbyters, and abject individuals, not 
the innocent multitudes of ecclesiastical fiction.184 In fact, Christians “inflicted far 
greater severities on each other than they experienced from the zeal of infidels.… If 
we are obliged to submit our belief to the authority of Grotius, it must be allowed 
that the number of Protestants who were executed in a single province and a single 
reign far exceeded that of the primitive martyrs in the space of three centuries and 
of the Roman Empire.”185 The emperors tended to practice a policy of modera-
tion in their punishment whenever it was necessary to exact certain measures and 
mostly ruled over extensive periods of peace and tranquility, without resorting to 
any steps at all against this clear and imminent threat. Whatever measures were 
taken, it was not for religious reasons, not even in the case of Nero’s fits of rage.186 
Gibbon follows the program of the philosophes in exalting Roman culture 
and its policies of toleration to deprecate the intolerance of the church. The early 
church failed to treat those who participate in other forms of religious expression 
with equal respect as grappling with the same ultimate mystery and cursed them 
as mécréants or “unbelievers,” who worship something much different from the 
true faith. Through this attitude, Christians “infused a spirit of bitterness” into 
their religion and proceeded to deliver the “greater part of the human species” into 
eternal torment, including the “wisest and most virtuous of pagans.”187 Eventually, 
the hatred of others turned on their own fellowship during the ages of orthodoxy 
as “the principle of discord was alive in their bosom,” creating one doctrinal dis-
pute after another and inflicting “far greater severities on each other than they 
had experienced from the zeal of infidels.”188 In the fourth century, Constantine 
convoked an ecumenical council at Nicea to determine Trinitarian orthodoxy and 
punished ministers and assemblies who refused to follow the confines. By the end 
of the century, Theodosius expelled all non-conforming bishops, yet “his penal 
edicts were seldom enforced” and little bloodshed ensued from the policy.189 Max-
imus was the first to take the more dire step and inflicted death upon Piscillian and 
his heretical group of disciples.190 More bloodshed soon followed and continued to 
escalate after the first century of orthodoxy, with the Catholics fighting the Arians 
(barbarians) during the sacking of Rome and setting a precedent for continuous 
bloodletting over other doctrinal issues in the years to come.191 
Most scholars view Gibbon’s work as being preoccupied with this and other 
attacks upon Christendom.192 They point to his unrelenting assault upon its “ficti-
tious miracles” and “falsification of history,” its fanatical superstitions and puerile 
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rites, its authoritarian leadership and irrational dogmatism, and its intolerant spirit 
and murder of those who would not conform.193 Other scholars find the charge of 
bias unfair or at least unbalanced in pointing out some positive comments about 
Christianity that are sprinkled throughout the account,194 but it is hard to dismiss 
the overall direction of the discussion. The positive comments are overwhelmed 
within the text by the programmatic agenda and appear somewhat disingenuous 
to the critical reader as if Gibbon is only feigning objectivity to hide the overall 
condescending attitude of a secularist—at least in many instances. Gibbon might 
excuse his basic negativity as the “melancholy duty” of a historian to discover the 
“inevitable mixture of error and corruption” in the “weak and degenerate race of 
[human] beings,”195 but the dark side overwhelms his analysis of the church and 
hardly represents a faithful rendition of the multifaceted nature of life. Early Chris-
tians appear as little more than killjoys, despising the pleasures of sex and luxurious 
living, questioning earthly institutions like marriage and other social structures, 
and spurning the exercise of human reason—and whatever else is useless for salva-
tion.196 The Church Fathers appear more like secular leaders with worldly ambi-
tions than spiritual teachers with real convictions, and the ascetic ideal of the time 
is continually denigrated in the typical manner of a Protestant, without much 
appreciation for the mystical quest of pious meditation or the intense dedication of 
a hermit who is looking for inward purity and shunning the things of this world.197 
The Middle Ages receives the most contempt as the period in which the 
church was the guardian of culture. It is brutalized in the typical style of a philoso-
phe as a time of ignorance and darkness, with few important individuals or events 
counterbalancing the discussion with noteworthy achievements.198
During the ages of ignorance which followed the subversion of the Roman empire in 
the West, the bishops of the Imperial city extended their dominion over the laity as 
well as clergy of the Latin church. The fabric of superstition which they had erected, 
and which might long have defied the feeble efforts of reason, was at length assaulted 
by a crowd of daring fanatics, who, from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, assumed 
the popular character of reformers. The church of Rome defended by violence the 
empire which she had acquired by fraud; a system of peace and benevolence was soon 
disgraced by the proscriptions, wars, massacres, and the institution of the holy office. 
And as the reformers were animated by the love of civil as well as of religious freedom, 
the Catholic princes connected their own interest with that of the clergy, and enforced 
by fire and the sword the terrors of spiritual censures.199
If we compare the era of the crusades, the Latins of Europe with the Greeks and 
Arabians, their respective degrees of knowledge, industry, and art, our rude ancestors 
must be content with the third rank in the scale of nations.… Some rudiments of 
mathematical and medicinal knowledge might be imparted in practice and in figures; 
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necessity might produce some interpreters for the grosser business of merchants and 
soldiers; but the commerce of the Orientals had not diffused the study and knowl-
edge of their languages in the schools of Europe.… The belief of the Catholics was 
corrupted by new legends, their practice by new superstitions; and the establishment 
of the inquisition, the mendicant orders of monks and friars, the last abuse of indul-
gences, and the final progress of idolatry, flowed from the baleful fountain of the holy 
war. The active spirit of the Latins preyed on the vitals of their reason and religion; 
and if the ninth and tenth centuries were the times of darkness, the thirteenth and 
fourteenth were the age of absurdity and fable.200
He characterizes monastic spirituality as finding its fundamental inspiration 
through an insatiable enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal, which saw “man as a crim-
inal and God as a tyrant” through its “rigid facts,” “abstemious diets,” and “bloody 
flagellations.” The monastic life turned guilt and pleasure into synonymous terms 
by waging war against the “desires of the flesh” and creating ridiculous legends 
about those devoted to its rigor. Far from promoting true spirituality, it did little 
more than infuse a “cruel, unfeeling temper” in the monks and a “blind submis-
sion” to the abbots, habituating the type of “religious hatred” and “merciless zeal” 
that led to Dominican inquisitions. The “servile and pusillanimous reign” of the 
monks suppressed all manly virtues in the Middle Ages and “seriously affected 
the reason, the faith and the morals of the Christian,” deserving “the contempt 
and pity of a philosopher” and the esteem of the “infirm minds of children and 
females.”201 
Above all, Gibbon follows the Enlightenment in his account of the early 
and medieval church by focusing his wrath upon the clergy as filled with avarice 
and rapacious lusts, who feigned a spiritual calling in recognizing the “very lucra-
tive” nature of the profession.202 Gibbon identifies the bishopric of Cyprian as 
the particular time and place where moral corruption set in and the clergy began 
to siphon off the riches of the church for their private gain and sensual pleasure. 
Cyprian ruled like a tyrant, using the power of penance and excommunication to 
wield “imperious declamations” over the conscience of others, much like Moses 
commanding the earth to swallow all those who refused obeisance to his authority. 
Cyprian held absolute sway over the North African church and wanted to expand 
his power and wealth just like Hannibal in the Punic Wars, except using “invec-
tives and excommunications” as weapons against the ambitions of the Roman 
pontiff.203 After this time, much of the church history is marked by Bishops vying 
for ecclesiastical preeminence as the “genuine motive of episcopal warfare” and 
trying to expand their power into the temporal realm, producing an entire culture 
submissive to their authority.204 What the church meant to the culture, in general, 
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is often represented through the ambition of bishops and seldom discussed posi-
tively. 
Gibbon’s work represents the type of secular and anti-Christian bias that 
pervaded the modern world after the Enlightenment. Today’s U.S. textbooks are 
subject to much the same criticism for their treatment of religion, although they 
reflect the biases of a pervasive post-Enlightenment culture and its leading histori-
ans in a less brazen and caustic manner. The texts certainly make a concerted effort 
to mitigate any appearance of prejudice when narrating the history of western civ-
ilization: they do not wish to offend the audience or alienate specific communities; 
they do not wish to relate theology in any direct way to bigotry; they do not rec-
ognize any slight to Christian people in extolling religious freedom and neglecting 
the importance of Puritan culture; but they still leave a trace of the bias within the 
white of the page by mentioning what is important to enlightened thinking and 
neglecting what it dismissed as part of the fanatical past. 
This enlightened history has a vested interest in marginalizing the Judeo- 
Christian tradition, which we have witnessed over and over within its most cele-
brated accounts.205 Voltaire sees history progressing linearly away from the darkness 
of medieval religion toward the light of human reason. His hatred of Christianity is 
a motivating factor in writing a universal history and guiding the audience to seek 
truth elsewhere in the world, outside the legacy of Hebraic culture. It also causes 
him to miss the important impact of Christianity on modern European society, as 
seen in his exaltation of the modern British system of governance, without recog-
nizing the central place of Puritan theology in its evolution. Raynal follows much 
the same program as Voltaire in condemning the reign of Christianity as a period 
of ignorance and darkness and exalting the advent of the Italian Renaissance as 
bringing a new age of truth and toleration to the world. He also expresses the 
same admiration for the English system of polity, while failing to grasp the impact 
of Puritan culture upon the process due to the same theological prejudices. In the 
nineteenth century, Michelet leads the charge of defending the philosophes’ view of 
life as expressing the inward truth of the French spirit and its glorious Revolution. 
He feels that Christianity’s view of a capricious deity prompted its infamous his-
tory of torturing innocent victims and wants his audience to condemn the religion 
as the number one enemy of the people and their longing for justice and equality.
In England, Hume and Gibbon represent a more civil approach to historiogra-
phy in trying to bring some semblance of objectivity to the study, but religious and 
political bias still has a way of intruding upon the best of intentions and marking 
their “moderate” approach to these issues. Hume represents history through the 
eyes of a Tory by expressing reverence for tradition and the gradual evolution of 
society, and brings considerable metaphysical judgment to bear upon all those who 
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disrupt its institutions through popular and radical change. However, his political 
prejudices seldom overpower the narrative or prevent him from acknowledging 
the central role of radical “fanatics” like the Puritans in establishing modern lib-
erties. He is willing to acknowledge the positive impact of religion upon culture, 
even if he expresses deep misgivings about the existence of God and understands 
very little about theology or its specific impact upon society. Gibbon tries to emu-
late the moderate approach of Hume as a Tory and views life in a more complex 
manner than the philosophes, but his theological prejudices often interfere with his-
torical judgment and provide an overall agenda that makes his positive comments 
about Christianity look insincere. As his basic agenda, he wants to debase the 
church by exalting the Roman empire as a tolerant and enlightened culture, and 
only does so by glossing over its oppressive nature and blaming Christianity for the 
destruction of the empire and superior cultural values in general through its lust 
for power and continuous theological disputes. He tries to pigeonhole the question 
of divine intervention in history and emphasize “secondary causality,” but fails to 
recognize that cause and effect reasoning involves a metaphysical leap into the 
unknown, that divine miracles are not so easily dismissed on historical grounds, 
that a secular approach is hardly neutral in dismissing God as a factor. In fact, all 
historiography involves a leap of faith and carries the subjective convictions of the 
author along with it. No one sees life in an objective manner as if beholding the 
“thing-in-itself,” or observing events outside a certain paradigm that configures 
the world into its narrow image.206 
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Modern science no longer looks out in nature to ask ultimate questions about the 
existence of God and the overall meaning of life. This modern view has a number 
of reasons, but some of its deepest historical roots developed within the early Puri-
tans and their rejection of the scholastic attempt to probe the mysteries of God 
within nature outside the direct revelation of Scripture. The Puritans thought it 
was better to search for the meaning of life in Scripture and spurned the innate 
capacity of autonomous human beings to seek out the hidden things of God 
through their reason. The philosophy of nature should recognize its limits and 
“reflect upon the mundane questions of secondary causality or practical concern, 
which it could resolve with some certainty or at least make some progress through 
testing answers.”1 And so, the Puritans ended up advancing the new experimental 
method of the seventeenth century and encouraging a practical and utilitarian 
view of education, rather than waste time in idle metaphysical speculation about 
matters of empirical concern.2 This new approach was inspired by heartfelt reli-
gious convictions, but it also helped facilitate modern science and its move toward 
a more secular view of life. The modern scientific community simply followed the 
Puritans’ understanding of human limitations by ignoring any quest for higher or 
deeper significance within the object of its study and preferred to treat “Being” 
as an instrumental means for technological skills and utilitarian purposes.3 It was 
content to set the goals of life within the inward dispositions of the human subject 
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and its desires, and let objective existence lose all meaning—at least for those who 
limited their understanding to the new approach and abandoned the “spectacles” 
of Scripture and its deeper commentary on life.4 
The dichotomy between faith and reason soon gave way to complete unbe-
lief in those individuals who wished to reduce all matters of life to materialistic 
concerns. Thomas Hobbes saw naturalism emerging in the future, where religious 
superstition would fade into the ignorance of past generations and implode before 
the power of palpable, materialistic explanations. He said the future would replace 
the miraculous hand of God with natural phenomena, the work of the Spirit 
with “affections of the mind or body,” angelic apparitions with dreams or visions, 
demonic possession with mental illness; and for the most part, he was right.5 The 
modern world tended to proceed in this direction. It tended to view nature as 
interdependent; natural explanations as good enough; and supernatural elements 
as incredulous, or at least an unnecessary divergence that defied Ockham’s Razor.6 
In the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte led the charge toward extolling the 
omnicompetence of science in addressing all human problems and replacing the 
need for religion.7 Historians and biblical critics like David Strauss disparaged 
the miraculous accounts of the Gospels and led many in the church to aban-
don any literal interpretation of the faith and its sacred text.8 Even a twentieth- 
century theologian like Rudolf Bultmann disparaged the cosmology of the NT as 
mythological and spoke of God as unworldly or transcendent, leaving “the closed 
weft of history…undisturbed” by spiritual activity.9 Of course, many non-religious 
scholars went further than Bultmann’s program of demythologizing the Scripture 
and chose to dispense with God-talk altogether and reduce the sum and sub-
stance of life to physics or matter in motion, even including human beings within 
the reduction.10 They rejected any human outcry and particularly disparaged the 
attempt of people like René Descartes to preserve some aspect of human dignity in 
the midst of the cosmic machine, rejecting the concept of a soul or “Ghost in the 
machine,” discarding all “internal mysteries,” preferring functional descriptions, 
and reducing our thought to chemical or neurological interactions.11 They rejected 
any dichotomy in the cosmos, particularly the idea that human life consisted of a 
“double series of events taking place in two different kinds of stuff.”12
The materialistic view of life owed much of its early impetus to the growing 
mechanistic imagery of certain physicists and those scholars who wished to use it 
as a means of undermining the presence of God in the universe and turn life into 
a self-sufficient system.13 The theory is often associated with some of the great 
names in the western canon—Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Gassendi, Descartes, 
and Boyle, although any account of its historical development depends upon the 
interpretation of complexities and inconsistencies in their works. These scientists 
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might reduce life to matter in motion or some efficient causality in certain places 
and then turn around and make room for the existence and activity of spiritual 
entities in others, making it difficult to trace a simple lineage of the theory and 
their place in it.14 
Above all its foundational figures, René Descartes stands out as the one 
person most identified with the early formulation and propagation of the theory. 
He provides a mature statement of it in his Principles of Philosophy (1644) and tries 
to maintain some consistency with it throughout the rest of his other works while 
struggling to preserve some semblance of human dignity and the religious beliefs 
of the day. In this and other works, he portrays space as a plenum or body-like 
extension of size, shape, and motion, and rejects those who conceive of objects 
as moving freely in the vacuum of space, attracting one another at a distance, or 
providing their own causal impulse as substantial forms.15 Whatever happens to 
corporeal entities is the result of impacts. A body only falls to earth as a result of 
the impact of other bodies.16 The world is a massive machine of integrated parts 
and mechanical laws and contains no space for divine intervention to perform its 
miracles—once the divine will decided to create the whole. The world is a closed-
shell and separated from its Creator.17
To a large extent, the theory represents Descartes’ answer to a problem that 
plagued the physics of his day concerning planetary motion, ever since Kepler 
debunked the existence of crystalline spheres. How is it possible for planets to cir-
cumambulate the sun in a regular pattern through the immense reaches of space? 
In answering the question, Descartes found it necessary to turn the universe into 
an enormous interconnected machine of vortices. He posited the existence of a 
huge whirlpool or vortex in our immediate solar system that carried all material in 
its wake, including planets and comets.18 This plenum helped answer the problem 
of Kepler’s observation, but it also proceeded to cause difficulties in other areas 
that were near and dear to Descartes’ ideology—like the place of God and the 
freedom and influence of the human soul. Of course, these other areas eventually 
receded into the background as the image of a machine was applied consistently 
and permeated many levels of society with dogmatic force during the next few 
centuries. 
More important than the influence of Descartes was the popular association 
of the mechanistic universe with the physics of Isaac Newton, promulgated by 
Deists, philosophes, and secular-types, all in the name of their ideology.19 Newton’s 
physics would reign for the next few centuries as the supreme systematic statement 
of “objective” science, and its association with the clockwork universe was crucial 
in forwarding the secular view of life. But in this case, the move toward secular-
ity had little pretext in any “objective” reading of science and more to do with a 
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highly subjective interpretation creating its own illusions about it. In fact, recent 
scholarship has demonstrated the distorted and misleading nature of the interpre-
tation by pointing to Newton’s unpublished manuscript, De gravitatione et aequi-
pondio fluidorum, which served as the basis of his mature statement in Philosophiae 
Naturalis Principia Mathematica and directly repudiates the Cartesian system. The 
treatise analyzes Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy in some detail and refutes many 
of its central ideas point-by-point.20 Newton displays particular concern about its 
notion of God as a “retired engineer” and berates it as one step away from com-
plete atheism.21 Descartes leaves no room for God to exercise dominion over the 
creation by making matter and extension indistinguishable, rejecting the existence 
of any void between material elements, and attributing motion to loops or direct 
material contact.22 
Newton thinks of space as a meeting place between the material and imma-
terial world, without confusing the two together (Spinoza) or tearing them apart 
(Descartes and Leibniz).23 God is said to be present everywhere as the Lord of 
creation and ruling nature actively and directly, “creating, preserving, and gov-
erning according to his good will and pleasure.”24 The regular motion of bodies 
finds its fundamental explanation in positing the existence of an “intelligent agent” 
moving objects through the power of a rational and purposeful will.25 The divine 
omnipresence acts like an immaterial aether that moves bodies by its will with-
out affecting the immutable nature of God or offering material resistance to the 
objects.26 
Newton thinks of space and time as coming into existence from an eternal 
act of divine emanation.27 Space and time always exist because God always exists. 
They never exist as separate subsistences outside the Ground of Being and find an 
ultimate purpose in establishing divine ubiquity as an immediate and co-eternal 
affection of God.28 This line of thinking allows Newton to conceive of space and 
time as “absolute,” making them oblivious to what happens with material bodies 
and remaining constant throughout all eternity—independent of all objects, but 
radically dependent upon God.29 It causes Newton to think of matter as created ex 
nihilo and located or placed within an absolute framework, which is extra-mental 
and non-relative.30 It makes him think of motion as a change of place in absolute 
space, rather than a change in an object’s relation to surrounding bodies.31 
Newton’s system of physics runs into difficulty when trying to explain the 
relationship between objects in material terms. It develops this difficulty because 
he rejects Descartes’ hypothesis of a vortex or the idea of a medium like aether 
filling the spatial void.32 Newton speaks of a force like gravity in relating bodies at 
a distance, but he insists that gravity is a non-mechanical cause. It relates bodies 
at a distance outside of impact. It does not act on the surface of an object like a 
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mechanical cause in relating to the mass of an object and diminishes with dis-
tance, unlike other physical quantities.33 All Newton can do is speak of “attractive 
Powers,” “Virtues of Forces” between objects, without supplying a specific physical 
answer to “whatsoever be the Cause.”34 He admits his ignorance at this point in the 
discussion and concedes the absurdity of believing that objects attract one another 
at a distance without the existence of some medium conveying the action.35
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of 
something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without 
mutual contact.… That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, 
so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the 
mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be con-
veyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who 
has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.36 
The use of the term gravitas only designates a mysterious force that has no mate-
rial explanation.37 
The problem only finds its resolution because Newton is not limited to mate-
rial explanations in his attempt to explain phenomena. Modern physicists might 
prefer for Newton to leave well enough alone and speak of gravity within the limits 
of science as a mathematical postulate or simple regularity that is defined by the 
inverse square law,38 but Newton is much bolder in his approach and willing to 
engage in metaphysical speculation about the forces of life and its causal nature. 
He starts natural philosophy in the phenomenal world and conducts experiments 
in the typical scientific manner to derive his results, but he has no problem using 
physics to ascend into a more universal and metaphysical realm and speculate over 
the First Cause of all things.39 At these more speculative moments, Newton is 
willing to find a definitive explanation within the existence of God as the imma-
terial power behind action at a distance.40 Here he posits God as the omnipresent 
force that permeates space like a spiritual aether, moving objects in accordance 
with the divine intention and explaining the beauty, order, design, and symmetry 
that scientists observe in the material world, without a specific material cause.41 
In fact, Newton views his work as promoting belief in the existence of God.42 
He considers the “framework of nature,” especially the “contrivance of the bodies 
of living creatures,” providing the best evidence for the existence of God from the 
philosophy of nature.43 However, this view of God is clearly enhanced by a lifetime 
study of Scripture, above and beyond all his philosophical pursuits.44 His devotion 
leads him to produce a substantial body of theological material, which continually 
speaks of the “God of Israel” as the Lord of all creation. This God actively exer-
cises dominion over the world in a free and voluntary manner, unconstrained by 
134 | forces of secularit y in the modern world
the eternal laws of a clockwork universe and more than capable of intervening and 
producing miraculous effects on extraordinary occasions, just as it is recorded in 
the Bible.45 Newton’s theological works include a detailed perusal of the prophe-
cies in Daniel and Revelation, which are interpreted in a literal manner and stoked 
with the typical millenarian expectations of the Puritan community and its belief 
in an ultimate intervention of God in the near future.46 
In certain ways, this appeal to special revelation is divided from his work in 
physics as he follows the basic tendency of Puritans in separating the two fields and 
their methods,47 but he is never faithful to a strict or absolute distinction between 
the two. In following the division, he speaks of the Bible as a non-scientific book, 
written to accommodate the experiences of common people and addressed to uti-
lize what appears true to them in a “relative” way about space, time, and motion.48 
His scientific works display the same division by defending the autonomous nature 
of experimental philosophy against metaphysical prejudices49 and mentioning 
God and Scripture only once in the first edition of Principia, thinking it “better to 
let his readers draw [religious consequences] for themselves.”50 But this division 
is violated on other occasions and hardly expresses his overall sentiment on the 
subject. He certainly avoids speaking about God in the first edition of Principia, 
but his General Scholium of the second and third editions adds explicit theolog-
ical comments to make clear his overall understanding of the subject at hand.51 
He goes on to speak of God as the basic presupposition of rational science in pro-
viding order and simplicity to the object of study 52 and rejects any strict division 
between religion and science. He rejects any notion of science that would exorcize 
the presence of God from the universe or justify a secular view of life as if conso-
nant with scientific inquiry. 
Newton’s view of science is never able to divorce its analysis from his religious 
concerns and so divide the results of dispassionate research methods from ideo-
logical commitments. The problem of mixing cultural commitments with scientific 
work ends up skewing his objectivity, but he is not alone in wrestling with the sub-
jectivity of his results and represents to a large extent the problem of all scientists, 
who can never claim complete immunity from cultural and ideological commit-
ments that surround them, as if living in an unbiased world of gathering facts from 
simple observations. Even using the experimental method makes Newton and the 
scientific community a part of a specific culture that tries to divide prejudice from 
objective fact; and after adopting the method, the bias only continues as the sci-
entists choose objects of interest based upon social pressures that arise outside the 
research and focus on a specific cause as the center of attention, while ignoring the 
many other influences that life presents to every object or effect.53 Thomas Kuhn 
thinks that facts or objects of research can never exist outside a scientific theory that 
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alters entities to fit its basic paradigm. A new theory “requires the reconstruction 
of prior theory and reevaluation of prior fact.” It requires the selection of facts that 
interest the researchers and secures an exalted status among the scientific commu-
nity only by resolving a few problems that a group of researchers finds particularly 
acute.54 Karl Popper says that the universal laws of science cannot be forged through 
following its singular statements and empirical experiences inductively. No empirical 
statement exists apart from universal reference and metaphysical commitment; “no 
matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not jus-
tify the conclusion that all swans are white.”55 Albert Einstein certainly agrees with 
these sentiments in rejecting the approach of Bertrand Russell and other empirical 
atheists who dismiss conceptual or metaphysical thinking out of their fear for reli-
gious mysticism. Physics always arises above a simple inductive approach toward the 
experiences of the senses and finds stimulation within the free creations or intuitions 
of human imagination to make progress within the discipline.56 
Most often these intuitions arise from a cultural climate that stimulates and cor-
relates science with many different ideological factors outside the specific discipline. 
This process certainly develops when Darwin relates his observations in nature to 
the economic theories of the day; it also develops when Newton cross-pollinates 
physics with the Puritan ideology of his day; and it continues to develop with con-
temporary scientists who are no different than their predecessors, even if they try 
to feign objectivity and hide or discard “religious” baggage. Quantum physicists 
have a clear secular bias in their desire to eliminate the mystical language of the 
past. They want to eliminate all talk of forces or fields and replace it with more 
concrete material terms, which provide an all-sufficient explanation in reducing life 
to particles or quanta. They want to eliminate Newton’s mystical talk of “gravity” 
and explain attraction (or repulsion) in terms of particle exchange, even though no 
direct empirical evidence exists up to this point to suggest the presence of a “grav-
iton.”57 Today’s scientists come from a more secular reconstruction of reality that 
develops after the time of Newton and causes them to look at the world differently 
through a new cultural perspective that is hardly neutral. No matter how much they 
protest by making a conscientious and concerted effort to remain neutral in their 
methods and research, none of them ever provides a dispassionate rendering of the 
facts that is free from the ideological frameworks of their inner and outer life.58 
No physicist can graze upon the ultimate reality of life or the ultimate force of the 
universe directly and objectively. The modern proclivity to view the forces of life as 
a part of the material world only speaks from the modern secular tendency to ignore 
divine presence and interpret nature as a self-contained unit with its own appetency. 
It speaks more of a cultural bias than the results of empirical observations or a direct 
scientific vision into the world of cause and effect.
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The forces of life remain as metaphysical and mysterious as ever. The popu-
lar culture denies this problem and imputes to matter its own efficacy, but much 
of academia has rebelled against scientism and recognizes the limitations of the 
scientific method in explaining metaphysical questions about causal mechanisms, 
or the why and wherefore of life. Modern philosophers take particular pleasure 
in pointing out this problem to their audience and debasing the exalted status 
of science in the modern world by showing certain limits within its methods of 
inquiry and ability to answer certain questions from a strict empirical analysis of 
nature. According to their analysis, science has particular difficulty when address-
ing teleological questions concerning the final cause or the why and wherefore 
of life that so preoccupied Aristotle and many others in the ancient world; even 
early modern questions concerning the causal mechanism of how things work in 
everyday life seem to escape its limited purview. In the eighteenth century, David 
Hume brought the most devastating analysis to the capacity of causal reasoning to 
develop definitive conclusions by demonstrating to the satisfaction of most phi-
losophers the inability of pure reason to analyze an effect in mundane experience 
and derive its cause without resorting to the custom or habit of experience that 
associates the two events together. Hume demonstrated in this simple way that the 
nature of the causal mechanism escapes us in everyday experiences of life, let alone 
in regard to the final cause of the entire universe, where no one has experienced 
its origin or even comprehended its phenomena.59 Ludwig Wittgenstein followed 
Hume and represented the sentiment of the philosophical community in saying,
All definitions are made a priori.
One elementary proposition cannot be deducted from another.
There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to 
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.…
It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not 
know whether it will rise.
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The 
only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the 
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, 
just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.60
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Many other disciplines joined the philosophical community in its polemic 
against scientism and its attempt to absorb all other aspects of life under the 
simple matrix of a mechanistic universe. After Newton, scientism reared its ugly 
head and created in many ways its own backlash by ascending to the top of Mount 
Olympus and deigning to replace all the other gods as the true and only discipline 
worthy of pious devotion. Newtonians like Pierre Laplace displayed the zenith of 
scientific arrogance by deprecating belief in the existence of God as an unnecessary 
postulate and declaring that the new science was able to comprehend all events—
past, present, and future.61 Other reductionists appeared in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries with the same hubris but soon ran into complications as the 
microscope and telescope revealed the rich diversity and complexity of life sur-
passing all previous expectations. Quantum physics finally imploded the myth of 
scientism altogether by discovering a strange world that lies beyond all calculation 
and determinacy.62 Werner Heisenberg disavowed the possibility of prying into 
this world through his famous Uncertainty Principle and abandoned all attempts 
to depict its atoms beyond mathematical matrices. He said, “Not only is the Uni-
verse stranger than we think, it is stranger than we can think.”63 Niels Bohr agreed 
and added his skepticism by declaring that no clear boundary exists between the 
measuring apparatus and the system measured when examining this tiny world. 
Whether light is a particle or wave depends on what type of experiment a physicist 
wishes to conduct.64 Of course, other disciplines attacked the hubris and ques-
tioned whether science was ever capable of handling the total spectrum of human 
experience through its various images and symbols. William James thought that 
scientific materialism dealt with a very limited part of the spectrum and missed 
the deeper spiritual reality that resonates within the human soul. The totality of 
human consciousness finds it necessary to describe experience through many dif-
ferent images and disciplines. It might even let in messages that come from excep-
tional phenomena, coming outside the limited purview of the physical world and 
transcending the naked eye, much like ultra-red and ultra-violet rays. Certainly, 
something is missing when a scientist listens to a “Beethoven string-quartet” and 
describes the experience as a “scraping of horses’ tails on cats’ bowls.”65 Science 
might do a pretty good job in discussing certain local regularities, making empir-
ical discoveries, and creating technological effects, but its wider-claims are far 
from compelling and require other disciplines or perspectives to fill out the entire 
human experience.66 
Modern philosophy has come to question the objectivity of all human 
knowledge by emphasizing more and more the place of human subjectivity in 
appropriating the empirical world. Immanuel Kant helped inspire this new direc-
tion by announcing a “Copernican Revolution” in the study of epistemology; 
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instead of assuming that “all our knowledge must conform to objects,” he thought 
it was more enlightening to assume the exact opposite and see the mind as impos-
ing its nature or a priori categories on the objects of the world.67 This revolu-
tionary turn was followed for the most part by the philosophical community and 
ended up destroying whatever remnant of belief remained in viewing the human 
mind as a simple arbiter of objective truth or tabula rasa. The next generation of 
Neo-Kantians saw George Hegel turn history and its philosophical inquests into a 
process of gaining knowledge of one’s inward subjectivity, or eliminating the alien-
ation that exists between the subject and object.68 “What is rational is actual and 
what is actual is rational.”69 Arthur Schopenhauer reduced the phenomenal world 
to a mere representation of our conscious life, comparing it to the illusive images 
of a dream or the Hindu concept of maya. He thought of space, time, and causality 
as appearing with the opening of the eye and expressing nothing more than the 
functions of the brain.70
Today’s postmodernists take this process as far as it can go by eliminating all 
distinction between the subject and object and relegating belief in the dichotomy 
to a fundamental error of the past, committed by classical metaphysics.71 Postmod-
ernists reject all traditional western attempts to develop a “mirror-image” of reality 
or find “objective cognition” from some ideal world of truth subsisting in the heav-
ens above. Humans relate to each other through the art of conversation and possess 
no ground to justify their language-games as if pointing to something solid.72 Their 
ideas only exist within the “fantasy-frame” of a “virtual reality,” which no longer 
finds a substantial difference between fantasy and the outside world, between the 
erotic illusion about a “fantacy-object” and the experience of making love to a “real 
partner.”73 Their ideas arise in dialogue with culture and develop along with it 
in a non-rational way through the accidents of history—the arbitrary constraints 
of the past and the power-plays of political and social forces in the present.74 All 
human ideas develop from a certain cultural perspective, representing the “shared 
background information” of a community and making it impossible to “get away 
from force, from the pressure exerted by a partial, non-neutral, nonauthoritative, 
ungrounded point of view.” No one can eliminate bias and adjudicate differences 
between various people and their ideas.75 
Scientists tend to resist this postmodern analysis as an extreme expression of 
philosophical disdain for their discipline. Almost all physicists believe in some 
external reality that answers to their methods and theories. Even in quantum 
theory, few physicists understand the presence of the observer as actually creating 
the initial reality or potentiality, even if the method and act of experimentation 
influences the results. In fact, the physical world often stands recalcitrant in 
thwarting their prior expectations and serves as an important empirical check to 
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their work, allowing them to start anew and make genuine progress in develop-
ing a better or more satisfying explanation. In the seventeenth century, Cardinal 
Bellarmine tried to press Galileo into admitting the Copernican revolution was a 
simple mathematical convenience in calculating the relationship between the sun 
and the earth, but scientists will have none of this and take the language of math-
ematics much more seriously than a mere calculating device that is indifferent to 
the reality of the world.76 Even the early Wittgenstein saw language as touching 
reality in describing its logical relationship or states of affairs,77 and scientists have 
shown the power of mathematical language time and time again in describing and 
predicting these relationships in making certain aspects of life more intelligible. 
These scientists make a good point and do well in remaining within the math-
ematical limits of their discipline but tend to fall upon more questionable foot-
ing when overstepping the warning of the philosophical community and taking 
their metaphysical leaps into the world of causality all-too-seriously. How and why 
things work remains as much a mystery as ever in the fundamental sense of these 
questions—no matter how many technological marvels are produced and put forth 
by the apologists of science in claiming the omniscience of the scientific enterprise. 
Understanding the physical world remains a much more difficult task than simply 
using it through a process of trial and error or mathematical prediction in finding 
out what works. Understanding the electromagnetic force is a much more difficult 
problem for physics than building and using a generator. Those scientists who 
view life as a self-contained unit of mechanical forces often speak from the hubris 
of their discipline in trying to reduce all of life to physics and represent little more 
than the modern secular culture’s point of view, based upon many non-scientific 
factors. In all the bluster, physicists remain as blind as ever to the efficient and final 
cause(s) of the universe. Their metaphysical flights of fancy involve little more 
than a leap of faith into the realm of the unknown, and theistic or Newtonian 
alternatives remain as viable as ever.78 Any popular belief in a mechanistic universe 
is based on subjective criteria.
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c h a p t e r  f i v e
Atheism often develops as a reaction to the inexplicable nature of evil or suffering 
in the world. The problem of evil hits people on an existential and visceral level, 
where life has brought a great deal of pain to those experiencing continuous suffer-
ing, meaningless toil, and unanswered prayers. Epicurus receives credit for providing 
the classical formulation of the problem by finding the presence of evil incompat-
ible with a divine reality claiming to be good and all-powerful.1 The presence of 
evil demonstrates that power and goodness have no ultimate ontological reality in 
a single being; otherwise, evil would be eliminated. Modern atheists like Bertrand 
Russell accept this argument and experience dark moments when they draw out the 
consequences for humankind with brutal logic.2
Brief and powerless is man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls piti-
less and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless to destruction, omnipotent matter rolls 
on its relentless way.… That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of 
the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves 
and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, 
no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond 
the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the 
noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of 
the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be 
buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond 
Innocent Suffering
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dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to 
stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of 
unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.3
The Puritans
The opposite point of view is found within the Judeo-Christian tradition, where 
God works within history and directs it with meaning and purpose toward the 
dawning of the kingdom of heaven.4 Here God takes the life and deeds of people 
and places them within the divine nature to participate in its immortality and live 
forever.5 This point of view permeates and motivates many followers of the Chris-
tian faith, but found its deepest expressions among Puritan authors who were so 
energized by their place within the divine economy that they conceived of their 
community as receiving a special calling and playing a leading role in the divine 
drama to redeem humanity and make a lasting impact on the world. The Puritans 
saw England and New England as the epicenter of God’s activity and hoped to 
“reform” all aspects of society in creating a better world.6 They came to think 
of their community as a “City on a Hill” that reflected the future and served as 
the center of a historical process, where genuine progress was made in all areas 
of life and continued to evolve until it fulfilled its purpose of establishing the 
kingdom of God, even without the personal intervention of Christ in their post-
millennial scheme of things.7 All along the way, Puritans discerned the “signs of 
the times” and witnessed God’s providential dealings among them, taking notice 
of earthquakes, tempests, eclipses, and other natural phenomena as special divine 
admonitions to fulfill their mission.8 They envisioned their community in terms 
of the ancient people of Israel, possessing the same special role within the divine 
economy, complete with their national covenant before God, and attended with 
the same visible blessings and curses upon their faithfulness to its stipulations. 
Their divines centered their understanding of the divine will upon covenant the-
ology and preached Jeremiads, which exhorted the people to remain faithful to the 
covenant and prognosticated disaster if they refused to repent of their infidelity to 
the founding principles.9 
The Puritans based much of their teachings upon faith in the sovereignty of 
God. They identified their ideas with the theology of John Calvin and followed his 
strong emphasis upon predestination, except preferring to engage in more spec-
ulation about God’s specific intent or purpose behind the actual decree.10 Like 
Calvin, the Puritans thought of God working all things according to the good 
pleasure of the divine will,11 but many of them were not content to recognize the 
simple truth of God’s ultimate control over the forces of life and wanted to engage 
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in some speculation and discern why God had ordained certain events to transpire 
within the divine counsels—an impiety Calvin certainly questions and repudiates 
several times in his Institutes. Calvin says that “nothing takes place by chance” or 
“without his deliberation,” including the fall of Adam, the evils of humanity, and 
the damnation of the reprobate,12 but he rejects those who speculate over the why 
and wherefore behind the “secret plan.”13 Calvin feels that true piety must limit its 
study to following what God reveals in Scripture and spurn any attempt to spec-
ulate about the intent or meaning of historical events apart from a specific divine 
word or commentary.14
Here, surely, the fall of Adam is not presupposed as preceding God’s decree in time; 
but it is what God determined before all ages that is shown, when he willed to heal 
the misery of mankind. Suppose our adversary again objects that this plan of God 
depended on the ruin of man, which he foresaw. It is quite enough for me to say 
that all those who propose to inquire or seek to know more about Christ than God 
ordained by his secret decree are breaking out in impious boldness to fashion some 
new sort of Christ.…With Augustine I say: the Lord has created those whom he 
unquestionably foreknew would go to destruction. This has happened because he has 
so willed it. But why he so willed, it is not for our reason to inquire, for we cannot 
comprehend it.15
After Calvin, this type of biblical piety waned, and the next generation of Protes-
tants reverted to scholastic and philosophical means of constructing their system 
of doctrine, dividing biblical studies from theology.16 In the most famous instance, 
Theodore Beza exhibited this tendency as the successor of Calvin at the Academy 
in Geneva and produced a grand supralapsarian scheme of history, based upon 
Aristotelian logic and the scholastic theology of Duns Scotus. Through this phil-
osophical scheme, he explained the reasons why God destined the majority of the 
human race to the pits of hell and designed the fall (lapsis) of Adam to condemn 
them, along with the other significant matters of biblical history and salvation.17 
The Puritans also had a tendency to search out the “secret plan” of God in 
their works. They emphasized the OT more than other Christian groups18 and 
tended to embrace the view of the Mosaic economy, which sees the blessings of 
life as a sign of divine favor and the curses as much the opposite (Dt 28).19 Thomas 
Beard, a Puritan divine, provided an extreme example of this viewpoint in his 
influential work, The Theatre of Gods Judgments (1597). As an early schoolmas-
ter and later friend of Oliver Cromwell, his ideas and work naturally exerted an 
important influence upon his pupil, as well as the subsequent Revolution, which 
published a revised and expanded edition in 1648—the year before Charles I’s 
execution.20 The book contains special exhortations to rulers about serving the will 
of God and warnings about divine wrath punishing “wicked offenders against the 
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law of God and the laws of kingdoms.” It warns against those rulers who hinder 
the “worship and service of God,” pointing to the plagues that fell upon Pharaoh 
and the agonizing death of Herod the Great as a fitting judgment for the enemies 
of God’s people.21 The “heavy and revenging hand” of God is sure to fall upon all 
those who spurn the Word and persecute the ministers of the sacred message, and 
Beard finds it most typical for the Lord to broadcast his righteous indignation in a 
direct, cause-and-effect manner, linking specific acts of disobedience with certain 
results: “we may plainly see that few persecuting enemies of Christ & his servants, 
have escaped without some remarkable token of God’s wrath and heavy displea-
sure.”22 The visible tokens are provided throughout the book ad nauseam, boldly 
illustrating the moral lessons or intent of God in history and often emphasizing 
the lex talionis of the Mosaic economy (Ex 21:23–25, Nm 32:23). Here is a sample:
Likewise we may read of Felix, Earle of Wartemberg, who swore to his companions at 
a supper, that ere he died he would ride vp to the spurres in the blood of the Luther-
ans, that is, true Christians; But in the same night Gods hand was vpon him, for hee 
was strangled and choked with his owne blood. Harken to this, yee bloody and mur-
thering Papists and quake for feare Illiricus.23
Likewise we may read of one John Martin Trumbant of Briquerras in Piamont, who 
would vaunt himselfe, and brag of his crueltie against professors of Christs Gospell. 
And further, how hee most barbously cut off a faithfull ministers nose, for which 
wicked deede, the Lord sent a mad Wolfe to bite off his nose, and so he died himself 
mad. This wolfe was never knowne to harme any man before.24
A certaine fellow, hearing a godly Preacher in a Pulpit say much against periury, greatly 
condemning the same, and shewed how it neuer escaped vnpunished, scoffingly saide, 
I haue often forsworne my selfe, and yet my right hand is not a whit shorter than my 
left, which words scarce vttered, but an inflammation rose in that hand which would 
neuer be cured. But was cut off, to saue the rest of his body, and so at length his right 
hand through the iustice of God was made shorter then the left.25
A certaine Noble-man would vsually hunt on the Saboath day, but as hee loued dogs 
more then the service of God vpon his holy Saboath, so the Lord rewarded him: for 
hee made his wife to bring foorth a childe with the head like a dog, that seeing he 
preferred his dogs before Gods worship, he might haue a dogge of his owne getting 
to play withall.26
It is reported that a wicked sonne did beate his old father, and trailed him by the haire 
of his head to the threshold of the doore, which wretch when he was olde, was so 
serued of his sonne and worse, for his sonne dragged him out of doores into the dirt 
in the streetes, …, so we see heere, like sin, like punishment.27
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Cirus, King of Persia, was a man of blood, but his ende was according to his life, for 
a woman overcoming him, and killing him, threw his head into a sacke full of blood, 
saying, now glut thy selfe with blood, which thou hast thirsted after, so long time.28
Theodeberius, eldest sonne of Clotharius, died amongst his whores: … The like befell 
on one Bartean Ferrier, a great learned man at Barselon in Spaine, who hauing locked 
himselfe in his study with a whore, was found dead vpon the strumpet.29
Now Gods fearfull iudgements vpon the persons of wretched sinners of this kind 
according to vndoubtd histories. In the Bishopricke of Coline, a notable vsurer, lying 
sicke, mooued his lips and mouth, as though he chewed somewhat, and being asked 
what he did eate he answered his money, and that the diuell thrust it into his mouth 
perforce, so that he could neither will, nor chuse, but deuoure it, and in this tempta-
tion he died miserable.30
It were to long to call all or halfe of the Popes to account for their abominations more 
then heathenish therefore let vs end with Pope Alexander the 6, which came to the 
Papacie not by desert, but by briberie and faire promises to the Cardinals, for he was 
a man, or rather a monster, full of all horrible vices and beastly conditions, hauing 
neither sinceritie, faith, religion nor ciuill honestie, but couetousnesse, ambition, 
more then barbarous crueltie: he set benefices and promotions to sale: he poysoned 
Iohn Michel Cardinal of Venice for his treasure: he perswaded Charles the 8. King 
of France to warre, and afterward himselfe turned to the contrary party: he deuised 
poyson for Cardinall Adrian his familiar freind, which his Butler mistaking, insteed 
of the Popes cuppe gaue his murdering Maister that which Cardinall Adrian should 
haue drunke, which the Pope drinking, and being poysoned as his freind should haue 
bin, died miserably, according to his iust derseruings, by his wicked behauiour.31
All these examples are meant to instill the fear of God within the godly and 
ungodly alike—all of whom experience the chastisement of the Lord. Beard ends 
with a final warning to the readers concerning a “greater punishment then any (as 
yet) spoken of, for the wicked, and that is eternal torments in hell fier,” making the 
horror of divine wrath much greater than the foreboding tokens of his own book.32 
This position also made its way into New England as a source of vigilance 
within the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Cotton Mather, their most prolific and 
famous author, saw the community playing a leading role in a divine drama and 
continually pointed to providential signs of deliverance and judgment in spurring 
the people to persevere and fulfill their special calling before God.33 In The Voice of 
God in Stormy Winds, Mather attacks the insidious “Atheism” among the people by 
inculcating the fear of divine sovereignty and excoriating any attempt to limit these 
phenomena to “Second Causes only” like the innate “Disposition of the Air, the 
season of the Year, or the Influence of the Constellations in the Heavens.”34 The 
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people must heed these “dreadful providences” as signs from God.35 At times they 
represent something positive for the community in exhibiting the type of mercy 
and deliverance “that happened on our Coast Yesterday and the Day before,” when 
“the French Privateer designing to do us hurt…suffered shipwreck,”36 but more 
often they bring fear and foreboding with their display of divine power. They bring 
swift justice to the godless, as seen in the recent case of two blasphemers, who 
were struck dead by a lightning bolt after defying the heavens.37 They also serve 
as a sign of divine displeasure or threat of a coming judgment and tribulation, as 
happened in so many instances throughout the history of the church.38 The basic 
purpose of storms is to arrest the people from their present complacency and make 
them recognize the fragility of their situation—that it is possible for God to bring 
disaster and even extinguish the community, as Mather illustrates throughout the 
work showing past and present examples of utter destruction through these divine 
tempests.39 
In A Discourse Concerning Earthquakes, he points to another type of sign from 
God that needs careful analysis to discern its multifaceted meaning for the commu-
nity.40 Sometimes earthquakes show divine displeasure with human behavior, and 
Mather cites a number of OT verses and passages to confirm this kind of mean-
ing;41 other times they bring judgment upon the world in delivering the people of 
God from oppression, and Mather points again to many specific instances in the 
OT to display this possibility;42 and still other times they contain a direct “Met-
aphorical sense” and portend “state-quakes,” “church-quakes,” “kingdom-quakes,” 
and other great changes that are about to transpire. Mather particularly focuses 
upon this latter dimension of their significance in the sermon as an opportunity 
to exhort the people in light of the signs and wonders around them. He interprets 
recent earthquakes in terms of the Olivet Discourse, where Jesus made “Great 
Earthquakes” a portent of his coming, warning his disciples to remain vigilant and 
discern the signs of the times. Mather wants to awaken his people by recalling 
the words of Jesus’ prophecy, helping them discern the present fulfillment, and 
providing a number of examples indicating the increase of earthquakes around the 
world—just as Jesus predicted concerning the latter days. Even New England has 
experienced several earthquakes of late and must recognize the signs of the times 
through practicing vigilant and diligent service to God.43 Mather uses these and 
other providential signs as a means of encouraging his people to be thankful for 
God’s mercy in delivering them from harm. He points out some contemporary 
examples of affliction to underscore the real and present danger, but his approach 
remains less condemnatory than The Theatre of Gods Judgements; he merely wants 
the people to consider their ways and serve the kingdom of heaven given the fra-
gility and ephemeral nature of the world.44
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Lisbon
Eventually, the Calvinist view of life faded over time as people imputed more 
autonomy to natural events and thought of God as more remote and less respon-
sible for everyday affairs.45 The suffering of life lost any real sense of meaning or 
purpose and called into question the fundamental religious notion of divine prov-
idence or an ultimate sovereign plan. Instead, the concern over human suffering 
summoned people to take responsibility and employ their best effort to alleviate 
whatever natural objects impeded their way on the road to progress or a more 
felicitous state of affairs.46 
A pivotal moment was the great earthquake that rocked Lisbon, Portugal on 
November 1, 1755. It happened on All Saints’ Day when all the churches of the 
city were crowded for the morning’s mass, ensuring maximum carnage and pro-
ducing a death toll of over 50,000.47 Some like John Wesley reacted with the theo-
logical and rhetorical style of a Puritan by underscoring the sovereignty of God 
in all things, the divine right to take vengeance upon those responsible for the 
Inquisition in Portugal, and the need to take refuge in the Almighty, not the abil-
ity of humans to control the forces of nature.48 But others started to question this 
old-school approach to a more complex and disturbing reality. A couple of months 
after the event, Voltaire wrote a poem questioning the supercilious optimism of 
the church and modern philosophical thinkers like Leibniz and Lord Shaftesbury, 
who simply dismissed real and senseless tragedies like Lisbon by believing that all 
things are just and work for the good in the counsels of God. Is it possible to tell 
those who witnessed the death of so many loved ones that “all is well” in the grand 
scheme of things and dismiss the cruelty of life around them as a mere chimera?49 
Three years later, Voltaire returned to the subject of Lisbon and composed Candide 
or Optimism—a novel that resonated with the public and warranted 43 editions in 
the next few decades.50 In the novel, Candide is the protagonist, who undergoes 
some tragedies in his life, forcing him to question the teaching of his mentor that 
this is the “best of all possible worlds,” that “everything is made for the best pur-
pose.”51 Candide finds it difficult to reconcile this optimism with the brutal death 
of so many good people, including Pangloss, his mentor and the “greatest of phi-
losophers,”52 but he (and Voltaire) refuses to sink into complete pessimism in spite 
of the evidence around him. Candide chooses to go on and “cultivate the garden” 
at the end of the novel, deciding to continue working with the prospect of finding 
meaning. Voltaire displays through Candide the indomitable hope that still beats 
within the human spirit. He finds it difficult to end his work on a pessimistic note 
or yield to the darkness of complete atheism, even if his thoughts are leading him 
elsewhere.53 He still wants to believe in God or something that is essential to the 
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existential and social needs of the people in spite of all reasons to the contrary. 
He protests the need to continue believing in some nebulous form of faith, which 
has little proof or definition. He later provides a utilitarian justification and cries, 
“If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him”54; in all this indicating 
a need for God that is growing more difficult to justify and floundering as an 
abstraction within his new anti-theological world of Deism and other modern 
expressions of faith.
More typical of the modern world was the tendency to pigeonhole the question 
of God altogether and limit the discussion of tragic events to the realm of secondary 
or natural causality as a practical means of resolving or alleviating the problem.55 
John Mitchell, an English clergyman and natural philosopher, represented this new 
secular emphasis by providing a detailed explanation of the Lisbon earthquake in 
1760, which limited the discussion to secondary causality and brought him much 
credit from the scientific community as a father of modern geology and seismol-
ogy. In his work, the cause of earthquakes begins with subterranean fires heating 
up underground water rather than the will or moral indignation of some divine 
force. The process of heating the water produces pent-up vapors that eventually 
erupt at an epicenter and travel in a “wave-like motion” across the surface of the 
earth. In the case of Lisbon, the earthquake was caused by an eruption at great 
depths in the Atlantic Ocean traveling to a nearby city, which remains vulnerable 
to a future episode. As a practical matter, Mitchell wants the people to recognize 
that certain places experience earthquakes at regular intervals, and low-lying, hilly 
regions receive the most violence or damage.56 The “Spaniards, at their first settling 
there [in Lisbon], were told by the old inhabitants when they saw them building 
high houses that they were building their own sepulchers.”57 The exhortation is to 
plan accordingly, and the concern about pleasing God seems less relevant in the hope 
of averting the next disaster.
This secular and scientific point of view has come to dominate the religious 
and non-religious community in the modern world. No longer are earthquakes 
seen as “acts of God” in any serious or literal sense of the phrase. Those who search 
out the “secret plan” of God and ask ultimate teleological questions about the 
purpose of earthquakes run the risk of receiving much ridicule from a public that 
is becoming more and more secular, just like their view of the world. Earthquakes 
are interpreted these days as natural phenomena within a cosmic machine that 
humans can mitigate only through proper precautions of a practical nature. Any 
mention of God’s hand in the matter is considered pre-scientific and condemned 
as judgmental. No better example is the continuous public ridicule of Pat Robert-
son, who professes to possess a “word of knowledge” as a charismatic minister and 
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periodically tries to connect certain natural disasters with divine acts of retribution 
like some prophet of old.58 This type of interpretation is best left to bygone days. 
Holocaust
No religious community suffered a greater disturbance or challenge to their beliefs 
in the modern world than the Jewish people. The anti-Semitism of the diaspora 
reached a zenith in the middle of the twentieth century with the elimination of a 
third of their people in death camps, leaving the survivors to question the existence 
of God and the meaning of their own existence as a “kingdom of priests and holy 
nation” (Ex 19:6). Some continued to follow the traditional belief of a sovereign 
God working on behalf of the chosen people, but many other Jewish people felt 
betrayed by the horrific scope of the Holocaust and proceeded to adopt a more 
secular view of life, which no longer saw the biblical concept of divine providence 
as a credible alternative and chose to dismiss or revise the ancient faith.
The haredi or ultra-orthodox tended to resist the general trend in representing 
the most entrenched part of Judaism and following the traditions of the religion 
and its ancient view of history. The haredi continued to find inspiration in the 
Hebrew Scripture and followed its understanding of tribulation as a divine act 
of punishment for the sins of the people.59 In this line of thinking, Hitler served 
the will of God as the rod of divine anger, fulfilling much the same purpose of 
Nebuchadnezzar in the prophecies of Jeremiah by chastening the iniquity of the 
Jewish people. The Holocaust was an act of justice, even if its ultimate purpose was 
redemptive in leaving a remnant to renew the sacred covenant and traditions of 
faith, rather than annihilate Jewish life forever. It was necessary for God to chasten 
the people because of their secular ways and lead them back to rediscovering their 
religious identity as the chosen people. Modern times brought the adulteration 
of the faith by the Reform and other liberal Jewish people through forsaking the 
traditional understanding of the faith and adopting an enlightened way of think-
ing.60 It saw many Jews forsaking their communities to assimilate into the new 
nation-states as citizens and becoming like “all the other nations” (1 Sm 8:5)61; it 
saw them engaging in pseudo-messianic movements like secular Zionism, which 
sought to resolve Jewish problems through the political methods of the world, 
rather than wait for a future apocalyptic deliverance that promises the full and true 
experience of salvation—both spiritual and corporeal.62 In blaming secularism, this 
ultra-orthodox explanation found the locus of the problem within the vices of their 
polemical enemies within Judaism but had some difficulty understanding why the 
actual locus of Hitler’s wrath seemed to be centered elsewhere. The extermination 
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was mainly conducted in Eastern Europe, where a higher portion of Orthodox 
Jews lived at the time, and the total operation eliminated 80 percent of the Rabbis, 
scholars, and students of Judaism, mainly living in that region and less influenced 
by the Enlightenment.63 
Today the mainline view of Judaism tends to reject the traditional under-
standing of the ultra-orthodox and find no fault with the Jewish people at all. 
The Holocaust contains no lesson or message that they need to discern from the 
heavens above. Those who suffered from Nazi atrocities simply “fell victim to a 
crime motivated by an evil fantasy,” which “had no intrinsic meaning” whatsoever 
for an individual to study and take to heart.64 This point of view often speaks of 
the Holocaust as if it had no antecedent in past events and defies any attempt to 
find a rational basis for it, calling the existence of a providential God into ques-
tion. The Holocaust represents an unprecedented and unique manifestation of 
evil, making it difficult to explain or justify from a rational point of view—reli-
gious or scientific, social or psychological. Above all, it calls into question those 
who continue to believe in a grand rationality for all things and precludes any 
simple reversion back to the old understanding of history when evil was “limited 
in scope” and possible to explain away through “God’s overall plan for Jewish and 
world history.”65 If anyone is to blame for the extermination, it is the Gentiles, not 
its innocent victims. The Jewish people are exonerated from all culpability in the 
matter, or even responsibility for preventing it as those who were blindsided by 
an inexplicable and irrational force that came from nowhere.66 German reasons 
for disliking the Jews are seldom mentioned in this account or immediately dis-
missed as arising from a mentality that wishes to “blame the victim.” One finds 
little mention of German complaints about Jewish people possessing a dispro-
portionate amount of power in the land or controlling the arts, banks, the press, 
and any number of important professions.67 One also finds little mention of the 
Enlightenment and its clear role in fueling modern anti-Semitism, maybe because 
this criticism hits too close to home for these enlightened Jews and makes them 
complicit in anti-Semitism—at least to some degree.68 If anyone is culpable for 
laying the foundation of Nazi death camps, it is typical of this interpretation to 
blame the church. Nazi anti-Semitism was little more than a “cancerlike muta-
tion of the Christian anti-Semitic ideology,” which demonized the Jewish people 
for murdering their Messiah and produced “the death camps [as] the terminable 
expression of Christian anti-Semitism.”69 The basis for the hatred is found within 
the NT and its conception of Jews as “Christ-killers,” making anti-Semitism an 
indelible aspect of the religion and explaining why this scurrilous accusation “has 
been repeated ad nauseam for almost two thousand years.”70 Richard Rubenstein 
says, “As long as there is Christianity, Jews will be the potential objects of a special 
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and ultimately pernicious attention which will always have the potentiality of 
exploding in violence.”71 However, the problem with his assessment is the lack of 
substantial proof. There is little evidence that the church sponsored anti-Semitism 
throughout its history and much that speaks to the contrary when considering the 
basic ecclesiastical policies of the papacy.72 Because of this problem, Rubenstein 
and the many liberal Jews who follow him often resort to employing psychobabble 
to find the pretext for blaming the church on a “deeper” subconscious level.
Even without Hitler, the Judas story is destined to continue to play a vital role in 
unconsciously poisoning Jewish–Christian relations. The Judas tale is part and parcel 
of the Passion drama, which is retold and relived by every practicing Christian during 
Holy Week. From the cradle to the grave, few stereotypes are as consistently rein-
forced under the most emotionally potent environments as these. The high point 
of the Christian religious calendar rehearses, amidst utterly magnificent music, fre-
quently aesthetically overpowering architecture and ceremonial grandeur, the terrible 
tale of the Jewish betrayal and the Jewish murder of the Jewish God!… The Judas 
story created the psychological ground which made it possible for Germans under 
stress to believe that the Judas–Jews had betrayed their country and caused her defeat 
in World War I. It was futile for Jewish defense and veterans’ groups to point to Jewish 
sacrifices on behalf of the Fatherland during the war. After all, Judas had betrayed 
his Lord with a kiss. The appearance of loyalty in a Jew could not be credited, even 
when that appearance was purchased through death on the battlefield.… I do not love 
my sons the less because I am aware of the unconscious parricide dwelling in their 
psyches. When I see Christian Heilsgeschichte as leading potentially to murder, I 
do not forget its Jewish origin. I can sense the potential murderer in my brother only 
because I have intuited it in myself. As Christian and Jew we cannot be united in 
innocence. Let us at least each be united in guilt.73
Today many Jewish people find it necessary to revise their theology after the 
Holocaust. They find it difficult to cite the book of Deuteronomy or develop a 
simple calculus like Jeremiah in assigning the specific punishment of seventy years 
in captivity for certain transgressions as if knowing the mind of God and verdict of 
ultimate justice in minute detail. Most Jewish people wish to mitigate this part of 
the tradition and emphasize other aspects of it, which allow for some latitude and 
inconsistency in understanding the overall mystery of God.74 They can point to 
the book of Job and view the ways of God as numinous or beyond the capacity of 
finite human beings to comprehend with simple moral constraints.75 They can say 
with John Calvin that humans should follow the will of God as revealed in Scrip-
ture and refuse to speculate over ultimate divine purposes as the zenith of human 
blasphemy and hubris.76 They can follow Immanuel Kant and find their moral 
duty in performing the dictates of the law as obedient servants, without any pros-
pect of receiving a specific reward.77 Maybe, the Holocaust represents the destiny 
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of the chosen people to suffer with God in the world and accept the difficult 
mission of a martyr, leaving them to live as a suffering servant, without incentives 
from respondent and operant conditioning.78 
Some Jewish people look in another direction and find the accent upon human 
responsibility and freedom an important aspect of their tradition and better option 
in providing a possible or partial solution. The Hebrew Scripture portrays God 
as giving to the people commandments, expecting their cooperation in fulfilling 
the divine will, and warning them of dire consequences if they go astray. Because 
of this bilateral arrangement, Judaism is able to think of God as restricting the 
exercise of omnipotent power when dealing with humankind, allowing space for 
genuine freedom and moral responsibility, and shifting the onus of creating evil 
away from the divine person toward the unfaithfulness of the covenant partner 
or vices of human beings in general.79 In trying to explain the Holocaust, Irving 
Greenberg speaks of this tension between God and human beings as lying at the 
root of the Jewish experience. He prefers to explain evil through the bailiwick of 
human responsibility and resolve the Epicurean triangle by sacrificing the typical 
metaphysical concept of omnipotence, rather than lose a more essential attribute 
like justice or goodness.80 
In the 1960s, the tension soon gives way to a more radical theological expres-
sion that denies the providence of God altogether. These Jewish theologians see 
the dialectical movement proceeding away from the belief in a transcendent God 
toward an emphasis on human freedom and autonomy.81 Emil Fackenheim follows 
many other radical theologians and proclaims that “God is dead,” like so many 
other radical theologians of the 1960s. It is no longer possible for Jews to believe 
in the God of history or their special calling from heaven as the “chosen people.” 
It is the obligation of all Jews after the atrocities of Auschwitz to stop praying as 
if God is connected to the world and has some special relation to them.82 Richard 
Rubenstein agrees with these sentiments and the emphasis upon the death of God, 
believing that Auschwitz broke the “thread uniting God and man” and sentences 
everyone to live in a “cold, silent, unfeeling cosmos” with no “meta-historical 
meanings” whatsoever. He finds it better to live in an absurd and meaningless uni-
verse than pretend to go on believing in an almighty and capricious deity who had 
the cruelty to inflict Auschwitz upon an innocent and unsuspecting people.83 And 
yet, Rubenstein and other radical theologians are unable to proceed any further 
in this line of thinking and reject the typical response of Camus and like-minded 
atheists, who discard religion in the name of the absurd. They continue to remain 
within the religious community as an essential aspect of human existence, but they 
find it impossible to continue believing in a personal God and necessary to demy-
thologize the sacred history of the past.84 
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Many of the Jewish people who experienced the Holocaust firsthand also dis-
play the same tendency in renouncing all faith in the personal God of Hebrew 
Scripture.85 Elie Wiesel represents this perspective in his classical work, entitled 
the Night. Wiesel was a Hungarian Jew, who was deported to Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald as a child and related his horrific ordeal some ten years later as a 
survivor. In the book, Wiesel relates the process of losing his faith, of coming to 
Auschwitz, of beholding the “little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned 
into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky,” of smelling the foul odors of the 
crematory, of viewing “those flames which destroyed my faith,” “which murdered 
my God and my soul and turned my dreams into dust.”86 Before Auschwitz, he was 
a pious student of the Talmud, who expressed a desire to learn Kabbalah at a young 
age from his teacher, Moshe the Beadle.87 He speaks of the Germans entering his 
town in the spring of 1944, creating a ghetto out of it, and eventually deporting all 
the people, who remained optimistic at first in the midst of so much uncertainty.88 
But through the long and exhausting ordeal, involving months of starvation and 
death, it was no longer possible for him and others to accept the silence of the 
heavens and believe in the ancient Hebrew traditions and its God of absolute 
justice.89 He might pray at times, hoping to receive enough moral strength and 
continue helping his father survive, but his animosity toward “that God in whom 
I no longer believed” became more and more palpable.90 In one telling incident, 
he describes his faith dying with three prisoners, who were executed for possessing 
arms.
One day when we came back from work, we saw three gallows rearing up in the 
assembly place, three black crows. Roll call. SS all round us, machine guns trained: 
the traditional ceremony. Three victims in chains—and one of them, the little servant, 
the sad-eyed angel.
The SS seemed more preoccupied, more disturbed than usual. To hang a young boy 
in front of thousands of spectators was no light matter. The head of the camp read the 
verdict. All eyes were on the child. He was lividly pale, almost calm, biting his lips. 
The gallows threw its shadow over him.
This time the Lagerkapo refused to act as executioner. Three SS replaced him.
The three victims mounted together onto the chairs.
The three necks were placed at the same moment within the nooses.
“Long live liberty!” cried the two adults.
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But the child was silent.
“Where is God? Where is He?” someone behind me asked.
At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over.
Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon, the sun was setting.
“Bare your heads!” yelled the head of the camp. His voice was raucous. We were 
weeping.
“Cover your heads!”
Then the march past began. The two adults were no longer alive. Their tongues hung 
swollen, blue-tinged. But the third rope was still moving; being so light, the child was 
still alive.…
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in 
slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face. He was still alive 
when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his eyes were not yet glazed.
Behind me, I heard the same man asking:
“Where is God now?”
And I heard a voice within me answer him:
“Where is He? Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows.…”91
The majority of Jewish people have moved toward atheism or secularism in 
their everyday thoughts and actions. The process received an impetus from the 
attitudes of the French Enlightenment and the policies of its Revolution against 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, and culminated in the dark days of the Holocaust, 
which sealed most Jews into seeking a secular salvation from a secular world.92 This 
process left the Jewish community asking questions about the significance of their 
identity as a people and the possibility of defining its nature in the future if religion 
was no longer the fundamental basis. The Jewish people had begun to move away 
from a religious identification by the time of the Holocaust and even proceeded 
to interpret Hitler’s hatred of their people during and after the war in the exclu-
sive terms of race, rather than religion, politics, and social standing, as the new 
and basic way of describing what it means to be Jewish.93 Rubenstein follows this 
secular tendency and admonishes Jews to abandon their religious identity since it 
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continues to serve as a pretext for Christians murdering Jewish people or viewing 
Hitler as an instrument of divine chastisement. It is better for the Jewish people 
to enter “simple humanity” than continuing to experience the pernicious hatred 
of “philo-Semitism” and “anti-Semitism” alike.94 And yet, Rubenstein and other 
secular Jews find it necessary for the community to survive even after reducing 
its people to nothing special. Fackenheim claims to hear a voice emanating from 
Auschwitz and admonishing secular and religious Jews to confirm their “Jewish-
ness” as a sacred duty. In a famous passage, he exhorts the people to survive and not 
hand Hitler a “posthumous victory” in allowing Judaic life to perish altogether—a 
message that all authentic Jews take to heart.95 
In many ways, Jewish people are those who survive in the midst of hardship, 
making suffering an indelible feature of “Jewishness” down through the ages. They 
are a religious and secular community that emphasizes and celebrates their suffer-
ing, even if this testimony is not unique to the community and unable to capture 
the entire essence of their experience. The Jewish people are certainly related to 
Christians in this regard. The Christian faith first developed out of Judaism and 
presented the prospect of suffering to its early followers through the NT’s empha-
sis upon the cost of discipleship (Mt 5:11–12; 16:24–26; 2 Tm 3:12). The theme 
of suffering dominated the first three centuries of the church’s existence in the age 
of martyrs and continued to find a prominent place in certain quarters, perhaps 
finding its most consistent expression in the Reformation among a pacifist wing 
like the Anabaptists, who interpreted the NT in a literal manner and took its 
words about suffering to heart.96 The Black Church has represented this theme 
in more recent times with its struggle against discrimination and racism, making 
their experience related to the synagogue and other fellowships who share the 
same understanding of their plight in society. 
The problem with the position is the difficulty of keeping a balanced or objec-
tive perspective on the suffering. The position certainly gains an audience from 
those who condemn violence and sympathize with its victim, but it fails to keep 
a balanced perspective about the complex nature of people, who like to exagger-
ate the sins of others and exonerate their own shortcomings. Anabaptists like to 
recount the heroics of their martyrs in suffering horrific torment for their faith, but 
often neglect the seditious behavior of their ancestors as a pretext for the persecu-
tion in disrupting society and slandering Christian magistrates as infidels.97 The 
Israelites suffered four hundred years of bondage in Egypt and spent much of the 
time crying to the Lord for deliverance, but found it difficult to leave the habit of 
grumbling during their forty years in the wilderness and lodged complaint after 
complaint against the Lord.98 This type of grumbling reaches its zenith in those 
who find their suffering unbearable, or without comparison to the rest of human 
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experience, moving them to slander divine providence or deny the existence of 
God altogether. Many Jews who interpreted the Holocaust as a unique event of 
unprecedented evil moved toward the rejection of their historic faith, but one must 
wonder whether the interpretation was necessary, or just the final expression of 
discontent. Even in their own history, one finds instances of horrific evil, like the 
brutal policies of the Assyrian empire and the destruction of the “ten lost tribes 
of Israel” in the eighth century B.C.E., without the Jews losing the faith of their 
fathers, without Hezekiah surrendering the last vestige of their life in Jerusalem. 
In the larger scheme of things, the facticity of death might represent the ulti-
mate problem that all human beings must face in their lives with its certainty and 
finality. Often, humans are shortsighted when comparing their lives with others 
and judging unfairness by the treatment of their immediate associates. They forget 
that the ephemeral nature of life makes all the relative differences pale into com-
plete insignificance. The Buddha recognized that suffering was a common lot of 
humankind, that everyone was going to become old and sick and die, and exhorted 
the people to find peace within their mind, rather than dwell upon the throes and 
vicissitudes of life.99 Blaise Pascal found the ephemeral nature of life the most dis-
turbing question of all and wondered why humans spend so much time dwelling 
upon trifling matters when this one horrific reality contains the only vital matter 
of concern for us all.100
When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before 
and after, the little space that I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immen-
sity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened and 
am astonished at being here rather than there;… The eternal silence of these infinite 
spaces frightens me.101
In this simple mathematical fact, the quantity and quality of any life are reduced 
to a meaningless nothing when divided by the infinity of time. 
The Bible engages the question of death and asks about the ultimate meta-
physical justification for this final tragedy of life—a question the secular ideology 
of today no longer entertains in its predilection for mechanical explanations. The 
Bible thinks of God as the measure of all perfection and human beings as worthy 
of death because of their failure to live up to the righteous and eternal standards 
of divine glory (Gn 3; 6:5; Ps 51:4; Rom 3:23; 6:23; Eph 2: 1–3). The death- 
sentence is universal, embracing the whole human race—both Jewish and Gentiles 
alike. The prophets of Judah might think of Gentiles as living outside the special 
revelation of God and walking in darkness, but they never exonerated the Jewish 
people as free from the bondage of sin and unworthy of the chastisement that 
befalls them from time to time at the hands of the very wicked (Hb 1). In fact, 
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Amos thinks their sacred covenant entails a greater accountability before God 
and results in a stricter form of punishment, which is necessary to redeem the 
people and purify their ways (Amos 3:2). This message comes to the forefront in 
the NT, where God’s people are summoned to take up their cross and undergo 
the most severe process of chastisement as a sign of their election and means of 
redemption (Mt 5:11, 12; Lk 9:23–25; Acts 5:41; Heb 12:6; 1 Pt 4:13–17). In 
following this important theme, most Christians understand suffering as a part of 
redemption and find it difficult to accept the simple cause-and-effect reasoning 
of Thomas Beard and his predilection to condemn those who endure hardships 
as more wicked than others.102 The words of Jesus seem most explicit in rejecting 
self-righteousness and reviling judgments (Mt 7:1–3), and preferring his follow-
ers to concentrate on their own sins, rather than spend time speculating over the 
pretext of God’s dealings with others (Lk 13:1–6; Jn 9:1–3). In fact, Christians see 
Jesus enduring the fullness of suffering, particularly during the last week of his life 
and death on the cross. Here Jesus experiences the cruelest form of punishment, 
dying as an innocent victim, bearing the sins of others, feeling abandoned by God, 
and crying out to the heavens for an ultimate reason, without receiving an answer 
or aid of any kind (Mk 15:33–34).103 This understanding of the cross becomes 
high theology when Christians recognize the fullness of deity within Jesus of Naz-
areth and find it necessary to reinterpret their understanding of God in terms of 
the suffering and death of their Messiah. Martin Luther calls this reinterpretation 
the “theology of the cross,” where one crucifies the former understanding of divine 
glory and takes seriously the revelation of God in Christ Jesus as seen in the events 
of his earthly existence. This revelation forces one to abandon the former “theol-
ogy of glory,” which “makes God the devil,” dwelling in self-sufficient transcen-
dence and imperial majesty. It forces one to forsake a priori theological notions, 
which find greatness within the prowess of human reason, turning God into Cyrus 
the Great, Alexander the Great, and Herod the Great. It forces one to forsake the 
exaltation of human arrogance and meditate upon the humble and com-passionate 
God of the cross, hidden from philosophical pretense within a servant, who suf-
fers, bleeds, and dies together with the people (1 Cor 1, 2).104 Modern theologians 
like to emphasize this theme and think it provides an answer to atheism and its 
continual protest about the problem of evil since God is no longer impassible or 
outside the realm of suffering. Even some Jewish mystics follow the theme by 
finding the presence of Shekinah in the wilderness, wandering and suffering with 
the people, and resolving the old Epicurean triangle with a different conception 
of God, who is no longer living outside the human condition as Graeco-Roman 
philosophy had taught the western world, but actually exists as a com-passionate 
presence within their darkest hours.105 While the modern secular world fails to 
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find God any longer in the midst of its suffering, these Jewish and Christian theo-
logians prefer to find Jehovah suffering together with the people and bringing an 
ultimate deliverance from the things that would destroy their souls.
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232, 249–50. Hegel is often given credit for introducing the death of God. For Hegel, the 
abstract essence of God must enter the sphere of alienation (death), in order to accept a 
sensuous or objective form, and then rise above it in pure universality (resurrection). Death 
belongs to the divine essence as a self-negation in order to promote history or becoming. 
This understanding of God lays the groundwork for Alfred North Whitehead and Process 
Theology. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, A. V. Miller (trans. and analysis) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 471 (779), 475 (784–85). Hegel also uses the 
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III. 
The Marginalization of  
Religion in American Society  
as a Private Matter

The modern doctrine of church/state separation developed out of concerns over 
the temporal powers of the papacy. In the fifteenth century, the Conciliar Move-
ment was successful at the Council of Constance in diminishing the authority of 
the pope through establishing the independent rights of the state and its people. In 
the sixteenth century, Protestant Reformers called for the separation of the church 
from the state, believing that the church had lost much of its original purity and 
fundamental spiritual mission in the Middle Ages by seeking the dominion of 
this world and using the coercive measures of temporal power to obtain it. The 
Reformers wanted to separate church and state for the sake of the church. They 
thought of the state as corrupting the church but were much less willing to reverse 
the equation and speak of the church corrupting the state or society. They never 
thought of the state existing outside the will of God, independent of a special 
metaphysical commission, or free to lead its citizens in secular autonomy, divorced 
from religious concern.
This secular view of life was a product of the Enlightenment. Deism arose at 
the time and rejected the biblical concept of the world’s dependence upon God. 
The Bible summoned its people to depend upon God for their “daily bread” as 
representing the ultimate force behind the sun, the rain, and the abundance of 
life (Dt 11:11–17; Ps 65:9–13; Mt 5:45, 6:11, 25–33), but Deism tended to con-
ceive of the world in a much different manner—much like a Cartesian machine 
c h a p t e r  s i x
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of interrelated parts that ran upon its own principles or natural laws, reject-
ing the biblical concept of God’s general providential care or special miraculous 
intervention in life. This secular view of the world and its forces was extended 
to human beings, who received the same autonomy from their Maker as the rest 
of creation and no longer needed divine grace or revelation to lead their lives. 
Human beings possessed a self-sufficient capacity to lead a moral life and dis-
cover through their God-given reason whatever transcendent, metaphysical, and 
ethical principles that were necessary for their society, without requiring an inti-
mate knowledge of the divine nature or receiving special illumination from the 
heavens.1 Morality was discovered through the eternal principles of nature, or 
reduced to the simple calculating sum of utilitarianism, making it independent 
of special revelation and abasing revealed religion as unnecessary for society to 
function.2 Deism believed that their people were able to know the will of God 
apart from the knowledge of God and deemed all theological discussions as 
speculative, divisive, and unnecessary. Only a Deist like Thomas Jefferson could 
say, “…it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no 
god,” or, “religion is a matter that lies solely between a man & his God”—as if 
one’s conception of the ideal had no relation to one’s conduct in society or polit-
ical point of view. Deism enabled human beings to live outside of God within 
their separate sphere of power, proceeding to the antithesis of the church’s rad-
ical dependence upon God for revelation and grace, creating a secular world of 
absolute autonomy, and laying the foundation for the complete separation of the 
church and state. 
French culture led the way toward secularization in the modern world with its 
war upon the Judeo-Christian tradition in the French Revolution and the estab-
lishment of the secular état as the new “voice of God.” The country followed their 
philosophes in blaming the church and its priests as the fundamental source of past 
transgressions in the Ancien Régime and demanded that the citizens leave their 
religious communities behind for a process of cultural régénération and accept a 
new laïque identity within la grande famille française. The law of 1905 made secu-
larity official by establishing “the Separation of Churches and State,” claiming that 
religion had no role to fulfill in the future of the culture; the future belonged to the 
état and laïcité. Many Europeans found France’s treatment of the church severe, 
but the basic trend of modern western culture proceeded in the same general direc-
tion.3 The state became the “absolute power on earth,”4 assuming the dominant 
role in the affections of the people by separating, subjugating, and assimilating the 
former role of the church in education, morality, philanthropy, health care, and 
ever-increasing areas of life.5
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Voltaire
The spirit of the French Enlightenment and subsequent culture centered much of 
its devotion on the life and teachings of one man. Many of the other great figures 
of the Enlightenment like Diderot and d’Alembert afforded their unique contri-
bution to the times, but they often deferred to this one man as if serving his legacy.6 
Toward the end of his life, the Parisians crowned a bust of him and celebrated the 
man with godlike accolades.7 His life and work seemed to embody all that was 
fashionable among the social elite of the day—the cynicism, the satire, and the 
wit—the love of toleration and the hatred of the church.8 He led his people down 
the path of irreverence, demeaning the Christian piety of simple peasants, encour-
aging impious blasphemy among those who were capable of mastering the art of 
cynicism, and extolling the power of human reason to establish its divine truth. 
His prominence only grew throughout his life, beginning with the success of his 
first tragedy in 1718. Thereafter he adopted the enigmatic name of Voltaire and 
developed along with it an enormous ego and reputation, which grew to become 
the leading philosophe of human prowess and reached God-like immortality upon 
the occasion of his death. His influence upon the French Revolution and its Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy (1790) was immortalized when his body was exhumed 
and enshrined as the first and foremost deity in the Panthéon of leading Enlight-
enment figures. The apotheosis was accompanied with a cavalcade of “military 
and civil organizations carrying banners and flags, a model of the Bastille, busts 
of Rousseau and Mirabeau, a statue of Voltaire surrounded by pyramids bearing 
the titles of his works, and a golden casket containing the seventy volumes of the 
edition published by Beaumarchais at Kehl.”9 
Voltaire and the French had a pretext within the many transgressions of their 
church to develop this extreme and blasphemous aversion to the religion. The 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes haunted the liberal sensibilities of the philosophes 
during the era and brought considerable justification for those who wished to turn 
against the church and heap aspersions upon it.10 The hatred of this policy and 
others like it seemed to well up in Voltaire from his youth, forming a deep-seated 
resentment toward the faith; but what drove him over the edge and shocked him 
into action was a particular event, the unjust execution of a kind and benevolent 
man from Toulouse. His name was Jean Calas. He was a Protestant cloth mer-
chant and was accused by his fellow citizens of murdering his son for converting to 
Catholicism, even though all the evidence pointed to an apparent suicide. Voltaire 
successfully helped to overturn the verdict in the Council of State and clear the 
name of the father and his family, even if no one could change the initial wrongdo-
ing. Out of the experience, he wrote the widely distributed and esteemed Treatise 
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upon Toleration (1763), which recounts the episode in detail at the beginning of 
the work and proceeds to develop a broad theory of religious “toleration” on the 
subject, filled with much anti-Christian venom.11
The work launches into a particular tirade when it comes to sectarian religious 
fanaticism. Any religion that divides the human race against itself is wicked and 
false. He thinks that all religions contain the same basic concept of God, and what-
ever differences arise in the course of time are the product of the non-essential spec-
ulations of dogmatic theologians. There is no reason why Jews, Muslims, and the 
many sects of Christianity cannot live in harmony under a general theism or deism 
and a basic code of ethics, which is the most important matter in religion, not doc-
trine.12 Religion is essential in creating social order and providing moral orientation 
through its belief in the ultimate judgment, but it deteriorates into a destructive force 
when its theologians engage in sectarian disputes over non-essential matters of faith. 
Ethics unites us together under one God, while doctrine divides us into warring 
factions.13
Of course, Voltaire’s own beliefs are much in harmony with what he wants 
all others to believe in order to obtain coalescence. True religion is confined in his 
works to a belief in the goodness of one, true God, the unity of the human race 
through acts of kindness, and the expectation of divine judgment, which discrim-
inates between the good and the bad.14 Religion consists of heartfelt reverence 
and basic acts of justice, not trips to a holy land or an altar, where mystical graces 
descend from the utterance of magical formulas.15 True religion is based upon a 
most rational belief in the order and design of the cosmos and does not require a 
childlike act of faith in mythical stories, miraculous events, and the contradictory 
doctrines of biblical revelation. Faith is based on the power of the human intellect 
and its ability to discover what is revealed for all to see in nature.16 No grace or 
special revelation is needed.
The Bible received much criticism in Voltaire’s later writings when it was 
safer for him to vent his wrath against the entire Christian faith and its sources. 
He believes that the miraculous nature of the biblical account drives many 
honest scholars to atheism, who simply find it incredible to believe in talking 
serpents and donkeys, or prophets eating excrement and marrying prostitutes.17 
The OT is described as a mingle-mangle of teachings that withstand all purity, 
charity, and reason.18 The NT is described as a mishmash of inept reason, out-
right lies, and contradiction in “almost every fact,” and its stories are considered 
juvenile, superstitious, and fanatical.19 The Bible is a book of wickedness and 
inferior literary style, leading Voltaire to deprecate its authors by expressing the 
typical anti-Semitic epithets of the Enlightenment. The Jewish people are den-
igrated as a cruel and barbarous enemy of the whole human race, much inferior 
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to other people in cultural, artistic, and scientific achievement.20 The only Jewish 
or biblical figure who is spared the tirade is Jesus of Nazareth, and he receives a 
favorable review through Voltaire’s reduction of his message to liberal toleration 
and rejection of many other elements in the church’s account.21 His portrait of 
the historical Jesus is set in contrast with the account of the canonical Gospels, 
which were written after the fall of Jerusalem and used Platonic categories to 
turn the simple carpenter from Nazareth into the eternal Son of God.22 
The severe criticism of the Bible is a by-product of Voltaire’s contempt for what 
the Christian faith represented in his society. The Church of France had supplied 
its enemies with many reasons to hate it—Dominican Inquisitions, the massa-
cre of Huguenots, Jesuit and Jansenist polemics, and all the rest. During the last 
year of l’Ancien Régime (1789), the French government employed 178 censors to 
control publications and make sure all of them were compatible with sound faith, 
public order, and good morality. Voltaire himself had some of his works censored for 
unsound theological opinions and spent eleven months in the Bastille.23 No wonder 
that Voltaire could describe Christians as “the most intolerant of all men.”24 Their 
religion should be the most tolerant of all others, considering the words and deeds 
of its benevolent founder, but instead of following his example it became much the 
opposite—“a virulent infection, a terrifying madness, a bloodthirsty monster.”25 Vol-
taire sees the history of Christianity as filled with little more than “fraud,” “errors,” 
and “disgusting stupidity,” and so “every sensible man…must hold the Christian 
sect in horror.”26 In his Sermon des Cinquante (1762), he declares war upon l’infâme. 
He wishes to “terminate and destroy the idol from top to bottom.”27 This solution 
is summarized in his famous cry écrazer l’infâme (crush the filth), which he inces-
santly repeats throughout his later works. The self-professed man of tolerance is now 
willing to have certain enlightened despots develop a final solution and destroy the 
infamous religion as a necessary step in creating a better world.28
Throughout his analysis, Voltaire never seems to blame the despots for their 
own policies. He was too much of a sycophant to go after the main source of oppres-
sion and become a martyr for the cause of liberty. He only supported democracy 
late in his life, when it was safe to do so, and his career was insured.29 Instead, Vol-
taire prefers to blame the Christian religion and its clergy as responsible for most 
of the bloodshed spilled over the last six centuries in Europe.30 He wants national 
independence from the Christian religion in general and the political impotence of 
the clergy in particular. He wants the priestly aristocracy removed from any place 
of authority in the state. They prey upon the superstitions of the multitude and 
fill the king’s ear with their ambitious plans and petty sectarian disputes, causing 
continual turmoil within the land. It is the fault of the clergy, not the king, that 
intolerance continues to fill the land.31
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In spite of the best efforts of American clerics, the influence of Voltaire 
migrated to the New World and “corrupted” their constituency with its religious 
and anti-religious attitudes. The popular newspapers and magazines of the day 
showed a widespread interest in his controversial ideas. Tobias Small and Thomas 
Franklin produced an English edition of Voltaire’s works somewhere between 1761 
and 1769, making the entire corpus accessible to a wider range of American read-
ers. Libraries contained many of his works, and interest in those works quadrupled 
by the end of the century if one simply tallies the many catalogue announcements 
of the day.32 Voltaire and the French Enlightenment were becoming a major force 
throughout the colonies and helping to change the ideological commitments of 
the people. In fact, the influence was so powerful that many of the leading figures 
or “Founding Fathers” identified as much with the French attitude toward reli-
gion as they did with the religion of their forefathers, who migrated to the land. 
Some remained openly Christian (Patrick Henry and Alexander Hamilton), some 
attended church but were non-communicants (George Washington and John 
Marshall), others embraced the religion of the Enlightenment ( John Adams and 
Benjamin Franklin), and still others went all the way, accepting the new religion 
of reason and using it to assault the Christian faith (Thomas Paine and Thomas 
Jefferson).33 Most were guarded about their religious beliefs in public, too clever 
as politicians to alienate voters or launch a direct attack on their constituency’s 
most sensitive subject. Thomas Paine, the irrepressible gadfly of the American 
and French Revolution, was the great exception. He chose to publish the politi-
cally incorrect Age of Reason against the advice of friends and suffered the political 
fallout for his indiscretion. In the work, Paine conducts a Voltairean tirade against 
the Judeo-Christian tradition and calls the Bible a “book of lies, wickedness, and 
blasphemy.”34 
Of all the rest, Thomas Jefferson came the closest to adopting the anti- 
Christian sentiments of Voltaire and Paine, even though he was more discreet 
about expressing it during his public career. Some like the Federalists detected 
his Voltairean disaffection with Christianity, calling him an anti-Christ and a 
Francophile during political campaigns, but found it difficult to make their sus-
picions resonate with the voters.35 Jefferson was much too cagey for them. He 
preferred to remain silent about his religious opinions for the most part and offer 
some equivocations to please the public whenever necessary, but there is no doubt 
about the fundamental veracity of the charge once one considers the total weight 
of his writings. The only question concerns the exact form, time, or setting in 
which these ideas came to enter his life in an age where historical records were 
scanty, and footnotes were few and far between. Some point to William Small, 
who served as Jefferson’s mentor at William and Mary, quickened his interest in 
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the Enlightenment, and “probably fixed the destinies of my life,” although we 
know little about his influence beyond these vague generalities.36 Others mention 
his tenure in France as a minister plenipotentiary from 1784 to 1789, where he 
experienced first hand the “misery of kings, priests, and nobles.”37 Still, others 
speak of his respect for Voltaire, pointing to the extensive use of Voltaire’s works 
in the Commonplace Book.38 But whatever the source or sources, the culture pro-
vided plenty of opportunities to learn the new ideology of the philosophes from 
the pervasive influence of French culture, and Jefferson gravitated in its direction.
Viscount Bolingbroke
Perhaps, the clearest and earliest indication of its influence and importance is 
found in Jefferson’s literary notebook (1765/66). Here he makes continuous use 
of the Philosophical Works of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751), 
as providing a direct inspiration for his own enlightened, philosophical orienta-
tion. Bolingbroke served as a member of the Tories in the English Parliament, 
beginning in 1700, and later became a secretary of state during the reign of Queen 
Anne. In 1714, he fell out of favor with the government when the Whigs gained 
power and spent the next decade as a political exile in France—a country he grew 
to admire and love as a young man in the late 1690s during the first of his many 
visits to the center of the Enlightenment. During his stay there, he developed a 
friendship with major figures of the French Enlightenment like Voltaire, Montes-
quieu, and Levesque de Rouilley, his mentor, and became an important conduit 
between cultures, conveying French ideas to the English-speaking world, and vice 
versa.39 
Thomas Jefferson was one of the many exposed to the ideas of the English 
Deists/French philosophes through the writings of Bolingbroke. In the first part 
of his early notebook, the Philosophical Works of Bolingbroke provides “the larg-
est section from any single author—54 excerpts and over 10,000 words.”40 The 
excerpts display the impact of Bolingbroke on Jefferson, especially in awakening 
him to the skeptical, rational, and natural religion of the Enlightenment.41 Many 
of these excerpts focus on Bolingbroke’s disdain for the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
revealing Jefferson’s animus and proclivity toward a hostile analysis of the faith at 
a very early age.
In the account, the anthropocentric nature of the tradition is emphasized and 
chastened as an unenlightened, unscientific way of thinking. Bolingbroke con-
tends that human beings are not the sole purpose of the creation or the end of 
divine activity in this world. In fact, there are inhabitants on other planets in the 
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universe, and these places are populated with a myriad of creatures superior to us 
and our limited capabilities.42 No people are more anthropocentric and display 
more human arrogance than the Jews. They speak of themselves as the chosen 
people of God, elected to receive the one unique revelation from on high, as if 
God remained unknown to other nations and only worked in their “little corner 
of the world.”43 This hubris might not matter in and of itself, but it works to the 
detriment of others when people like the Jews see divine providence working for 
their own benefit; it made the Jewish people particularly cruel and unjust in their 
treatment of the non-elect, blinding their hearts and minds to their own imper-
fections.44 In fact, “no people was less fit than the Israelites to be chosen for this 
great trust on every account.”45 They were an avaricious people, who lived for 
materialistic “appetites and passions,”46 lacking any fear of ultimate judgment and 
any real motive to enhance genuine piety here on earth.47 They were so occupied 
with laying up their treasures on earth that they failed to develop a concept of 
immortality until Hellenistic times and its influences, revealing an ignorance that 
characterizes their Scripture in general48 and making the so-called pagans more 
enlightened and better equipped to accept the Messiah than these fanatics.49
The Jewish people receive much of this vitriol because their culture produced 
the fundamental source of divine revelation for the church—the true enemy of 
Bolingbroke, Jefferson, and the sons of the Enlightenment. The animosity toward 
the church leads to the defamation of Hebraic culture and its greatest literary 
achievement—the Old and New Testament. According to Bolingbroke’s ( Jeffer-
son’s) account, the Hebrew Torah displays little knowledge of the true God and 
contains “palpable falsehoods” on “almost every page.”50 Its stories are simply fan-
tastic and incredible, defying all rational belief in this modern era.51 Certainly, 
Moses’ account of creation must be considered absurd by any person possessing a 
modicum of education and acquaintance with the Copernican system of modern 
astronomy.52 His narration is incredulous, and his concept of law even worse, “more 
ineffectual than any other law, perhaps, that can be quoted.”53 The laws of nature 
contradict the Mosaic economy at important junctures and utterly repudiate the 
bigoted admonitions of Deuteronomy 13 to slay idolaters,54 making it impossible 
to equate the God of nature with the God of the Old or New Testament.55 The 
God of Moses is “partial, unjust, and cruel; delights in blood, commands assas-
sinations, massacres, and even exterminations of people”; and the God of Paul 
“elects some of his creatures to salvation, and predestines others to damnation, 
even in the womb of their mothers.”56 Jesus tried to rescue the world from this 
Jewish nightmare,57 but his “gospel is one thing [and] the gospel of Paul, and all 
those who have grafted after him on the same stock, is another.”58 Paul perverted 
the teachings of Jesus, turning him into a mystical divine Savior, who satisfies the 
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angry Jewish God through blood atonement and redeems us from original sin by 
an act of divine grace. This God of cheap grace still acts with the same injustice as 
the God of the OT.59
The true God of nature never dispenses with justice in seeking the salvation of 
the sinner, preferring “the repentance of the offender” as the means of atonement 
to the bloodthirsty need for vengeance through an ignominious spectacle like cru-
cifixion.60 The theology of nature uses “right reason” and stays within the boundary 
of proper ethical discourse.61 It rejects Pauline flights of mysticism as corrupting 
the original message of Jesus. Pauline theology resulted from the process of Hel-
lenization as the Christian faith moved away from Palestinian soil and injected 
the theological and speculative mysticism of Platonic philosophy into the faith.62 
Bolingbroke displays his virulent displeasure with Platonism at this point, 
rejecting it as a philosophical system and considering it an instrument through 
which Paul, Augustine, the Cambridge School, and all those who tried to synthe-
size it with Christianity eventually corrupted the faith.63 Imagination should never 
“leave the sensible objects” of this world and climb a “mystic ladder…to a region 
of pure intellect.”64 One should never create abstract forms, take mystical flights of 
fancy, and substitute them for the concrete voice of nature.65 What is inspirational 
about the Bible really comes outside of it through the true exercise of reason in 
its submission to the natural law. In true Christianity, God submits revelation to 
the sound judgment of our rational faculties.66 The exercise of right reason pro-
vides us with a more reliable source of finding God than submitting ourselves to 
religious authorities and their blind speculations outside of nature.67 It is better 
to use a posteriori reasoning and appeal to the “miracles” all around us than trust 
in the testimonies of others concerning fantastic events that offer no empirical or 
existential verification.68 
With this exhortation, Jefferson finds much wisdom and becomes a faithful 
disciple of Bolingbroke and the religious thought of the Enlightenment. His writ-
ings provide a continuous testimony to the same type of religious expression found 
in the work of Bolingbroke and other sons of the like-minded French spirit.69 His 
works include similar remarks that deprecate the Jewish people and their faith, 
find inspiration within the teaching of the historical Jesus, lament the Platonism 
in Paul and the church, reduce religion to morality, and extol the ability of reason 
to discover God in nature and lead a moral life. If there is any significant differ-
ence, it involves the place of politics and the means of implementing the message, 
not the basic nature of their religious convictions. Both Bolingbroke and Jefferson 
exhibit a kindred spirit in opposing the Judeo-Christian tradition and wanting to 
promote a more rational religion in its place, based on the evidence of nature. The 
only significant difference concerns the political means of achieving the goal and 
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leaves Jefferson looking and finding inspiration from other sources. Bolingbroke 
appears to respect the place of the church in the Erastian world of British society, 
while Jefferson wants to use political power to create a new and enlightened order. 
Jefferson wants to change the religion of America by erecting a wall against the 
participation of the church in society and substitute his own faith as the wave of 
the future, placing him squarely within the more extreme and virulent measures of 
Voltaire and his disciples.
Religious Opinions
Most of Jefferson’s religious beliefs function within the basic parameters of enlight-
ened religion with its emphasis upon reason, morality, and ecumenicity. He grew 
up in the Episcopalian Church, but never subscribed to any one group and calls 
himself at various points in his career a “Deist,” “Theist,” “Unitarian,” “Epicurian,” 
“real Christian,” “rational Christian,” et cetera.70 As a Deist, he rejects theology 
as speculative and irrational and dislikes sectarian dogma most of all, which he 
identifies with the narrow-minded views of Presbyterians, Puritans, and the rest 
of Calvin’s disciples. He prefers a less definitive view of God than Calvin offers 
in his Institutes, and so reserves most of his “dogmatic” statements for the ratio-
nal analysis of moral, social, and political life, dividing a knowledge of the divine 
will from theological speculations about the divine essence.71 He wants religion 
to emphasize the rational and moral instincts of all humankind, not the specu-
lative constructs of Reformed theologians and their many creeds. Reason is the 
“umpire of the truth.” It is the seat of divine revelation.72 In a letter to Peter Carr, 
he encourages his nephew to examine the claims of the Bible in a critical manner 
and develop his conclusions about its stories, apart from any theological preju-
dice.73 Christianity has enslaved the minds of its constituency for two thousand 
years with its ridiculous stories, stifling dogmas, and “incomprehensible Trinitar-
ian arithmetic.”74 It is time for western society to free itself from this bondage and 
find the God who is available for all of us to see in nature.
After all, it is morality, not dogma, that comprises the real essence of true 
religious affection.75 All human beings are endowed by their Creator with a basic 
sense of what is right and wrong, whether they serve the divine will as “a plowman 
[or] a professor.”76 These “moral instincts” are related more to the affections of the 
heart than the specific rational acuity of each and every individual.77 In fact, all 
religions agree on the same essential morality, which God has implanted in each 
and every one of us. It is metaphysical speculation and ritualistic practices, along 
with a host of other trivial matters that divide religious people into warring sects 
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and cause division among the human race.78 While society needs religion to pro-
vide a sufficient basis for its moral laws, there is no need to endure the many acts 
of religious uniformity in society and much to speak against the continued practice 
of inculcating a specific profession of faith. The salvation of society and its people 
is found through a gospel of works, not faith.79
In following this emphasis, Jefferson finds in Jesus of Nazareth the greatest of 
all moral teachers. All religions might follow the same moral code, but the teach-
ings of Jesus represent “the most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by 
man,” “more pure than those of the most correct philosophers.”80 Jesus reformed 
a religion that was rotten to the core. More than any other faith, Judaism was 
enslaved to an authoritarian priesthood, a depraved historical record, the material-
istic pleasures of this life, and “many idle ceremonies, mummeries, and observances, 
of no effect towards producing the social utilities which constitute the essence 
of virtue.”81 He particularly opposed the monstrous view of a “cruel, vindictive, 
capricious and unjust” God, which the Jewish people inherited from Moses and 
their forefathers, as well as their anti-social attitudes toward other nations as the 
“chosen people” of God. Jesus rejected the ethnocentric nature of their religion 
and extended his gospel of “universal philanthropy” to all humankind, “gathering 
all into one family, under the bonds of love, charity, [and] peace.”82 This emphasis 
upon universal love and moral goodness is what Jefferson finds most appealing in 
the life of Jesus, not other parts of the biblical story or the church’s own account 
of him. Jefferson refers to himself as a “real Christian” in this context, since he 
follows the moral teachings of the historical Jesus and not the corrupted version 
of the later church.83 Those who wrote about Jesus in Scripture were illiterate and 
uneducated, and composed unreliable accounts long after his life and ministry 
were over. They disfigured the simple beauty of his instruction through Greek 
metaphysical categories, transforming him into a mythical divine being and mirac-
ulous wonder-worker.84
Jefferson decides at this point to launch a quest for the historical Jesus, hoping 
to rid the gospel account of all its later ecclesiastical corruptions and find “the dia-
mond in the dunghill.” These aspirations sound high-minded and academic at first 
glance in its attempt to obtain scientific results in the midst of dogmatic prejudice, 
but his research largely becomes a testimony to the same a priori prejudices of the 
orthodox church and the early liberal efforts in the field. Whatever offends his reli-
gious sensibilities is eliminated from the account, and the remaining image of Jesus 
sounds more like an eighteenth-century philosophe, rejecting scholastic views of God 
and reducing religion to morality, than any real Jew living in the first century.85 He 
proposes to cut out all the “Platonising” elements of the later Greek church, which 
turned the simple carpenter into a metaphysical ideal,86 but falls into the same trap 
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by projecting his own modern ideals upon Jesus and incurring the same criticism he 
levels against the Hellenistic church. He uses Jesus as a receptacle for his own ideas, 
recreating a first-century Jew in his own enlightened image.87 
Like the philosophes and the later liberals of Germany, Jefferson bases much 
of his analysis upon a certain understanding of science that was prevalent at the 
time. Jefferson uses this scientific understanding to reject the possibility of God 
intervening in history, although he offers no real historical analysis to justify his 
conclusion. All miraculous narratives are expunged from the text as contradicting 
“our experience of the laws of nature.”88 Jefferson simply cuts and pastes and cre-
ates an image of a simple, moral teacher worthy of esteem among his peers. His 
first attempt is found in a modest syllabus of the “genuine” ethical teachings of 
Jesus, which he composed over “an evening or two” during his tenure as president 
and entitled “The Philosophy of Jesus” (1804).89 Later on, after his retirement 
to Monticello, he sat down and revised his earlier effort creating a much larger 
version, The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth (ca. 1819), which emphasizes the 
ethical teachings in Luke and Matthew.90 He points to Joseph Priestly’s writings, 
especially his “Corruptions of Christianity and Early Opinions of Jesus,” which he 
read “over and over,” as a special source of inspiration in his work and means of 
gaining academic credence.91 The Unitarian theologian certainly creates a similar 
picture of the historical Jesus as a mere man. Priestly says that the person of Jesus 
was transformed by the Alexandrian school of theology into the divine Logos of 
Platonism,92 and claims his message of repentance and obedience was changed by 
Augustine into a doctrine of grace.93 Jefferson follows the same basic understand-
ing of Jesus and the process of Hellenization in his account, except in regard to the 
question of miracles. Priestly still holds to the resurrection and the rest of Christ’s 
miracles as recorded in the Gospels,94 whereas Jefferson rejects them as scientifi-
cally impossible and removes them from the text.
The admiration for the teachings of Jesus is contraposed by his disdain for the 
orthodox portrait of him. He rejects the divine incarnation, the virgin birth, the 
vicarious atonement for sin, and the resurrection from the dead.95 He hopes that 
“the day will come when the mystical generation of Jesus by the supreme being as 
his father in the womb of a virgin will be classed with the fable of the generation 
of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter.”96 Along with the miracles, he mocks the special 
doctrines of the church, especially the Trinity, which he compares to the “hocus- 
pocus phantasm of a God like another Cerberus, with one body and three heads.”97 
These and all the other “creeds, formulas, [and] dogmas” of the church pervert the 
simple Jesus of history and transform him into the Christ of faith.98 The process 
started with the Apostle Paul, “the first corrupter of the doctrine of Jesus,” and only 
increased in the later church with its hierarchical structure, sacramental powers, and 
mr. jefferson  | 191
wicked priesthood.99 It is this development that constitutes the “real anti-Christ” 
and should incur the wrath of all true followers of Jesus and his teachings.100
Jefferson reserves most of his venom for the clergy as the leaders of the apos-
tasy and sponsors of great evil in society. In a Freudian slip, he refers to them 
as “priests” throughout his works, regardless of their denomination, revealing his 
deep-seated French resentment toward them.101 His special wrath is exercised 
against the “priests” of New England, who propagate the Calvinist faith, the most 
bigoted of all religions, and support the Federalist opposition to his civil policies.102 
The solution is to eliminate them from the state, and so he proposes legislation at 
several points in his career to exclude the clergy from holding public office.
The clergy are excluded, because, if admitted into the legislature at all, the probability 
is that they would form it’s majority. For they are dispersed through every county in 
the state, they have influence with the people, and great opportunities of persuading 
them to elect them into the legislature. This body, tho shattered, is still formidable, 
still forms a corps, and is still actuated by the esprit de corps. The nature of that 
spirit has been severely felt by mankind, and has filled the history of ten or twelve 
centuries with too many atrocities not to merit a proscription from meddling with 
government.103
James Madison, John Leland, Noah Webster, and many others criticize the pro-
posal as a basic violation of civil rights, which causes him to back down for a time. 
Jefferson offers some equivocations to please their legitimate concerns and then 
returns to the agenda, adding new proposals that would eliminate the clergy from 
school boards and censor political sermons from the pulpit.104
Jefferson also hopes to undermine the power of the clergy and the Christian 
faith by creating a public school system that would exclude religious instruction.105 
In his Notes on Virginia, he proposes to take the Bible out of “the hands of chil-
dren” and replace it with “the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and 
American history.”106 Like all sons of the Enlightenment, he hopes to exalt a secular 
view of history, which finds its cultural roots in the Graeco-Roman world and elim-
inates from the consciousness of the citizens whatever positive influence developed 
out of the Judeo-Christian tradition. His new view of history treats religious groups 
as creating schisms among the human race and spilling “oceans of human blood” 
over the pettiest doctrinal issues.107 The new history dismisses any vital “enlight-
ened” concerns to the religious struggles of the past and refuses to consider that 
many of these struggles were fought over the sacred canon of modern ideals like 
liberty, equality, and democracy—ideals that Jefferson shares with many of these 
religious combatants. Jefferson only identifies religious zeal with unjust persecution. 
He has no idea where the ideals of liberty developed in his own country, claiming 
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at certain times that the North continues to suppress the spirit of liberty and rights 
of humankind, which first arose in the South!108 Like Voltaire, he tends to identify 
all of Christendom with one specific expression of faith within a certain provincial 
struggle of his. In Jefferson’s case, the Puritans are considered the most intolerant 
of all religious sects because of the early persecution of Quaker missionaries and 
the rejection of Jefferson’s political agenda, but any positive aspect of the religion 
is dismissed through the negative stereotype. Jefferson considers the forefathers of 
Massachusetts and their descendants as nothing but bigots, and his history of the 
march toward freedom has nothing else to say about them.109
Public Education
To inculcate the new view of history, Jefferson hopes that the public will fund a 
government-sponsored educational program. Jefferson is hailed in many circles as 
the “father of public education” in America and deserves much credit for his attempt 
to educate all citizens, but it is clear that much of his concept of education is devoted 
to instilling a catechism.110 Of course, there are many inspiring words that speak 
much to the contrary: “I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against 
every form of tyranny over the mind of man,”111 it is unconscionable “to compel 
a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which 
he disbelieves,”112 et alia; and Jefferson is truly devoted to protecting civil liberties 
and promoting freedom of speech in the classroom for the most part. But when it 
comes to inculcating his own agenda the noble sentiments are set aside by practical 
necessity to serve the greater good—the greater good in this instance being a democ-
racy, or at least Jefferson’s version of it. Jefferson certainly understands that people 
need to receive instruction in a democracy if they are expected to make informed 
decisions.113 The aristocratic governor of Virginia, William Berkeley, maintained his 
power for so many years by refusing to educate his people through the press and 
proper schooling.114 The need for education presents itself wherever the people are 
empowered to rule over their own affairs. “Wherever the people are well-informed, 
they can be trusted with their own government.… Whenever things get so far wrong 
as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights.”115 However, 
the problem with Jefferson’s proposal is that its specific motivation tends to color the 
curriculum with his own philosophy of life. He truly wants to provide a forum for 
free discussion and inquiry, but he also wants an educational system to counteract 
the Federalist and Christian influence from the North and instill his own political/
religious ideology as a form of catechism.116 For example, he makes the following 
statement to a member of the Board of Visitors at the University of Virginia.
mr. jefferson  | 193
In most public seminaries text-books are prescribed to each of the several schools, as 
the norma docendi in that school; and this is generally done by authority of the trustees. 
I should not propose this generally in our University, because I believe none of us are so 
much at the heights of science in the several branches, as to undertake this, and therefore 
that it will be better left to the professors until occasion of interference shall be given. 
But there is one branch in which we are the best judges, in which heresies may be taught, 
of so interesting a character to our State and the United States, as to make it a duty in us 
to lay down the principles which are to be taught. It is that of government. Mr. Gilmer 
being withdrawn, we know not who his successor may be. He may be a Richmond 
lawyer, or one of that school of quondam federalism, now consolidation. It is our duty to 
guard against such principles being disseminated among our youth, and the diffusion of 
that poison, by a previous prescription of the texts to be followed in their discourses.117
Of course, he claims within this rationale that the agenda will cover only a part 
of the curriculum, but in his mind it covers an essential reason for launching the 
school in the first place; and as he knows all-too-well, this and other aspects of his 
agenda will tend to make their way into other areas of the curriculum in a more 
surreptitious manner.
The interest in using education is displayed right from the start of his time 
in public service. In October of 1776, he became a member of the committee to 
revise the legal code of Virginia and proposed three bills to encourage the growth 
of education in the Commonwealth: The Bill for the More General Diffusion of 
Knowledge (no. 79), The Bill for Amending the Constitution of the College of 
William and Mary (no. 80), and The Bill for Establishing a Public Library (no. 81). 
The first bill was the “most important” and sought to subdivide all Virginia counties 
into wards, with each ward providing elementary education to all “free children” for 
three years at the public’s expense. Reading, writing, and arithmetic would serve as 
the fundamental courses of instruction, and the history of western culture would 
provide sufficient examples of moral exhortation, rather than turning to the message 
of Scripture for answers. After the completion of this level, the better pupils would 
be eligible for more advanced subjects in secondary schools, and the best of these 
students would be sent to the university and receive training for roles of leadership 
in the state.118 However, the bill was attacked from a number of quarters, including 
Presbyterian ministers concerned about the place of religion in society, Methodist 
ministers believing that Sunday School could teach literacy just as well, and taxpay-
ers who preferred charity to a coercive measure that would tax the rich to support the 
children of another.119 A less effective measure was passed a couple of decades later 
in 1796, which left its implementation to the discretion of local court officials and 
provided only for primary education. Since these officials were unlikely to increase 
the tax burden for themselves and their rich cronies, Jefferson’s dream was “com-
pletely defeated,” leaving its fulfillment to another time and place.120
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Jefferson’s Bill no. 80 was designed to “secularize” the College of William and 
Mary by reducing Anglican control over its board and faculty.121 The college was 
chartered in 1693 with the expressed purpose of producing “complete gentlemen 
and good Christians.” The faculty consisted of ministers for the most part and was 
appointed by the church and its bishops to serve the interests of the ecclesiastical 
establishment.122 Jefferson wanted to change the basic purpose of the school by 
ending its association with the church, eliminating the school of theology, purging 
it of Tory influences, replacing the governing board, and making the adminis-
tration responsible to the legislature, not the kingdom of England or its church. 
In the place of the divinity school, he proposed a professor of “history, civil and 
ecclesiastical” and a professor of “moral philosophy,” who could serve as Jefferson’s 
Trojan horse in the curriculum to inculcate his religious principles.123 Of course, 
the proposal upset the religious establishment and was defeated by the legislature 
in 1779, but what Jefferson could not secure through the normal democratic pro-
cess he did through his executive powers the same year as a visitor to the college 
and governor of the state. He converted the Indian mission into the study of cul-
tural anthropology, added “the law of Nature & Nations, & Fine Arts to the duties 
of the Moral professor,” and eliminated the two professors of divinity, substituting 
“others of law and police, of medicine, anatomy, and chemistry, and of modern lan-
guages” in their stead.124 With these and other measures in place, the fundamental 
direction of the school changed over the course of time into much the opposite, 
serving now the ideology of Jefferson rather than that of the church. After visiting 
the college in 1811, Bishop William Meade made the following observation.
Infidelity, indeed, was then rife in the State, and the College of William and Mary was 
regarded as the hotbed of French politics and religion. I can truly say, that then, and 
for some years after, in every educated young man of Virginia whom I met, I expected 
to find a skeptic, if not an avowed unbeliever. I left Williamsburg, as may well be 
imagined, with sad feelings of discouragement.…
The grain of mustard-seed that was planted at Williamsburg, about the middle of the 
century, had taken root there and sprung up and spread its branches over the whole 
state,—the stock still enlarging and strengthening itself there, and the roots shooting 
deeper into the soil. At the end of the century the College of William and Mary was 
regarded as the hotbed of infidelity and of the wild politics of France.125
Later in 1816, Jefferson supported the state of New Hampshire in its attempt to 
arrest Dartmouth College, a private Congregationalist institution, away from the 
board of trustees, although the United States Supreme Court decided otherwise.126
Jefferson’s most famous and successful project in education was the Uni-
versity of Virginia, one of the first public institutions of higher education in the 
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country.127 Jefferson affords a number of exhortations about the importance of free 
inquiry at the school in January of 1819,128 but there is no doubt that its curricu-
lum, textbooks, and faculty must submit to his basic philosophical orientation—a 
framework that is evident from the very outset of the planning stage. The school 
finds its initial justification not so much in the love of learning or the advancement 
of knowledge,129 but in Jefferson’s concern over the influence of the Federalist 
opposition in northern schools. The school finds its calling in counteracting the 
nefarious influence of the Federalists in education and promoting the Republican 
principles of Jefferson, especially in the law school, hoping to stack the state and 
federal legislatures with a team of his disciples.130 The fulfillment of the dream is 
insured in the course of its development by Jefferson and the Board of Visitors, 
insisting that the law professor share the correct political vision and prescribing 
specific texts for the classroom, including Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, 
Sidney’s Discourses on Government, The Federalist Papers, Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence, and Madison’s Virginia Report of 1799–1800, touching on the Alien 
and Sedition Laws.131 Jefferson speaks of his desire for liberty to reign at the school 
and leaves the choice of books to individual professors in most instances, but when 
it comes to risking the Jeffersonian program of liberty itself, he was less willing to 
take any chances. Censorship was always a viable option if circumstances allowed 
the opposition a forum to undermine the basic mission. In one infamous episode, 
Jefferson urged an editor to publish an abridged edition of David Hume’s History 
of Great Britain, the “manual of every student” in the country, because it was laden 
with Tory ideas and needed to be “republicanized.”132
At the University of Virginia, the program of censorship was exercised with a 
special vengeance against the church and its many denominations. The private cor-
respondence of Jefferson speaks in a direct and forthright manner about his dream 
of witnessing a “quiet euthanasia” upon the fanatical beliefs of the church as a means 
of restoring a religion of “peace, reason, and morality” in the country, and his plans 
of using public education in fulfilling the dream.133 At the University of Virginia, the 
dream came to fruition under the guise of advocating liberty and non-discrimination 
through policies that really favored the religious agenda of Jefferson in the end at the 
expense of the church and its participation in the school. His ultimate design was 
to eliminate the Christian faith and replace it with his own, and this is exactly what 
he proceeded to do at the university with the power of the state and its tax dollars 
providing a considerable source of income. In the name of constitutional freedom, 
Jefferson freed his university of Christian influence by refusing to appoint a divinity 
professor or teach “theology, apologetics, and Scripture” against the customary prac-
tice of the time.134 In the name of secularity, he prevented ministers and religious 
services from obtaining access to the centers of power on campus, only agreeing after 
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considerable pressure to make sectarian instruction available outside of his famous 
serpentine wall for those who wanted it.135 In the absence of the Christian faith, 
Jefferson commissioned the professor of ethics to teach “the proofs of the being of a 
God, the creator, preserver, and supreme ruler of the universe, the author of all the 
relations of morality and the laws and obligations those infer”—all the religion he 
deemed necessary to believe. Religious instruction was made a part of the curriculum 
but only in a surreptitious manner to represent Jefferson’s own proclivities, which 
accent the “most interesting duties” of “every human being” and neglect theological 
discussions as divisive.136 The liberal/deist point of view was couched as if represent-
ing everybody and placed under a category other than “religion.” Of course, Jefferson 
refused to acknowledge the specific or sectarian religious nature of the instruction, 
but as a master of the name game he could hide his hypocrisy under different labels 
like “ethics” and advocate church/state separation all at the same time.137 The Pres-
byterians recognized the underlying danger that Jefferson’s designs represented to 
their faith and raised a significant opposition to the plans throughout the Common-
wealth. An ally of the school, Joseph Cabell, chastened Jefferson in several letters 
about the legitimate nature of the Presbyterian complaints, informing him that they 
only wanted their fair share of a public community if their tax dollars were used as 
a means of support, but the objections went unheeded for the most part,138 and Jef-
ferson continued his final solution with only a few setbacks. One of the few defeats 
was the elimination of Thomas Cooper, a virulent anti-Christian and son-in-law 
of Joseph Priestly, from obtaining a professorship in law and chemistry. Cooper felt 
that doctrines like “the Trinity and transubstantiation may no longer be entitled to 
public discussion”—a viewpoint that Jefferson hoped to instill within his students.139 
Those who advocated a strict doctrine of church/state separation tended to agree 
with Jefferson’s policies. James Madison recognized the problem with denying rep-
resentation to sectarian groups, but he also felt the discrimination was necessary for 
maintaining the peace at a public university and religion separate from the power of 
the civil government.140
Church and State
The exact relationship between religion and the government is subject to the same 
type of equivocation and duplicity throughout his career. All depends on what 
suits his political or religious purpose at the moment. On the one hand, he wants 
to reduce religion to morality like most sons of the Enlightenment and then speak 
of its importance as the foundation of society. In the Declaration of Independence, 
he claims that God has endowed all of humankind with inalienable rights and the 
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purpose of government is found in serving that sacred foundation.141 In the Vir-
ginia Statute for Religious Freedom, he speaks in this way, claiming that the statute 
is based upon the “plan of the Holy author of our religion” to create human beings 
with a free mind and grant them liberty as a natural right. On the other hand, 
when religion is understood in terms of the Judeo-Christian tradition, then it 
suddenly becomes a private matter between “our God and our conscience,” which 
has no social ramifications whatsoever. He can say that “our civil rights have no 
dependence on our religious opinions, any more than on our opinions in physics 
or geometry,” contradicting the very words of his two famous documents.142 He 
can treat religion and politics as if they are two different subjects, calling for the 
complete separation of the two realms and building his famous wall.143
One of Jefferson’s proudest achievements was the Virginia Statute for Reli-
gious Freedom (1786). It received worldwide acclamation, and his tombstone listed 
it along with the founding of the University of Virginia and the writing of the 
Declaration of Independence as the three great achievements of which poster-
ity should remember him.144 The statute disestablished the Anglican Church in 
Virginia, promoted freedom of religious expression, and eliminated religious tests 
for public office.145 Patrick Henry, the chief spokesman of the Anglican Church, 
had opposed the legislation in favor of multiple establishments, which would sup-
port the Christian religion as the one, true faith and provide public assistance to 
support its various denominations in accordance with the discretion of each and 
every taxpayer. Henry garnered significant support for his proposal from clerics 
across the church as well as a number of political heavyweights, including Wash-
ington, Marshall, and Lee, but Jefferson’s complete disestablishment would prevail 
through his considerable political and intellectual talents in the end.146 Indeed, 
it was one of Jefferson’s finest hours. The statute rejected any religion from con-
trolling the government through a litmus test or a priori commitment to its per-
petuity. No special privilege or stature would be accorded to any ideology in the 
ongoing contest for gaining public support.
However, Jefferson’s position becomes more controversial when he tries to 
expand the program a posteriori by excluding the church from influencing policy 
or participating in the public arena. This concept of church/state separation finds 
its most famous expression in a letter he wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association 
of Connecticut, dated January 1, 1802. The occasion of the letter was a concern 
on the part of the Northern Baptists that Jefferson was proceeding too far in his 
desire to separate church and state by refusing to proclaim a national day of fasting 
and prayer, unlike his two predecessors in the office of the presidency.147 Jeffer-
son tries to explain his position by making a distinction between the policies of 
the federal and local governments, emphasizing the word “congress” in the First 
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Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” 
This amendment is interpreted as establishing a secular national government, free 
from any religious concerns or practices, leaving him with a built-in excuse to 
omit the proclamation of a special religious observance as a federal official. The 
amendment is interpreted in a broad and legalistic manner as “building a wall of 
separation between church & state,”148 which includes in his mind a prohibition 
on the federal government from enacting anything of a religious nature, not just 
creating a national church. He hopes that his expansive interpretation will “make 
progress” in the future and encompass the other sectors of government, even if 
he feels restricted by its precise language in limiting the separation to a specific 
domain. The wall of separation and its consistent application develop from his 
concept of religion as a “matter which lies solely between Man & his God.” It is 
a fundamental presupposition he mentions at the beginning of the letter, right 
after the greeting, and also shares with some of the Baptist leaders in Virginia 
as common allies in the struggle. This concept of religion can lead in no other 
direction than the complete secularization of government in all its sectors, and 
Jefferson is certainly correct in drawing this conclusion, given the questionable 
nature of his supposition, which remains a matter of considerable debate within 
the nation today.149
The wall of separation represents the most indelible legacy of Jefferson’s 
thoughts and actions upon the relation between church and state, but he is not 
without contradiction on the issue. He is a good case in point for those who follow 
the hermeneutical approach of deconstructionism and find writing filled with 
complexity or ambiguity in meaning; authors involved in numerous contradictions 
or blind spots;150 and interpreters needing to psychoanalyze their subjects and 
search for underlying motives that sometimes subvert the outward intent.151 This 
type of hermeneutical approach will allow the many sides of a person like Jefferson 
to emerge, without feeling the onus to reconcile the tensions or contradictions. 
Here are just three ways to look at Jefferson and his view of church/state relations:
One, there is the Jefferson who wishes to forward his religious convictions. 
This side of Jefferson makes it clear that government cannot exist apart from reli-
gion.152 Here religion refers to his concept of universal morality, and not some spe-
cial theological set of dogmas associated with sectarian expressions of Christianity. 
Here religion refers to his convictions about an innate or a priori sense of right and 
wrong that God has implanted in the hearts of all human beings, that Jesus incul-
cated among his disciples in the most sublime form, and Jefferson finds “necessary 
for a social being.”153 Religion is a positive good and necessary aspect of society, as 
long as it exists in abstracto, without making concrete connection with a specific 
theological dogma in understanding the divine nature, and follows the liberal/
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deist penchant in reducing religion to morality—the typical religious conviction of 
enlightened intelligentsia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Two, there is the political side of Jefferson that must accommodate the will of 
the people to forward his public career or obtain a larger civil agenda. For example, 
he helped craft a “Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving” 
in the state of Virginia, authorizing magistrates to honor the “Almighty God” in 
this manner, and even proclaimed one of these days of divine worship while serv-
ing as its governor.154 This simple example contains an obvious refutation of the 
notion that Jefferson championed the absolute secularization of the government 
throughout his political career. The endorsement of a Puritan-type tradition with-
stands the possibility of understanding his overt words and actions consistently, as 
advocating a complete divorce between church and state and interpreting dises-
tablishment to mean the end of religious influence on all levels of the government. 
The proclamation, along with some other political/religious initiatives, present 
a problem for those who wish to interpret Jefferson as a strict separationist and 
provide a uniform interpretation of him on the issue;155 but it could be that Jef-
ferson simply lacks consistency, or presents a duplicitous position on the issue, 
which must accommodate the affections of the people. Certainly, as a Deist and 
proponent of an “eternal wall,” he might find it difficult to embrace the Christian 
practice of giving thanks (eucharisteō) for divine blessing or grace (charis), but as 
a politician, he might have a motive to steer away from his doctrinaire political/
religious conviction and find a need to placate or galvanize his people in serving 
an ultimate objective, accepting a certain amount of compromise along the way. 
No one can discern his motives; they are hidden and subject to the interpretive 
difficulties of all deconstruction or psychoanalysis, but it is only the worst sort 
of American hagiography that protects the name of Jefferson from unveiling the 
deeper and sometimes darker motivations of his policies. Only the most naïve cit-
izen accepts the overt sincerity and literal truth of a politician’s words and actions.
Three, there is the Jefferson who develops a Voltairean-type of animosity 
toward the Judeo-Christian tradition and wants to perform a “quiet euthanasia.” 
The strict doctrine of separation certainly has a pretext in this motive and appears 
throughout his life, beginning with his literary notebook or Commonplace Book.156 
However, the doctrine and hatred only seem to escalate later on in his life during 
and after the presidential campaign of 1800 because of the clerical assault upon 
his French ideals, exploding into the public domain and serving as a pretext for 
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. At this time, he makes it clear that 
politics have no place in the pulpit since Federalist ministers are criticizing him; 
that religion is a private matter, since he does not want to confirm their suspicions 
about him.157 He is now able to understand disestablishment in the broadest sense 
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and practice it with literal obedience as President of the United States, contradict-
ing his previous policies in Virginia, accenting the strict doctrine of separation on 
the federal level, and hoping to see its application to the states in the near future. 
The first draft of his letter implies a general disapproval of ongoing religious prac-
tices in the respective northern states by preferring “voluntary regulations and dis-
cipline of each respective sect,” and is only stricken for political reasons.158 The 
final draft leaves the broad statement intact that religion is a “matter that lies solely 
between Man & his God,” making all forms of religion irrelevant to all levels of 
the government. 
The attempt of Jefferson to diminish the role of the church and create a sec-
ular government is an important aspect of his legacy, but it only represents one 
side of his multifaceted and complicated career. By emphasizing this side, there is 
no attempt in this work to provide an overall portrait of the man and his career, 
or even present a fair and balanced view of his overall position on church/state 
relations. Certainly, Baptists, Quakers, and other persecuted groups would want to 
speak of the considerable debt that they and all lovers of freedom owe to Jefferson 
as a great champion of religious liberty and a powerful advocate of their cause 
against ecclesiastical establishments. In emphasizing the secular side of Jefferson, 
there is no intention to dismiss the positive contributions of his legacy regarding 
religious toleration, which all sides of the present debate have come to admire. In 
emphasizing the darker side of his relation to the church, the Jefferson Memorial 
remains secure within the pantheon of religious/political devotion in America, 
which also must recognize the frailties of its founders and a side of their beliefs and 
attitudes that remain muted within the plethora of hagiography often surrounding 
them. There is no understanding of Jefferson and his famous wall without placing 
it within his context and relationship to the church and state, which included the 
anti-Semitic/anti-Christian attitudes of the Enlightenment and a clear attempt to 
marginate the Judeo-Christian tradition through political means.
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James Madison
There was no greater political ally in helping to forward the basic agenda of Jef-
ferson on religious issues than James Madison. The two Virginians shared almost 
identical convictions on the issues, although the precise nature of Madison’s “pri-
vate” religious opinions remains much more obscure than those of his distinguished 
colleague, whose “private” letters were published and filled with theological com-
mentary. Unfortunately, Madison says very little about the subject in his public 
words and writings, only some vague testimony about his belief in a “God All 
Powerful, wise and good,” who is “essential to the moral order of the World” and a 
terse comment later in life about Christianity being the “best and purest religion.”1 
And yet, it is well-known that religion played an important role in his early and 
overall maturation. At the age of twelve, he was sent to a boarding school and 
tutored by Rev. Donald Robertson, the Scottish Presbyterian headmaster, who 
instructed him in the classics, literature, science, and Reformed theology. Four 
years later, he went to Princeton, the academic bastion of New Light Presbyterian-
ism, and experienced particular inspiration from its president, John Witherspoon, 
who applied his religious convictions to the “general principles of law and politics” 
and inspired many future leaders of the nation with his criticism of Tory policies 
and firm belief in religious liberty.2 As a Virginian, Madison also experienced the 
c h a p t e r  s e v e n
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surge of Baptists, Presbyterians, and other dissidents entering the state during the 
times of the Great Awakening and dominating his region as the majority of the 
citizens. Both he and Jefferson attended their meetings and joined their push for 
religious freedom as faithful representatives of the people.3
Madison’s concern for the issue escalated into a zealous crusade when certain 
Baptist ministers were jailed in Anglican-controlled Culpepper County for simply 
preaching their version of the gospel, causing him to develop the most uncom-
promising position. He began to speak out as early as 1774 about this type of 
injustice within the established order and developed an extreme view of religious 
freedom for the time, exceeding the expectations of many reformers, rejecting all 
talk of toleration as the halfway measure of a religious establishment, and want-
ing to end its privileges altogether.4 At the revolutionary convention of Virginia 
in the summer of 1776, Madison sought to amend George Mason’s version of 
the Declaration of Rights with much stronger language about the “free exercise of 
religion” as an “absolute right.” Mason’s proposal provided the “fullest toleration” 
to “all men,” whereas Madison went beyond this condescending language of an 
established order and afforded the “full and free exercise” of everyone’s religion, 
rejecting the “peculiar emoluments or privileges” of a specific religious expression, 
not just its overt acts of persecution.5
Much of the battle came to a head a few years later when a majority of the 
Virginia legislature wanted to help financially strapped religious institutions 
through a general assessment supporting “Teachers of the Christian Religion.” 
The measure was sponsored by Patrick Henry and supported by many distin-
guished politicians in the state, including George Washington, John Marshall, 
Edmund Randolph, and Richard Henry Lee. With Jefferson serving as a plenipo-
tentiary minister in France, the task fell on the shoulders of Madison to lead the 
Baptists and other dissident groups in opposing the bill.6 In the spring of 1785, 
Madison wrote his famous “Memorial and Remonstrance” attacking establish-
ments in general and Henry’s assessment in particular. He argued that the legal 
establishment of Christianity has led to political tyranny throughout its 1500 years 
of existence. “In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on 
the ruins of civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the 
thrones of political tyranny; in no instances have they been seen the guardians of 
the liberties of the people.”7 His solution was to disestablish the Anglican Church, 
as well as deny public support for the Christian religion and its many sects.8 His 
“Memorial and Remonstrance” collected over 1,500 signatures in the central Pied-
mont, Shenandoah Valley, and Northern Neck, helping to turn the tables and 
develop overwhelming state-wide disapproval of the bill. Because of Madison’s 
leadership, the measure was defeated and used to forward Jefferson’s earlier “Bill 
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for Establishing Religious Freedom” (Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom), which 
was signed into law on January 19, 1786, and served as an important symbol of 
disestablishment throughout the country.9 
Alongside his struggles in Virginia, the name of James Madison is forever 
linked with the cause of religious liberty through his sponsorship of the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution. Within his first draft, Madison proposed a couple 
of amendments that would guarantee freedom of religious beliefs and practices, pro-
hibit the establishment of “any national religion,” and extend the “equal rights of 
conscience” to the many states.10 After a number of counter-proposals and drafts, 
the delegates approved a single amendment upon religious liberty, which reads, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.” The final version represents the work of the entire 
Convention, although Madison served as the guiding light in the overall process 
and became known as the “Father of the Constitution.” The actual wording seems 
to pacify the concerns of northern delegates and sounds much like the proposals 
made by Fisher Ames of Massachusetts and Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, 
both wanting to protect local establishments from the intrusion of federal policies.11 
Because of this and other concerns, Madison was unable to extend the dominion of 
the amendment to the many states, even though his fundamental goal was reached 
by protecting the free exercise of religion and prohibiting the establishment of a 
national church. Certainly, if Jefferson and Madison obtained all that they wanted in 
their most doctrinaire moments, the amendment would have called for the complete 
secularization of government in all its realms, but this doctrine would go far beyond 
the political realities of the day. Even Madison’s comments during the debate, as 
recorded in the annals of Congress on August 15, 1789, appear to limit the scope 
of the amendment and follow a narrow reading of its intention.12 There is no talk 
of separating the sacred and the secular.13 There is only the desire to prevent the 
American government from following the example of Europe and establishing a 
religious institution of its own. While the states are free to continue their prac-
tice—many of which allowed townships to establish a church in their districts—the 
federal government would not seek to establish such an institution; and that is all. 
If more was intended (and the words are ambiguous), there is little direct proof of 
a broader reading at the Convention or during the ratification process among the 
many states, which lean toward the narrow reading of the text, if anything.14 If one 
wants to follow a broader meaning, one must find its justification within modern 
hermeneutical principles, which allow greater freedom and seek to expand or decon-
struct the meaning of the text in other directions, beyond the original intendment.
Did Madison intend to proceed all the way in the paradigm toward a complete 
separation of church and state? The total evidence involves the same equivocations 
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that Jefferson also expressed throughout his career and writings, with a more doc-
trinaire position appearing only later in Madison’s life, once political motives were 
set aside and no longer served as an obstacle in expressing his heartfelt convictions. 
For those who reject the wall of separation and look to Madison as an authority in 
favor of their viewpoint, there is plenty of evidence to support their interpretation. 
There is his belief that religion is essential to the moral order—a conviction he 
shares with Jefferson and the rest of the Founding Fathers.15 There is the continu-
ous God-talk in his public addresses, referring to “Divine Providence,” the “Divine 
Author of Every Good and Perfect Gift,” the “Sovereign of the Universe, and 
Benefactor of mankind,” testifying to a belief in a personal and Christian concept 
of deity and expressing gratitude for divine grace and goodness to the nation.16 He 
exhorted the American people to
…offer, at one and the same time their common vows and adorations to Almighty 
God…for the devout purpose of rendering to the Sovereign of the Universe and the 
Benefactor of Mankind the public homage to His holy attributes; of acknowledging the 
transgressions which might justly provoke the manifestations of His divine displeasure; 
of seeking His merciful forgiveness, and His assistance in the great duties of repentance 
and amendment, and especially of offering fervent supplications that in the present 
season of calamity and war He would take the American people under His peculiar care 
and protection; that He would guide their public councils, animate their patriotism, and 
bestow His blessing on their arms; that He would inspire all nations with a love of justice 
and of concord and with a reverence for the unerring precept of our holy religion, to do 
to others as they would require that others would do to them; …17
There is evidence of him supporting civil religious practices. While serving in the 
Virginia state legislature, he endorsed the use of chaplains and days of fasting, 
prayer, and thanksgiving, exacting a penalty of fifty pounds upon non-conforming 
ministers who refuse obeisance to the civil religion.18 As President of the United 
States, he issued four proclamations of prayer and fasting, beginning on July 9, 
1812, with the outbreak of British hostilities and recognizing in all of them the 
need to seek divine guidance and blessing.19
Nevertheless, Madison’s absolute and unequivocal position of total separation 
appears to emerge later in his life, only when political considerations and practical 
compromises no longer interfere with his intentions. Here he speaks in unequiv-
ocal terms of a “total separation of the Church and the State” as a Constitutional 
principle.20 “In the Papal System, Government and Religion are in a manner con-
solidated, & that is found to be the worst of Govts.”21 He considers any coalition 
between religion and government as destructive to both institutions and wants the 
separation applied to the many states, along with other “rights of conscience.”22 In 
his “Detached Memoranda,” he rejects military and congressional chaplains as a 
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violation of the First Amendment and even repudiates his former proclamations 
of prayer and thanksgiving, offering a number of excuses for his lapse: he only 
followed the precedent of Washington and Adams while serving in office; he was 
“disinclined” to do so until Congress forced his hand; he left the observance “up to 
the people to express it” according to “their own faith & forms;” he always made 
the proclamations non-sectarian and voluntary, and so forth.23 What emerges 
from his explanation is a person who wanted to please the majority while serving 
as the president and knew the majority rejected his absolute view of church/state 
separation, making it necessary to compromise and seek divine blessing as a nation 
in uniting the people.24 He might find it difficult to “trace the line” and avoid all 
collisions between the rights of religion and civil authority,25 but his basic pro-
clivity is found in separating the two realms as much as possible; this doctrinaire 
position appears to represent his mature and fundamental position.
John Adams
It was the power of the French Enlightenment and the process of secularization 
that brought to fruition the basic designs of Jefferson and Madison more than 
any statute or government policy. Many of the leading figures of eighteenth- 
century America were convinced secularists and preferred to attribute the creation 
of the Constitution to the powers of reason or secular historical antecedents than 
theological dogma. These sons of the Enlightenment produced many works that 
demonstrate the overall bias, but one of the best examples of the mentality is 
found in John Adams’ Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of America. 
The first volume was finished just in time to enjoy a wide circulation among the 
delegates at the beginning of the Constitutional Convention, and the next two 
volumes were completed a year later.26 The work represents the growing secularity 
of America, even more so than Jefferson’s writings, as it simply neglects to men-
tion the religious moorings of the country and looks to other “secular” sources for 
inspiration, rather than conduct an open or direct assault upon the church. In the 
preface of the work, Adams claims that the American way of government resulted 
from the hard work of reason and consultation with scientific writers in the field, 
not “interviews with the gods” or the “inspiration of Heaven.”27 He bestows much 
credit on a number of “secular” experiments in history, extending back to Ancient 
Greece and Rome, as well as his own considerable ability to analyze their strengths 
and weaknesses. No direct assault is launched upon the Judeo-Christian tradition 
per se, but through his neglect of mentioning anything significant in the tradition, 
the work reflects the anti-Semitic and anti-Christian bias of the Enlightenment.
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Adams begins his history in the Graeco-Roman world. He mentions the 
experiment of Solon in Athens as inspiring the Romans and later European 
models toward a nascent form of democracy and mixed government. The Athenian 
experiment and other ancient republics are commended as providing an invaluable 
source of inspiration to Rome and the many Italian republics in the Middle Ages, 
even if they ultimately failed in the march toward perfection because of an inad-
equate system of checks and balances.28 The Puritan Revolution is afforded just 
a few lines and only mentioned to dismiss its importance as an “unsuccessful and 
injudicious attempt to abolish monarchy and aristocracy.” Cromwell, Ireton, and 
all its other leaders are treated as “mad with enthusiasm” and discarded as irrele-
vant, providing no source of inspiration or example worthy of emulation for the 
coming era.29 Instead, Adams prefers to exalt those who offered a more sober, sci-
entific analysis of government than these religious zealots. He gives special credit 
to Machiavelli for reviving the rational approach of Plato and Aristotle to political 
discourse. He also mentions many others like Harrington, Milton, Sidney, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Swift, Franklin, and Price as the “greatest lights of humanity” for 
helping to establish the modern concept of republican government.30 Harrington 
is given much credit for the discovery of checks and balances—“a noble discovery, 
of which the honor solely belongs to him, as much as the circulation of the blood to 
Harvey, printing to Laurence Coster, or the invention of guns, compasses, or optic 
glasses to the several authors.”31 (Of course, the honor belongs to him because the 
other authors of the Puritan Revolution used Bible verses to prove practically the 
same point, and secular or philosophical approaches are what Adams wants to 
honor as worthy of esteem.)
Adams believes that the evolution of political thought has reached a level of 
perfection in England and America unsurpassed by all others with its clear sepa-
ration of executive, legislative, and judicial branches.32 Most of his work is devoted 
to spelling out the reason why a proper separation and balance is necessary for 
preserving a free republic.33 His argument is filled with detailed historical analy-
ses and rational disputation, which exhibit extensive learning and a considerable 
amount of thought,34 but what he fails to understand in all its ratiocinations is the 
significant debt he and his country owes to the Christian faith, especially to the 
Puritans of his state of Massachusetts. Regardless of his belief in objective research 
and rational analysis, he like any other interpreter of history or literature reads 
texts and considers ideas through the context of a cultural background.35 His own 
Puritan culture believed in the separation and balance of powers, and he reads the 
past and reasons to conclusions like anyone else in a certain Sitz im Leben, ever 
remaining within the interpretive matrix of that culture. Adams might provide 
further justification for the doctrine and develop his unique statement or idiom. 
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He might serve the culture as an unconscious or unwitting member of its point of 
view. He might have no idea how much a role Christianity played in developing 
the basic outline of government in his country or his own way of thinking, but 
the evidence of this influence is beyond dispute. Even his mode of argumentation 
remains indebted as much to faith as it does to his rational acuity. No better illus-
tration of this influence is found than the continuous accent upon human deprav-
ity throughout his work as providing the fundamental rationale for separating and 
balancing powers. Human depravity is a unique doctrine of Christian anthropol-
ogy, strongly emphasized by the Reformed theology of New England and most 
essential in distinguishing its confession from all other religions and philosophies 
in the world. Christianity teaches a darker view of the human condition than other 
ideologies with its emphasis upon original sin, the accent upon confession, and the 
complete dependence upon divine grace. Adams argues throughout his work from 
this concept of human depravity, believing no set of circumstances or values can 
alleviate the dark condition in which all of us are born. The selfish impulses are 
much stronger than any positive affection that public service might inflame toward 
the good of our fellow citizens. The ambitions of politicians cannot be eradicated 
in this life, but only held in check by a system of government that prevents the 
hubris of one person or group from obtaining uncontrolled power.36 This same 
argument is repeated time and again in Montesquieu, Madison, and all those who 
defend the need for balancing and separating powers in the modern world—an 
argument indebted in a most decided way to the dark image of the human condi-
tion in Christian anthropology.37
In contrast to his secular works, Adam’s overt political stance often represents 
or accommodates the religious affections of his constituency. His exact motives are 
difficult to ascertain and subject to the same sort of deconstruction that recognizes 
the contradictions in Jefferson and Madison and problems dividing their actual 
(or changing) point of view from the reality of political posturing. A good exam-
ple is the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which was drafted, edited, and 
enacted under the leadership of John Adams, and reflects the need for compromise 
between elements within the constituency—the Congregationalists who want an 
establishment to bolster their small, struggling churches and the dissenters who 
want religious liberty but think of Protestantism as the necessary foundation of 
that liberty.38 The new Constitution reflects these concerns and stipulates that 
all state officials and appointees “believe and profess the Christian religion” and 
“abjure all allegiance” to any foreign power—civil or ecclesiastical.39 It says that all 
human beings have a sacred duty to worship God at “stated seasons” in the public 
forum. The “publick Worship of God” and “publick instructions in piety, religion, 
and morality” are necessary in preserving “good order” and “civil government.”40 
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It supports the rights of conscience for dissidents but allows local officials to con-
tinue the colonial practice of requiring attendance and financial support of their 
Congregational churches, with a possible exception for dissidents, if they are able 
to establish their own fellowship within a community.41 Later Adams describes the 
arrangement as providing a “most mild and equitable establishment”42 and pro-
vides some apologetic testimony for its provisions in his writings,43 but it remains 
difficult to separate his endorsement from the desires of his constituency and 
ascertain what he really thinks in an ideal world. On the surface, the interpreter is 
left with the contradictions of a man who is caught between his own Puritan cul-
ture and the ideology of the French Enlightenment—a man who finds religion the 
foundation of civil government and then turns around and disavows the Puritan 
background of his own political ideas in the name of rational secularity. 
Liberals and Republicans
The Christian roots of the nation started to fade into distant memory as the tide 
of secularization began to engulf the whole country. By the second half of the 
nineteenth century, a number of groups began to advocate a revision of the First 
Amendment, calling for a complete separation of church and state. One of the 
most strident groups was the National Liberal League, founded in 1866 by Francis 
Abbot. Its main goal was the “TOTAL SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE,” as “the very corner-stone of the American Republic.”44 At their conven-
tion that year, they decried “any interference by religion in the affairs of society and 
the State.”45 “Christianity…is by its very nature hostile to individual and national 
liberty, and to equal individual rights.”46 “Christianity…is averse to republicanism, 
[and so] the education of the masses out of [the] religion is an absolute necessity 
for the perpetuation of this Republic.”47 “Universal education is the only safeguard 
of universal liberty; no child in the republic should be permitted to grow up with-
out at least a good common school education; the public school system cannot be 
sustained in equal justice to all except by confining it strictly to secular instruc-
tion.”48 Our public institutions are degraded by the very presence of religion.49 
America was founded by “liberals and free thinkers,” who rejected the hatred of 
sectarian religious groups, and “succeeded in placing the general government upon 
a purely secular basis.”50 The Liberal League wanted to replace the First Amend-
ment with a new amendment, which rejected any union between church and state 
in all levels of government. The articles of the amendment spelled out some spe-
cific demands, including the end of religious tests and tax support for religious 
sects, schools, and charities.51 Alongside the amendment, the league also listed a 
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number of additional demands in their Convention of 1876: (1) the taxation of 
churches, (2) the elimination of public chaplains, (3) the end of Bible-reading in 
schools, (4) the rejection of all laws based upon “Christian” morals, (5) the end of 
Sabbatarian laws, (6) the end of religious fasts and holidays, and (7) the elimina-
tion of judicial oaths.52
The Blaine Amendment
Shortly after the liberals began to organize and exercise their political muscle, 
the President of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant, adopted the essential spirit 
of their agenda as a part of his Republican platform. On September 30, 1875, he 
rallied some of his former troops in Des Moines, Iowa for the coming election 
and warned them concerning the divisive nature of religious superstition in the 
Republic, hoping to prevent a new “civil war.”
Comrades: It always affords me much satisfaction to meet my old comrades in arms 
ten to fourteen years ago, and to live over again in memory the trials and hardships 
of those days,—hardships imposed for the preservation and perpetuation of our free 
institutions. We believed then and believe now that we had a government worth fight-
ing for, and, if need be, dying for.… Let us, then, begin by guarding against every 
enemy threatening the perpetuity of free republican institutions.… If we are to have 
another contest in the near future of our national existence, I predict that the dividing 
line will not be Mason and Dixon’s, but it will be between patriotism and intelligence 
on one side and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other. Now, in this cen-
tennial year of our national existence, I believe it is a good time to begin the work of 
strengthening the house commenced by our patriotic forefathers one hundred years 
ago at Concord and Lexington. Let us all labor to add all needful guarantees for the 
perfect security of free thought, free speech, and free press, unfettered religious sen-
timents, and of equal rights and privileges to all men, irrespective of nationality, color, or 
religion. Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar appropriated to their 
support, no matter how raised, shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian 
school. Resolve that neither the State or nation, nor both combined, shall support 
institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford every child growing up in 
the land the opportunity of a good common school education, unmixed with sectarian, 
pagan, or atheistical tenets. Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church, and 
the private school, supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the Church and State 
forever separate. With these safeguards I believe the battles which created the Army of 
Tennessee will not have been fought in vain.53
In December of 1875, Grant went to Congress and urged them to pass a new con-
stitutional amendment that would make “Church and State for ever separate and 
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distinct,” that would require the states to provide “free public schools” for all chil-
dren, that would forbid religious and anti-religious instruction in the classroom, 
that would prohibit any level of government from using “school funds or taxes” to 
benefit a “religious sect or denomination.”54 A week later James G. Blaine, who 
was a congressman from Maine and presidential hopeful within the Republican 
Party, seized upon the popular momentum and offered an amendment for legisla-
tive consideration.55 The amendment read,
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of 
public schools, or derived from any public fund thereof, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised 
or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.56
The amendment enjoyed broad support at the time and particularly appealed to 
the many sides of Blaine’s constituency. Many Republicans preceded the nation 
in advocating the Jeffersonian doctrine of church/state separation from the very 
beginning of the party in the early nineteenth century, showing a tendency to 
apply his strict interpretation of the First Amendment to all levels of government, 
encouraging the development of a public/secular system of education, and hoping 
to prevent religious schools from receiving public funds. The Jeffersonian agenda 
experienced some success in places like Michigan, which led several other states to 
promote a secular view of government and adopt the strict doctrine of separation in 
its constitutional framework of 1835; but much of the impetus among other states 
came later when Catholic immigrants poured into the country and presented an 
imminent danger to the Protestant hegemony and its concerns over preserving 
the American way of life.57 These Americans viewed Protestantism as the founda-
tion of Republican government and Catholicism as a threat to individual freedom. 
They saw Catholicism and its hierarchical system of polity undermining the dem-
ocratic spirit of most Protestant churches and challenging the quasi-Protestant 
character of the common schools.58 Few of them were able to divorce religion and 
morality, or denude an educational system from the basic principles that supported 
good citizenship and their basic view of government and culture.59 This meant 
that the common schools must inculcate their general Protestant values through 
preaching liberty, equality, and democracy, and must add religious exercises like the 
singing of Protestant hymns, daily prayer, and the reading of the King James Bible 
to underscore the message.60 When Catholics challenged these religious practices 
and set up their own parochial schools, Protestants sought to preserve their priv-
ileged status and prevent Catholics from siphoning off public funds away from 
the common schools toward a sectarian purpose through devices like the Blaine 
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Amendment. The congressional debate included vitriolic, anti-Catholic polemics 
concerning the un-American nature of the religion, clearly hoping to capitalize on 
Protestant fears and bigotry.61 
The results of the debate were mixed. The measure failed to garner the neces-
sary two-thirds majority in the Senate by a slim margin, after roaring through the 
House with an overwhelming majority of 180 to 7. However, Congress proceeded 
in subsequent sessions to compel the new territories into adopting Blaine-like 
amendments as a condition for entering the union, and some thirty states enacted 
similar measures by the early part of the twentieth century—some preceding, while 
others followed the congressional debate.62 At the turn of the century, the process 
of watering down religious content within the common schools was transpiring on 
its own, apart from Catholic complaints, as the culture sought to include as many 
children as possible and adopt a non-sectarian or secular approach to teaching.63 
With the defeat of the amendment, the attempt to create a more secular govern-
ment on the federal level was set aside—at least for the time being, and it was left 
up to the states or local municipalities to pass their own versions. While liberal 
newspapers and organizations continued to press the issue throughout the rest 
of the century, the political will soon collapsed after 1876, and liberal Americans 
were left looking for another avenue to help change the federal government into 
their secular image and establish secularism as the law of the land.64
The Court
What the liberals could not accomplish through the legislature they were able to 
secure through the courts of the country as it moved into the twentieth century. 
For the most part, the liberals of the nineteenth century understood that the First 
Amendment required a substantial change in its wording to develop a stronger 
doctrine of separation. But tactics changed when new hermeneutical procedures 
allowed the courts to become more flexible and activist in applying the law to 
present circumstances.65 Legal realists like Oliver Wendell Homes began to sanc-
tion the practical realities of his profession, admitting that judges seldom act in 
accordance with the authorial intent of the Constitution but often fill in gaps, 
make deductions, and work for a good social outcome. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
this position worked its way through the most prestigious law schools of the land 
and made its impression upon the United States Supreme Court, redefining its 
nature.66 As early as 1934, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes could say,
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to 
insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it 
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must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution 
meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great 
clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framer, 
with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the 
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow concep-
tion that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning—“We must never 
forget that it is a constitution that we are expounding… [,] a constitution intended 
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs.”67
With hermeneutics no longer restricted to its original intention, the jurists were 
free to deconstruct or expand the meaning of the Establishment Clause beyond 
its limited purview and erect a wall between church and state, based on their own 
“interpretation,” cultural biases, and the genuine need to apply the letter of the 
law to a new and contemporary situation. The jurists were given the freedom to 
expand the scope of the First Amendment and go beyond its simple rejection of 
a national church or providing a priori privileges to a specific denomination. They 
broadened the meaning to promote a much more secular agenda and erected a 
Jeffersonian wall, which proceeded to bar the majority of Americans from express-
ing their faith in the public square through sacred symbols and rites, promote 
a secular concept of life through funding non-religious education, and create a 
secular establishment in the place of religion in general, maintaining that religion 
has no serious or beneficial influence upon public policy, as if the government 
existed outside metaphysical concerns. The wall of separation was not erected by 
the founders of the Constitution but the secular, activist members of the Court, 
who wished to “read” the First Amendment in that way, using a more flexible set 
of hermeneutical principles. 
The first mention of the wall is found in Reynolds v. United States (1879), 
just after Grant’s administration and its call for the separation of church and 
state, already indicating the political nature of any interpretation provided by the 
Court.68 In this case, the Court ruled against the Mormons and outlawed the 
practice of polygamy, claiming it violated social norms, disturbed public peace, 
and represented the despotic practices of the past that were inimical to demo-
cratic principles.69 The Court helped substantiate its case by referring to the words 
of Madison and Jefferson in their original debate over religious establishment in 
Virginia and quoting the famous paragraph concerning the wall of separation 
in Jefferson’s letter to the Baptists, treating it as if it contained an authoritative 
interpretation of the “scope and effect” of the First Amendment. Its verdict was 
important in helping to open a door toward the doctrine of separation, although it 
only cited the words of Jefferson without endorsing any specific interpretation or 
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expanding on what it found so meaningful in the letter. It took the Supreme Court 
another seventy years before it erected the wall in more unequivocal language. The 
Court referred to Reynold v. United States in its decision as setting an important 
precedent, although it was not until this later time that the consciousness of the 
Court was changed decisively through the use of the famous metaphor.70
The latter decision was the work of Justice Hugo Black, a New Deal Dem-
ocrat from the great state of Alabama. As a populist, Black was furious with the 
elitist Court early in his political career for turning down New Deal legislation 
and even approved of Roosevelt’s attempt to pack the Court by appointing more 
jurists than stipulated by the Constitution.71 When this strategy failed, Roo-
sevelt proceeded along the more typical political lines of waiting for a vacancy 
and appointing a jurist in favor of one’s overall political philosophy. Eventually, 
Hugo Black was tapped and became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 
1937. Black certainly represented a basic commitment to the left-wing ideology 
of the administration, which was leading the country into secular, egalitarian, and 
socialist policies.72 In his early days, there were some problems with his profile 
as a member of the Baptist Church and the Ku Klux Klan,73 but Black clearly 
distanced himself from his past and maturated into much the opposite during his 
tenure in Washington, leaving his former religious convictions back in the Bible 
Belt, becoming a secular liberal progressive, and identifying with the ideology of 
authors like Dewey, Russell, and Camus—the foremost atheists of the day.74 Roger 
Newman, his leading biographer, describes him as basically an “irreligious man,” 
who “drifted from organized religion,” except for an occasional visit to All Souls 
Unitarian Church.75 The constant force in his life was Thomas Jefferson, whom he 
admired as a Bible-believing Baptist and a secular atheist in his attempt to separate 
the government from the corrupting influence of religion. According to the testi-
mony of his son, Jefferson was his father’s “number one, number two, and number 
three” historical hero, especially regarding First Amendment issues.76
It is no surprise, given this background, that Black used an opportunity in 
Everson v. The Board of Education (1947) to erect a wall of separation between 
church and state.77 The case concerned a statute that authorized the payment of tax 
dollars for the transportation of Catholic children to and from parochial schools. 
The Protestant majority had no interest in sectarian education and wanted to keep 
tax dollars within their own public domain. They were represented by groups like 
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and the predecessor of the National 
Council of Churches—all united in denying any form of aid to parochial schools 
and pushing the country toward a strict doctrine of separation out of concerns over 
the spread of the Catholic menace.78 Black ruled in favor of the statute since trans-
portation is “indisputably marked off from the religious function” of the schools 
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and all citizens should receive equal treatment under the law in secular matters. 
However, the specific ruling was not so memorable as his protestations in trying 
to pacify the left-wing members of the Court and his constituency, reaffirming in 
spite of the decision his firm belief in the separation of church and state. It is these 
comments that set an important precedent in the consciousness of the Court and 
the land up to the present-day. During this part of the opinion, he declares that the 
First Amendment “has erected a wall between church and state,” which is “high 
and impregnable.”79 
At this point, Justice Black and the rest of the Court felt some sense of obliga-
tion to justify their decision by appealing to the intention of the Founding Fathers, 
rather than underscoring their new freedom and activism in accordance with 
modern hermeneutical methods. It was here that they particularly went astray, 
abandoning a more credible appeal to interpretive ambiguity and appealing to the 
old method of seeking the original intent of the author(s). This decision forced 
them into practicing the worst sort of revisionist history, pre-selecting and weigh-
ing evidence to fit their a priori interpretative designs. Thus, to fit their theory, they 
spoke of the First Amendment as a “direct culmination” of struggles for religious 
liberty in Virginia, and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison as the “leading” 
actors in the state and national debate, inflating their secular agenda as much as 
possible, while ignoring the opinions of legislative bodies and everyone else in the 
process. They particularly pointed to Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance” 
and Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, but ended up conflat-
ing the basic argument for disestablishing the Anglican Church in these docu-
ments with the more strict doctrine of a wall, which the two Virginians wanted 
to erect later on and often violated throughout their career in trying to please the 
majority.80 Of course, the Court used much the same historical argument as their 
pre-selected sources, blaming sectarian religious groups for most of the “turmoil, 
civil strife, and persecution” that filled Europe in the past centuries,81 ignoring the 
positive contributions of Puritans and other religious groups to their own view of 
government, and turning a blind eye to the infamous secular atrocities right before 
them, committed by Hitler and Stalin—both militant atheists and ardent support-
ers of church/state separation.82 The Court thought of religion as injurious to the 
public welfare, based upon the Voltairean view of history, and found it necessary 
to keep it away from the centers of power at all cost and provide it with no tax 
support. “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion.”
Thereafter, the concept of separation became an agenda of the Court in its 
quest to create a secular public arena. The next year, the Court carried out its 
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intentions with legalistic precision as it declared voluntary religious instruction 
within the public schools “unconstitutional.” It maintained that church and state 
“best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its 
respective spheres”; it is just that the “lofty aims” of the church need to work without 
tax dollars and outside the power of government. The case involved a local school 
board in Champaign, Illinois that provided space during regular school hours for 
students to receive religious instruction in the faith of their choice. Students could 
opt out of this instruction if their parents objected to their participation, but these 
students would need to attend secular classes during that period. In spite of the 
voluntary nature of the program, the Court struck it down in the name of its wall, 
maintaining that non-participating students would feel a sense of alienation from 
their classmates.83 By using this rationale, the Court clearly moved away from 
the democratic process in expressing the will of the majority toward emphasizing 
the “rights” of minorities or non-conforming individuals who feel excluded from 
the basic religious sentiments of the community.84 In fact, this argument became 
normative and fundamental to the Court in subsequent decisions and was sure 
to shut down any expression of religion if carried out with draconian precision. 
In rejecting any civil expression or endorsement of religion, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor attempted to make offense the sole criterion. “Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community.”85 With this type of litmus test, any-
thing the Court labeled as religious must be excluded from the public square as 
offensive to some minority interest group, whose “rights” not-to-be-offended now 
trumped the freedom of the majority to express its religious point of view.
In the numerous cases that followed, the Court attempted to eliminate reli-
gion from a public sphere that was steeped in its traditions, and the decisions 
began to lack consistency because of it. For example, the Court allowed chaplains 
to continue serving the state legislature of Nebraska, pointing to the “unambigu-
ous and unbroken history of more than two hundred years” of this ministry and 
looking to the heavens for “guidance on the legislative body.”86 This kind of his-
torical reasoning proved sufficient to create a crack in the wall and some hesita-
tion toward establishing complete secularism in the government, allowing certain 
long-standing practices to form an exception to the general rule—practices like 
legislative and military chaplains, tax exemptions for churches, and public dis-
plays of historical and religious meaning.87 In Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), a crèche 
was allowed to continue standing alongside other “secular” symbols of the yuletide 
season. Justice Warren Burger and the Court thought it necessary to engender a 
“friendly spirit of good will in keeping with the season” and accommodate the 
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“historical origins of this traditional event” or “National holiday,” rather than deny 
its connection through an extreme process of secularization.88 Justice O’Connor 
agreed with Burger and said the crèche was more like a museum piece in a display 
case. It did not endorse a particular religious message.89 And yet, five years later 
in Allegheny County v. the ACLU of Pittsburgh (1989), Justice Harry Blackmun 
decided that the role of government is not so friendly toward religious displays. 
The purpose of government is to secularize society or denude holidays of religious 
meaning.
…Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has 
attained secular status in our society.… In sum, Lynch teaches that government may 
celebrate Christmas in some manner or form, but not in a way that endorses Christian 
doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has transgressed this line. It has chosen to celebrate 
Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: 
Glory to God for the birth of Christ.90 
In this specific case, involving two separate displays, the Court ruled against a 
crèche that stood alone in the “Grand Staircase” of the Allegheny County Court-
house and conveyed a direct message of specific religious meaning; but it ruled in 
favor of an eight-foot tall Menorah standing only a few blocks away in an adja-
cent public building since its religious message was denuded by the proximity of a 
forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign saluting the cause of liberty—both acting 
as a sufficient means of secularizing the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah in the mind 
of the Court.91 In both parts of the ruling, the Court provided the government 
with the possibility of joining the Kulturkampf but only on behalf of non-religious 
forces. The same type of legal reasoning followed similar cases both before and 
after this decision, with the Court considering the relationship of the display to 
cultural tradition and its proximity to other “secular” symbols or messages.92 In all 
its cases, the Court showed the capricious nature of their name game in declaring 
what was religious and what was not without much justification. Black declared 
the Christmas tree and the menorah to be secular; O’Connor declared the Christ-
mas tree secular and the menorah religious; Brennan declared both symbols reli-
gious;93 but none provided much support for their position beyond, “Yes, it is,” or, 
“No, it is not.” 
The one area the Court proved most vigilant in protecting the wall was the 
public school system as the most impressionable training ground for the next gener-
ation of Americans. Regarding prayer, the hostility toward the presence of religion 
only seemed to escalate in the course of time.94 The Court began by prohibiting 
the government from composing an official prayer for teachers and students as an 
exercise in the classroom (1962); then it prohibited the voluntary recitation of the 
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Lord’s Prayer and Bible reading (1963); then it rejected a public school from cre-
ating a “moment of silence” if it included the mere mention of “voluntary prayer” 
as an option (1985); then it outlawed religious leaders from praying at graduation 
(1992); and finally it proscribed student-initiated, student-led prayers at football 
games (2000).95 In each case, the right not-to-be-offended was able to trump the 
will of the majority in its desire to express the basic religious sentiment of the 
community. Public school prayer was said to place undue pressure upon dissenters 
at a young age, “jeopardize freedom of conscience,” and place the “imprimatur” of 
the state upon certain religious practices in excluding others.96 The conservative 
members of the Court like Antonin Scalia mocked the very notion that stand-
ing in a respectful silence during a public prayer constituted serious psychological 
coercion. Historical establishments of old involved real “force of law and threat 
of penalty,” not listening to a nonsectarian prayer at a public event, where one is 
free to agree or disagree.97 Justice William Brennan admitted that the Founding 
Fathers had nothing to say about devotional exercises and were preoccupied with 
more serious transgressions of a religious establishment than public prayer or the 
type of minimal coercion that now concerned the Court.98 
A number of recent cases have involved the question of “parochiaid” or the 
giving of financial aid to religious schools.99 The fundamental position of the Court 
remained committed to facilitating the advancement of secularism in the public 
schools, but it ran into difficulty along the way maintaining its strict wall and 
denying all aid to sectarian schools and was forced to compromise and moderate 
the stance in certain cases. In the mid–1980s, the Court rejected the idea of state-
paid teachers going to sectarian schools and teaching “secular” subjects like art, 
music, reading, and math—fearful that these teachers might take the opportunity 
to sanction and promote a religious perspective in a non-secular environment.100 
However, it turned around over a decade later and vitiated the earlier position in 
a Title I case by allowing government aid to benefit disadvantaged children and 
facilitate remedial instruction at religious schools, as long as sufficient safeguards 
were enacted to ensure compliance with secular goals.101 In most cases, the Court 
refused to alleviate the additional financial burden of parents who sent their chil-
dren to religious schools, except through some incidental costs like tax deductions 
and travel expenses.102 However, in an astonishing reversal of its fundamental phi-
losophy, the Court upheld a program in the state of Ohio that allowed parents 
to use vouchers in religious and non-religious schools alike.103 This decision rep-
resented the first time the Court allowed a substantial amount of money to flow 
from the government to private religious schools and might portend a substantial 
revaluation of its strict doctrine of separation in the future.
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In the meantime, the Court continued to maintain a secular view of the gov-
ernment as its basic presupposition, while many of its actual decisions appeared 
wavering and arbitrary to outsiders.104 Justice William Rehnquist was one of the 
few jurists to derail the decisions, mocking their capricious nature and calling for 
an end to the wall as an incoherent metaphor, based upon poor history and poor 
legal analysis.
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain 
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks 
on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or 
a film projector to show a history class. A state may lend classroom workbooks, but 
not lend workbooks in which parochial school children write, thus rendering them 
nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but may not 
pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the zoo or natural history 
museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the 
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech 
and hearing ‘services’ conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, 
but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian 
school. Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take 
place outside the parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down the street. A State 
may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests 
and state-ordered reporting services. Religious instruction may not be given in public 
school, but the public school may release students during the day for religion classes 
elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws.105
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understand-
ing of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been 
expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas 
Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known 
as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter 
to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years 
after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached 
observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.… Notwithstanding the absence of 
a historical basis for this theory of rigid separation, the wall idea might well have 
served as a useful albeit misguided analytical concept, had it led this Court to unified 
and principled results in Establishment Clause cases. The opposite, unfortunately, has 
been true; in the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been 
neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided 
pluralities, have with embarrassing candor conceded that the “wall of separation” is 
merely a “blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier,” which “is not wholly accurate” and 
can only be dimly perceived.…The “wall of separation between church and State” is 
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a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to 
judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.106 
Unfortunately, not even Rehnquist understood that the “bad history” went far 
beyond the relationship between the First Amendment and Jefferson’s wall of 
separation to the very telling of the American story, which centered upon the 
“wisdom of the Founding Fathers” as if they were born in a spiritual vacuum.
Jurists like Rehnquist and Burger abandoned the strict doctrine of separation 
as hostile to religion and incompatible with the basic notion of equality or fair-
ness.107 Rehnquist moved toward a more moderate position, known as “accommo-
dationism,” which gives to the various levels of legislative bodies in the country 
the right to exercise their discretionary powers in accommodating religion and 
subordinate concerns over the Establishment Clause to the fair treatment of reli-
gion in the public square.108 On the state level, the legislatures adopted the new 
perspective by providing a greater space for religious participation and expression 
in the form of public displays, rites, and access to government facilities and fund-
ing.109 On the federal level, the United States Congress passed the Equal Access 
Act in July of 1984, requiring local school boards to provide the same access to 
their facilities and properties that non-curricular clubs receive from the districts.110 
In Board of Education v. Mergens (1990), the Court declared the act to be constitu-
tional and ruled in favor of a Bible study club wanting like-access to the facilities 
of an Omaha high school.111 In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995), it 
reiterated the position, ruling against the wall that Jefferson erected at the school 
and ordering the university to treat a student-run Christian organization with the 
same rights as any other campus organization; if the university paid the printing 
costs of a secular group, it must pay the same costs for a religious group.112
This type of accomodationism was not completely new to the Court. Justice 
Burger represented a less bellicose form of the Rehnquist position in some ear-
lier decisions. He tried to accommodate religious tradition and admitted some 
difficulty in drawing a simple distinction between church and state.113 In Lemon 
v. Kurtzman (1971), he suggested changing the metaphor of a “wall” to a “line,” 
which is a “blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier.”114 He felt most judicial deci-
sions were based on the “cumulative criteria” of many cases, assembled over a 
sufficient period from the nuanced interaction with the complexities of real-life 
problems. In this way, he pointed to three fundamental criteria that the Court had 
used in the past when determining matters of church/state relations.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria 
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our 
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
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primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,…; finally, the 
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ Walz, 
supra, at 674, 25 L.Ed.2d at 704.
These criteria resonated with the members of the Court as it tried to move forward 
as a more consistent body,115 but problems continued to abound in settling specific 
cases, indicating to some observers that the Court’s fundamental presupposition 
from 1947 in establishing the secular nature of the government might present an 
insurmountable obstacle in developing consistent verdicts and a just relationship 
between church and state. Is it really possible to divide religion and politics into 
two separate subjects? Is it possible or even desirable for human beings to lead 
their corporate lives in the state outside of religious concern as if fulfilling some 
“secular purpose”?116 Is a secular establishment really neutral toward religion in 
denying it serious representation in the public square? Maybe, there is a funda-
mental problem with all establishments, religious and non-religious alike.
In all these cases, the Court seldom engaged in any clear analysis of the nature 
of secularity.117 Too often it used an argumentum ex ignorantia to label an idea or 
symbol as secular by refusing to acknowledge its total history, ignoring any reli-
gious connection, and discounting any serious philosophical justification or prob-
lem.118 It preferred not to think of the origins of Santa Claus (Saint Nicholas), or 
the relation of a Christmas tree to the birth of Christ. It preferred not to think 
about the Puritan origins of its own conception of government, or any philosoph-
ical justification of metaphysical concepts like liberty and equality. It preferred just 
to assign a label and claim as secular whatever is essential to its vision of society 
or the government. For example, the Court decided during the 1960s that Sab-
batarian or blue laws were constitutional by saying the laws serve a secular, non- 
religious purpose in giving people a day of rest, without explaining in any coherent 
manner why rest is a secular idea.119 In keeping with the charade, the Court must 
tell the citizens to forget about religion as members of the state: not to remember 
that the Lord rested after six days of work (Gn 2:2; Ex 20:11), not to recognize 
rest (Heb. Shabbath) as a biblical admonition, not to see religious laws as serving a 
societal purpose (Mk 2:27), and not to consider the simple fact that admonitions 
to work or rest involve metaphysical values, or some type of religious leap into 
transcendental or mystical knowledge, outside a simple scientific or secular view 
of the world.120 
The argumentum ex ignorantia allowed the Court to label as secular whatever it 
found beneficial to the nation without explaining why a certain statute or symbol is 
considered non-religious. The argumentum ex ignorantia often declared the values 
of the Court or the values that Americans possessed as a people to be non-religious 
without providing any justification for doing so. The list of these “secular” matters, 
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which served a “secular purpose,” included the following: safety and expeditious 
travel, “ordinary police and fire protection, public highways and sidewalks”;121 “sol-
emnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging 
the cognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society”;122 “education”;123 “pro-
tecting the health” of children and “providing a fertile educational environment” 
in school;124 charitable work, social services, relieving poverty, and assisting the 
handicapped;125 “liberty,” “academic freedom,” “freedom from indoctrination”; the 
promotion of “democratic values” in public schools, which nourish “dialog” and 
“dissent,” not religious dogma;126 recognition of “religious and cultural diversity” 
and the “message of religious pluralism”;127 promoting “secular moral values” like 
the second table of the Ten Commandments (honoring parents and the proscrip-
tion on murder, stealing, adultery, false witness, and covetousness).128 In this list, 
the Court merely declared through the “will to power” the secular nature of these 
values, without supplying any justification. In labeling all these and other values 
“secular,” the Court rejected the Mosaic Law, the Hammurabi Law Code, and 
the basic Semitic mentality of connecting moral law with the will of God.129 The 
Court rejected the analysis of their own Founding Fathers, who thought of reli-
gion as the basis of moral valuation and spoke of the divine laws/rights given to all 
humankind in nature as providing the matrix for the government’s existence and 
purpose.130 The Court rejected the former religious foundation of morality and the 
government and ignored any serious philosophical discussion to determine a new 
basis for the government and the moral perspective. It ignored the difficult philo-
sophical problem of deriving “ought” from “is”—or, how to derive a transcendent 
commentary on life from a secular perspective of the world.131 Instead, the Court 
preferred to leave that problem to philosophers and lose God at the least possible 
expense, discounting any problematic nature to their ethical presuppositions or 
capricious labeling of their values as secular. It wanted to believe that ethics can 
exist apart from any mystical, religious contemplation of the ideal or ontic reality 
of the ideal, without explaining how this is possible. It preferred to argue from 
silence, or use the “will to power.”
This argumentum ex ignorantia continued into the Court’s disuse/misuse of 
history.132 The Court maintained its doctrine of separation by ignoring or dis-
playing little knowledge of the broad history and development of western ideas. 
Its use of historical analysis was provincial and ethnocentric, typically relegated 
to the exaltation of the American government and its leaders. It displayed no 
real knowledge or acknowledgment of the Puritans, the real spiritual founders 
of the country, who formed its basic vision and view of government and spear-
headed the democratic revolutions in England and New England.133 Even those 
jurists who acknowledged religious origins of the culture appeared to possess little 
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understanding of the specifics and often denied the ongoing religious significance 
today as if important cultural ideas lose religious connection over time through the 
process of secular re-education and inculcating ignorance.134 The very doctrine of 
church/state separation demanded a rejection of positive religious influence from 
the past and constant reminder of its shortcomings, as the sponsor of persecution in 
society. The Court preferred to spin its own story rather than engage in serious his-
torical analyses concerning the evolution of ideas and recognize any complexities 
or entanglements. The Court liked to tell and reiterate a story that was more false 
than true, that the early settlers came to this country fleeing religious persecution 
to provide a negative view of the church and its political influence.135 The Court 
told this story to establish its secular concept of church/state separation. It wanted 
to present freedom as the opposite of the religious impulse and sentence religion 
to the margins of society as the source of “divisiveness,” especially within the realm 
of politics.136 Liberty must be understood as non-religious, even anti-religious.137
The Court’s historical understanding of church/state separation also suffered 
from the same limitations, displaying little understanding of the broad history 
and problems of the doctrine. Typically, the Court centered its historical analysis 
upon Jefferson and Madison as the “architects of the First Amendment”—the 
only Founding Fathers who held to the strict doctrine.138 It ignored the anti- 
Semitic/anti-Christian motives behind Jefferson’s position, the inconsistent politi-
cal careers of both Virginians in patronizing the majority’s religious sensibilities,139 
and preferred to select and cite works like Madison’s “Detached Memoranda” that 
“proved” their strict position. In all this, the Court failed to acknowledge any dark 
side to the doctrine of church/state separation. It preferred to think of persecution 
as a religious disease but failed to note twentieth-century regimes like the Nazis 
and Communists, who also erected the same French concept of absolute separa-
tion in an attempt to destroy the church and slaughtered tens of millions of people 
in the name of developing an a-theistic, secular state.140 Most members followed 
the same doctrine of secularization (laïcité) as these regimes. They did so in a 
more passive way, performing a “quiet euthanasia,” without resorting to militant 
atheistic propaganda in state-sponsored institutions, or inviting a reaction. They 
tried to distance their policy from the Nazis and Communists, but the net effect 
of refusing to represent religion in the burgeoning power of the state and denying 
its positive social influence is not much different in the long run. (The French 
idea was originally conceived as a means of forging a fraternité of citizens as an 
alternative to the body of Christ. The French Revolution denuded the culture 
of all Christian symbols and exchanged them for a new secular identity under 
the cocarde tricolore of the nation-state. In a most telling moment, Abbé Grégoire 
and the National Assembly offered the Jewish people citizenship as long as they 
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underwent a process of régénération, or leave their distinctive religious community 
behind and adopt French ways and customs.141 The process certainly worked as 
Jews became a secular people after this time. The Third Republic made the process 
of secularization (laïcité) and the “Separation of the Churches and the State” the 
official modus operandi of the state at the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth century, and the French people were transformed through this 
process into secular subjects of the state, just like the Jewish people.142)
The Court engaged in a great deal of double-talk about its role in the secular-
ization of the culture,143 but it clearly endorsed a secular message and picked the 
secular side of the cultural war.144 Occasionally, it ran into a political hot potato 
and found it necessary to retreat from the basic agenda. For example, the Court 
engaged in political calculations by refusing to eliminate the Pledge of Allegiance 
from the public schools. It certainly knew that this devotional exercise was much 
more coercive than public prayer as it invited the audience to participate with their 
hands over their hearts, their eyes wide open, and their mouths confessing sacred 
words, binding the people to the nation, not just asking them to stand and listen.145 
This oath (Lat. sacramentum) was intended to bind the audience’s allegiance to the 
state and confess the unity of the nation in serving the will of God. The phrase 
“under God” was added to the pledge during the Eisenhower administration in a 
deliberate and clear attempt to withstand the godless etatism of the Communists, 
but the Court found it difficult to expunge a direct violation of its strict interpreta-
tion, given the power of the civil religion and the basic desire to promote devotion 
to the state. Justice William Brennan attempted to reconcile the pledge with the 
secular establishment by claiming that the oath served a secular purpose and the 
phrase “under God” had lost all “religious significance” through “rote repetition.” 
He suggested that the public schools substitute the pledge, patriotic material, and 
a catechism on national values for the former devotional exercises in the Bible 
and prayer.146 His suggestion worked within the basic schema of the French Rev-
olution and the Third Republic by wanting the secular state to use its power and 
replace the former devotion to God with the new religion on the block—etatism. 
The American Civil Liberties Union
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) became the principal group that 
sponsored the separation of church and state in the courts during the twentieth 
century, beginning with the famous “Monkey Trial” in the summer of 1925. The 
group was founded just a few years earlier in January of 1920 and has grown into 
a formidable force ever since, boasting over 500,000 members, 200 staff attorneys, 
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hundreds of local chapters, and thousands of volunteers on its latest website. The 
group started as the brainchild of one man, Roger Baldwin, who grew up in a Uni-
tarian family within the inner circle of Boston and attended Harvard University, 
where he received a B.A. and M.A. in Social Science and then began a career in 
social work.147 He developed into a social activist during World War I, working 
with the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) in the spring of 1917 and 
forming his own group, the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB), in the fall 
of that year to fight against the war and defend the rights of protestors.148 Baldwin 
rejected the use of force to resolve conflicts and was sentenced to a year in prison 
for resisting the draft and rejecting any form of alternative service as a consistent 
pacifist, who refused to aid and abet the war effort in any way.149 
After the war, he decided to expand the scope of his activities beyond the basic 
mission of the NCLB and formed the ACLU to protect the civil liberties of all 
citizens, although his concept of civil rights was marked by a social conscious that 
gravitated toward left-wing political interests. The ACLU particularly focused in 
its early days upon the “rights” of workers to form unions.150 Baldwin became an 
influential player in some left-wing groups that had strong ties with Communism 
in America and Russia and even served on the board of the Kuzbas Industrial 
Colony, which tried to plant collective communities in the Urals.151 In the 1920s 
and 1930s, he described his political views as “anti-capitalist and pro-revolution-
ary,” sympathetic to the “economic system being worked out in Soviet Russia,” 
where “civil liberties [are] far greater than elsewhere in the world,” and wrote a 
book, Liberty Under the Soviets, defending the repressive measures of the Soviet 
Union as “weapons of struggle in a transition period to socialism.”152 Even though 
Baldwin never joined the Communist party, two original members of the ACLU, 
William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, actually served later on as chairs 
of the party;153 and the government found it necessary to raid the offices of the 
ACLU periodically over concerns about subversive Communist activities. Because 
of this, the ACLU found it necessary to moderate its public image during the 
heights of the Red Scare, rejecting open communists from joining the group and 
serving on the board.154 
The connection with left-wing political goals engendered a tension within 
the purposes of the ACLU. The group took a leading role throughout its history 
in defending the cause of freedom and individual liberty, and yet often worked 
at cross-purposes in expanding the role of the federal government and reducing 
the space in which the exercise of liberty can operate.155 Under the Free Exercise 
Clause, the ACLU defended the rights of non-traditional groups to practice their 
peculiar religious faith against the tyranny of the majority, earning considerable 
praise from those who champion religious liberty.156 Under the Establishment 
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Clause, the ACLU tried to establish an “a-theocracy,” or its belief in secularity as 
the ideology of the American people by cleansing the government of all religion, 
using the public school system to inculcate its beliefs in secularity, and denying 
any modicum of representation to religious ideas and symbols in the public arena. 
It interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting the public endorsement of a 
religious viewpoint and establishing secularity as the modus operandi of the gov-
ernment. Public values, symbols, rituals, and access must be reserved as a forum for 
representing secular people and their ideas.157 
The doctrine of church/state separation became the fundamental means 
used by secular people in the modern world to refashion society into their image. 
The doctrine was designed during the times of the Reformation to protect the 
church from the corrupting powers of the state, but the French Enlightenment 
turned the doctrine around and used it to marginate the power of the church, 
eliminate its place in society, and create another version of life in its stead. This 
motive prompted Jefferson to erect a wall of separation between the two realms 
and use public education to forward his anti-Christian agenda. He and Madison 
were unable to eliminate the presence of the church in the federal, state, and local 
governments during their lifetime, but sympathetic jurists found it possible to res-
urrect this conception years later and “reinterpret” the words of the Constitution 
to align with the doctrine of the Enlightenment and their own secular, deistic, or 
a-theistic point of view. Today, secular groups like the ACLU represent this new 
interpretation of the Court in a most severe and draconian manner. They might 
work to defend individual liberties for those who live on the margins of society, but 
they also work to eliminate the space where those liberties function by consigning 
more and more power to the state in advancing a left-wing agenda. Christians 
tend to accept the role of the government in secularizing society, offering little 
resistance and preferring the NT’s image of the church as a remnant in this world. 
Muslims have no tradition of church/state separation and fight the introduction of 
this process of secularization in the Middle East, committing horrible acts of bru-
tality in an attempt to protect their religious traditions and culture. The terrorists 
and the many who sympathize with their cause do not want the “Great Satan” to 
destroy the central place of the Mosque as it destroyed the role of its own church 
in western civilization.158 
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the czar, despite the fact that the czar was for religion and the Soviets are against it. 
Freedom for anti-religion is naturally much greater than anywhere else in the world, 
since it is officially encouraged and directed as part of the Communist program—
although it is still a weak force except as it opposes scientific agriculture to peasant 
superstition.
The sectarians, evangelicals, and non-Christian oriental religions enjoy about as 
much freedom as in other countries, and more than in most with a state church. The 
old Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches alone suffered severe restrictions, pri-
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  Baldwin endorses the Soviet doctrine of “complete separation of church and state,” hoping 
to eliminate the influence of the church as an effective force in society and endorse his own 
social “scientific” viewpoint through the power of an expanding state. Ibid., 91, 97.
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certainly says a number of disturbing things that remain worthy of condemnation from a 
western viewpoint, but it is not as if everything he says is false. Unfortunately, westerners 
spend too much time speculating over the motives of the jihadists rather than reading 
their actual words. Most people prefer to condemn rather than understand their enemies; 
Understanding them would mean “blaming the victim” or mitigating the responsibility 
of their enemies, who must be condemned as evil. This attitude makes issues difficult to 
resolve.

The problem with any strict doctrine of church/state separation is the failure to 
understand how religion tends to permeate all levels of society. Its influence is felt 
within a wide range of institutions, inspiring its rituals from birth to death, pro-
moting certain types of behavior and actions, while condemning others as unac-
ceptable.1 Its ideas are integrated within the forces of life and often served as a 
necessary and critical part of the past when evolving modern beliefs and practices, 
making it difficult to label current institutions as secular or sacred and creating a 
coherent division between the two realms. Often those who label certain aspects 
of life as secular are presenting little more than an argument from ignorance (argu-
mentum ex ignorantia) by failing to acknowledge or find any connection with reli-
gion in certain areas of interest due to their inability or unwillingness to discern 
it. Any argument from ignorance fails to account for the possibility of future his-
torical or philosophical insight into the nature of things and discovering what was 
missing. Religious apologists made this same mistake in the past when insert-
ing God into the gaps of their scientific knowledge to explain the inexplicable in 
the universe, but the modern theological community showed the basic fallacy of 
this approach and now tends to abandon the argument from silence for the most 
part.2 This type of argument is no longer considered valid among modern religious 
thinkers, and its secular counterpart is no different and must be rejected similarly. 
Ignorance never serves as a sufficient reason for proving much of anything. 
Postscript
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Those who believe in God tend to see God everywhere through the eyes of 
faith. They do not discover the presence of God dwelling in an isolated corner of 
the universe or existing within certain gaps of our scientific knowledge, but think 
of God as an omnipotent and omnipresent force who exceeds all possible limita-
tions in ruling the entire universe. Their faith beholds the presence of God in all 
dimensions of life, from the depths of Sheol to the farthest reaches of the heav-
ens, from the innermost recesses of the heart to the outward affairs of everyday 
business at the city gates (Pss 24:1, 7; 139; Is 66:1). George Hegel viewed reality 
as the external expression of the divine Spirit and found the relationship growing 
more intimate through the historical process of reconciling divine subjectivity and 
objectivity into an ultimate unity.3 Ralph Waldo Emerson found revelation within 
the everyday occurrences of life. He thought the world develops from a transcen-
dental center of spiritual life and exemplifies its origin like a parable or metaphor, 
inviting the pilgrim to soar beyond the external scientific surface and develop a 
metaphysical eye in searching for its ultimate meaning.4 Paul Tillich thought of 
God as the ground of all being, providing the ultimate justification of life or depth 
of the human spirit. God is not a being alongside other beings as if circumscribed 
within a limited dimension of existence, but comprehends all things and defines 
their very being as esse ipsum, verum ipsum, and bonum ipsum.5 
Religion provides those who can believe in God with an answer to the heart-
felt need of most human beings in their quest for some sense of value and meaning 
in life. A simple scientific description finds no real imperative to change the way 
things happen to exist in the world. It provides no real standard of perfection to 
distinguish between what happens to occur in the natural course of events and 
what “ought” to transpire in creating a better world from an ideal point of view.6 
In recognizing the dichotomy, many people have found it necessary to look beyond 
the phenomenal world and the many secular ways to describe it and find a firm 
foundation for their society and its norms within some ideal ontic dimension. 
The Hammurabi Law Code and the Hebrew Torah represent the most famous 
examples of this longing by looking to the revelation of the divine will in founding 
the laws of their people. The western philosophical tradition contains the same 
longing for a metaphysical basis of society, reaching back to the Graeco-Roman 
world and extending to modern times via the Middle Ages. Plato thought of an 
ideal realm existing apart from the sensible world as embodying universal con-
cepts. He particularly related the ideal good to the existence of an ultimate or 
supreme form to provide ethical statements with some transcendental and ontic 
dimension.7 Cicero followed the Platonic tradition and spoke of a natural law that 
first develops out of the mind of God and provides the basis of justice in all of the 
society.8 Christians carried on the tradition of natural law and deconstructed it in 
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the Middle Ages through the work of William Ockham and the Decretalists into 
the modern concept of natural rights.9 John Locke made these divine rights the 
basis of good government and influenced the Founding Fathers of America, who 
constantly refer to the importance of religion in providing a basis for the moral life 
and justification for the social order.10 
The nineteenth century ushered in a more skeptical era with many philoso-
phers expressing doubt about the existence of God and placing the former empha-
sis on the moral life under serious question.11 The skepticism of the academy was 
burgeoning during the era and reached a fervid pitch in the writings of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who provided the most scintillating presentation of its brutal logic as 
the manifestation of the “Antichrist,” but only to reel from the utter darkness of 
the position in the end. In his work, Nietzsche announces on behalf of the acad-
emy that “God is dead,” even if it takes some time for the multitudes to receive 
the news and accept the full ramifications of the new reality.12 At first, Nietzsche 
tries his best to accept the verdict and offers a consistent anti-metaphysical con-
fession, which finds no goal or meaning in life and dispenses with the presence 
of a moral conscience as the remnant of the old theistic point of view, wanting 
the Übermenschen to live “beyond good and evil” and question the “value of moral 
values.”13 However, his “revaluation of values” soon reverses its course and decides 
to offer a new moral truth to replace the old religious values, rather than dispense 
with moral categories once and for all.14 Derrida says that Nietzsche destroys all 
metaphysical truth, then forgets what he says or erases the previous comments so 
that he can speak the truth once again with great boldness.15 This inconsistency 
gives rise to the type of multiple readings associated with Derrida’s approach to 
the reading of a text, but it also reveals a human problem or weakness that prefers 
to remain inconsistent and reel from the utter darkness of a meaningless existence 
than face all the brute logic of an atheistic point of view. 
The modern world is caught between its head and its heart. The reasons for 
unbelief appear much more serious than the possibility of faith, given the clear 
limits of philosophical inquiry in addressing metaphysical concerns, the plausibil-
ity of finding any historical truth in many biblical stories, the power of alternative 
explanations in fields like science and economics, and the growth of technology 
replacing former spiritual resources. For these and many other reasons, it appears 
as if the process of secularization is gaining momentum and sure to overwhelm 
the religious community if the trend continues in its present direction, with no 
sign or prospect of significant reversal. And yet, religion has a way of hanging 
around as an indispensable element in addressing the basic needs of the human 
heart, which remain unfulfilled in the secular world of instrumentality, or treating 
human beings as a means without ends, only leaving one to wonder, “Is that all 
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there is?”16 Faith wants to believe too much and prefers to reject the limitations of 
a secular answer. It would rather be wrong with those who accept the possibility of 
meaning in life and the hope of immortality than sink into the secular abyss with 
the boast of being right about the utter futility of one’s existence. It would rather 
cling to the words of Jesus and the promise of eternal life than give up all hope and 
follow the path of oblivion ( Jn 6:60, 66–68). It rejects the secular answer because 
it refuses to entrust its soul to the natural course of events or follow the path of 
rational expectation toward the inevitable conclusion. It refuses to limit its hope to 
the principalities and powers of this world as if dwelling in a self-contained system 
of cause and effect, preferring to look beyond these forces to the apocalyptic and 
catastrophic activity of God making all things new. It sees real possibility within 
the future activity of a God who can contradict the present course of things with 
supernatural power, pronouncing the poor blessed and giving hope to the hopeless 
through a simple word of promise. It has no reason to believe that the promise 
will find fulfillment, given the present state of affairs and its natural course, and 
no expectation that the process of secularization will change in any significant way 
since faith is never able to capture God dwelling in the present through a direct 
vision and prove its point.17 It must rest content in the promise and continue to 
believe despite all the evidence to the contrary—“in hope against hope” (Rom 
4:18). 
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